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Introduction  
How are the countries in Central Europe doing two decades since the fall of communism? 
Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary are four countries that immediately after 1989 
began processes of democratization and the development of a market economy. The countries 
had a difficult and long way to go - big changes had to be made in their societies.  
Membership in both NATO and EU was definitely a milestone, a long process since the 
beginning of the 1990s that lasted until 2004, was finally over.  Today it is definitely 
interesting to compare them. After all, they did not entirely follow each other along the same 
path. And although the transformation in many ways has been completed, there are still some 
critical issues left that will have to be worked out, which means that they are still far away 
from the end of their “journey”. For instance, improvements when it comes to governance, 
and to make up for the economic growth, are just some of those critical things which have 
been on the agenda since 1989. 
I have considered the studies made by Nations in Transit, which is a comprehensive, 
comparative and multidimensional study of reform, in former communist countries, in Europe 
and Eurasia. This study tracks the reform record among these countries. By this study, we are 
capable of taking a closer look on how these countries, and their societies, are functioning, 
and how they have developed ever since the first years after communism, until today. While 
studying, and comparing the countries in the northern tier of Central Europe, we can see that 
some areas are improving, while some others are going quite unsteadily and have gotten 
somewhat worse. To be more specific, we can see that the scores for the independent media 
have gotten worse in Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia since 2002, while scores 
for national democratic governance have gotten worse in all the countries since 2002, while in 
Hungary, it first improved, before it got worse in the last few years. Judicial framework and 
independence have become worse in Poland and Slovakia, but have somewhat improved in 
the Czech Republic. In Hungary, scores in this area have become worse since 2010, after 
improving from 2002. Last but not least, the level of corruption has gotten worse since in 
Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia since 2002, while in the Czech Republic it had a small 
improvement since 2002, but it has basically the same score as the others.  
Based on these results, it seems that corruption, judicial independence, media 
independence and national governance remain issues in the countries in the northern tier of 
Central Europe. Why is that? And couldn’t we expect that these issues would have become 
better before and even after they became EU-members? What is going on in these societies 
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that can explain their possible unsteady progress in these areas – what can be said to be 
holding them back? Can we find common or different explanations for it? With this in mind, I 
want to highlight the following question or puzzle: What explains the unsteady progress in 
some certain areas of the reform process in Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary? 
 This puzzle is both interesting and important to ask. Firstly: it might give us an 
impression of how well these post communist countries are doing and functioning today. 
Second: it can give us an answer of how successful their earlier choices, and shaping of 
society after communism have been, ever since these choices were made. Thirdly: if their 
progress, unsteady, steady or worse, can be explained by the same or different factors. One 
basic point, as that we can be able to track down post communist difficulties, which might be 
general issues that countries with their former background and history, must be dealing with 
for a long time to come. Especially the recent development in Hungary since the 2010 
election is particularly interesting, and rather dramatic. 
 The Nation in Transit data will not be given a strong weight in my thesis, apart from the 
fact that the data generated by Freedom House, with the pattern I have found among four of 
their annually measured variables, constitute the starting point for my analysis: unsteady 
process. The background for these variables' ratings will also be used in the theory- and 
analyze section, to contribute explaining their possible unsteady process, or the risk for it, or 
even the risk for democratic backslide. The thesis focuses primarily on the post-communist 
era (i.e., post-1989), although there will be some reference also to pre-communist and 
communist times.   This thesis is a most-similar cases design, in which I will compare rather 
similar cases, which only differs on the dependent variable(s), and differences on the 
dependent variables are expected. 
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1.0 Justifying and explaining the measures in Nations in Transit  
 
 My thesis focuses on unsteady process (or progress). Insofar as Nations in Transit tracks the 
reform record in former communist countries, I have considered their scores in Nations in 
Transit even further back - since 1997, and I find a pattern (though not a very strong one, 
because of some lack of data) that their process was going rather steady, and improved in 
most areas between 1989 and the late 1990s. I will not focus on Nations in Transit from this 
period however, but the point is: this was perhaps something one could expect, based on the 
fact that one of their biggest goals after transition was to join the EU, while building up their 
societies after 40 years of communism. But a short time after the millennium, according to 
Nations in Transit, some certain areas have gotten worse, which we might consider as rather 
surprising. In other areas which Nations in Transit also measures, like electoral process, and 
civil society on the other hand, the process has been steady in all these countries (except for in 
Hungary). Those areas will not be discussed here, I will focus on those four areas all of these 
countries seem to struggle with. 
 
Table 1.0 Their scores in Nations in Transit 2002-2011 
 
 
(These scores are measured by certain criteria’s set by Nations in Transit, each year, and reflects the consensus of Freedom House, it’s academic advisers and the author(s) of the reports, 
with ratings based on a scale from 1-7m where 1 is the highest level of democratic progress). (Freedom House 2011 1: Democracy Scores). 
 
Above, I have listed up the scores for the 4 different areas of the reform process. How Nations 
in Transit rate and measure these sides of the reform process can be viewed in Appendix 1.  
Independent Media 
  Year             2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Czech R.          2.50  2.25  2.25  2.00  2.00  2.25 2.25  2.25  2.50  2.50 
Poland              1.50  1.75  1.75 1.50   1.75  2.25 2.25  2.00  2.25 2.25 
Slovakia           2.00  2.00  2.25  2.25  2.25  2.25 2.50   2.75 3.00 3.00 
Hungary           2.25  2.25  2.25  2.50  2.50  2.50 2.50   2.50 2.75 3.25 
National Democratic Governance 
 Year            2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Czech R .      2.25  2.25  2.25  2.50 2.50   3.00  2.75  2.75   2.75  2.75 
Poland           2.00 2.00   2.00 2.50  2.75  3.25   3.50  3.25   3.25 2.75 
Slovakia        2.25 2.25   2.25  2.00 2.00  2.25   2.50   2.75  3.00  2.75 
Hungary         n/a    n/a    n/a   2.00 2.00  2.25   2.25   2.50  2.50  3.00 
Corruption 
 Year             2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Czech R.        3.75  3.50  3.50   3.50 3.50  3.50  3.25  3.25 3.25  3.25 
Poland            2.25 2.50  2.50  3.00  3.25 3.00   3.00  2.75  3.25 3.25 
Slovakia         3.25 3.25  3.25  3.00  3.00  3.25  3.25  3.25  3.75  3.50 
Hungary         3.00 2.75  2.75  2.75  3.00  3.00  3.00  3.25  3.50  3.50 
Judicial Framework and Independence 
 Year           2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Czech R.      2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.25  2.00  2.00  2.25  2.00  2.00 
Poland         1.50  1.50   1.50  2.00  2.25  2.25  2.50 2.25   2.50 2.50 
Slovakia      2.00  2.00   2.00  2.00  2.00  2.25  2.50  2.75  3.00  2.75 
Hungary      2.00  1.75   1.75  1.75  1.75  1.75  1.75  1.75  2.00  2.25 
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Why be bothered?  
 
Why should we be bothered about these sides of their democratic process? Let’s start with 
corruption; here I have chosen first to use a quotation which I believe hit the spot pretty well:  
 
"Not only does corruption point society in the wrong direction, but it also exhausts 
Governmental legitimacy, supports the wrong kind of public leadership, and sets the 
wrong kind of example for future generations. It contaminates.(…) Corruption 
undermines political decisions, leads to inefficient use of resources and benefits the 
unscrupulous.(…) Corruption involves the loss of moral authority, weakens the 
efficiency of government operations, increases opportunities for organized crime, adds 
to taxpayers 'burdens. (…) It is something everybody pays for at huge cost. (…) And it 
allows immunity for criminal acts."(UNDP 2002:29). 
All these issues endanger the foundations of emerging democracies, governance practices 
and economies, in transition.  EU’s Strategy Paper (2002) describes corruption as a serious 
concern in Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, and remains a concern in Hungary. 
Although a comprehensive strategy has been adopted to deal with the problem, the concrete 
results have been so far limited – and in particular to build a political, administrative and 
business culture which can resist it. The EU asserted then, that corruption “threatens to 
undermine the functioning of many public spheres (McManus Czubinska et al 2004: 107). I 
would argue that the extent of corruption shows a deficit in democratic governance. We can 
see from the measures according to Nations in Transit that this problem has gotten worse in 
Hungary, Slovakia and Poland since 2002, and remained a major problem in the Czech 
Republic. Why corruption is still such a major issue in all these countries, even though they 
have gone through the preparations (acquis communautaire) for EU-membership, and 
eventually became full members, demands an explanation. We can definitely claim that this is 
holding their societies more backwards, and it is important to consider the causes of it, and 
look at what that has been done so far.  
The rating for national governance has become worse since 2002 in all the countries. It is 
well known that state capacity and its institutional effectiveness in the regions are rather 
weak, if we compare them with their Western counterparts. I believe the reasons for weak 
national governance will be very important to analyze deeply, because I believe strongly that 
it has an important connection to the problems in the three other areas - why corruption still is 
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a problem, and independence of media and judicial framework.  Weak governance has been 
explained as the main obstacle to both economic development, and the legitimacy of 
democratic government, where corruption has been indicated as its worst consequence (Surdej 
2005:5). In Hungary, with the new Fidesz government that came to power in 2010, a series of 
steps have been taken, which have resulted in a serious backslide in its democratic 
development (Kovács & Hevesi 2011:237).  
Juridical framework and independence have developed somewhat better in the Czech 
Republic, while in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia they have gotten worse since 2002. The 
juridical framework and its independence are important. According to Christopher Walker’s 
book, The Perpetual Battle – Corruption in the Former Soviet Union and the New EU 
Members, corruption has persisted at a high level in the new EU-states, and in Central Europe, 
despite the improved environments for the media and civil society, in large part to stubborn 
problems with the judiciary. Some EU states have made progress on judicial reforms over the 
past decade, but cases of alleged corruption by senior officials, once exposed, rarely end with 
guilty verdicts and meaningful punishments (Walker 2011:13). In Hungary, several steps have 
been taken recently to weaken the courts, while the Hungarian government has struggled 
earlier with lack of transparency and accountability (Kovács & Hevesi 2011:238). 
The media play an important role to inform the citizens of a state, and in that way, they 
are important to monitor how democracy is working (even though they can be viewed as a 
profit generating business). Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the independent media 
were repeatedly challenged in all countries in Central Europe. Practically all of the new 
political elites have exerted pressure on the media, and have sought to impose their line, and 
suppress critical voices (Hume 2011:13). The development of the free and independent media 
in Central Europe is definitely important, and has contributed to growing awareness of for 
instance the pervasiveness of corruption. Without independence, the media will be more 
influenced by political considerations of who supports whom, rather than solid facts and 
arguments. Political control of the independent media constitutes an enormous potential for 
corruption and rent seeking (Lizal & Kočenda: 20). Recently in Hungary, the government has 
drastically reduced the independence of the media, which can be considered highly 
problematic. The new media legislation which presented fundamental reforms has raised 
serious concern. It drastically reduced the independence of public-service television and radio 
broadcasting, and even established a new regulatory system with stronger authority over 
broadcast media, printed publications, even the internet (Kovacs & Hevesi 2011:238). For 
instance, in December 2011, this Hungarian Media Council shut down one of the few 
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remaining independent radio stations (KlubRadio) (Freedom House 2011 2). These all 
involved changes, reflected in the new Constitution which came into force from 1 January 
2012.  
 
So keeping in mind my thesis, what is holding these countries back? And what is the reason 
for Hungary’s recently backsliding, to a situation that seems similar to pre 1989, and where 
the situation is perhaps even more dramatic than in the other countries? To manage to find 
explanations for this puzzle, we first need some theories that can lead us on the way, and to be 
able to find patterns. When I have gone through these theories, I will continue explain the 
choice of method, and why I have chosen to compare these four countries in the first place. 
Then I’ll go into the analysis part – where I will test and compare each of the countries on my 
theories, to find explanatory patterns, and similarities and differences. The EU’s role upon 
these countries will also, in the end, be discussed, before I will reach a conclusion based on 
my findings.  
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2.0 Theories- what might explain their unsteady progress in these certain areas? 
In this section, I will go through possible theories explaining the dependent variable. In the 
end I should have at least 4 theories with which to work, and test upon the four countries. I 
will also make a hypothesis for each theory that can be confirmed or rejected after my 
analysis.  
History and communist legacy 
 
From to Jeffrey Kopstein’s article, “Post Communist Democracy – Legacies and Outcomes”, 
I find one possible explanation – and that is history and culture: “The region's sham 
democracies and outright dictatorships, widespread rural poverty, and comically corrupt 
bureaucracies all lent credence to the well-established belief that there was something 
different about the lands east of the Elbe river and in the Danubian basin that made them pale 
imitations of real democracies and advanced economies. They were simply not "European"” 
(2003:246). Communism in itself also did a great deal of developmental damage in these 
countries, and several institutions have been difficult to reform. Most civil societies (which is 
my next theory) in the region can also be characterized by a lack of respect for the law which 
has been inherited from centuries of foreign occupation or domination. Previous and current 
economic complexities, with traditional clan structures can have contributed to the perception 
that “corruption is a daily fact of life from which everybody benefits, and in that case, it is not 
a crime, as there are no victims” (UNDP 2002:7) Furthermore, according to UNDP (2002), 
the main reason for the lack of success in anti corruption work, are the lack of political will, 
lack of knowledge and experience, weak institutions, lack of coordination and cooperation 
with civil society. Karl Kaser describes the state capacity and its institutional effectiveness in 
the region as weak, compared to those in Western Europe. This is also described to have 
historical roots. The emerging Western type of state has been able to set rules and execute 
them, but the Eastern states lack the power in the form of institutional penetration to fully 
execute its laws (Kaser 2010:95). I would suggest that this is also strongly explained by 
legacies.  
Michael Minkenberg is among those who have written about the pre-1989 legacies and 
the radical right in post-1989 Central and Eastern Europe. His thoughts go into the theory that 
the radical right in the region is a phenomenon inherently shaped by the historical forces of 
state socialism, the transformation process, and in contrast to those parties in Western Europe, 
most extreme ideologically and anti-democratic (Minkenberg 2009:445). I would suggest that 
Map of Central Europe, is taken from 
Europetravel.com. The four countries 
are marked in blue. 
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it might even be described as a pre-communist phenomenon also. Some of these parties’ 
leaders are atavistic and highly nationalistic; that is especially the recent case with Jobbik in 
Hungary. Lenka Bustikova and Herbert Kitschfelt also find that highly polarized patrimonial 
regimes are the most fertile ground for the radical right, due to high level of inequality and 
dissatisfaction resulting from a dismantling of the welfare state (Bustikova et al 2009:459). 
Legacy, they say, is static, and changes slowly, if at all. It even casts a shadow over dynamic 
processes; such as democratization and the transition to market economies (Bustikova et al. 
2009:481). How have right-wing parties affected these countries and what might that affection 
be an indication of? The radical right party in Poland, the LPR (League of Polish Families), 
was founded in 2001 as a merger of several small right-parties - several of them were radical 
nationalists. The LPR was also the only Polish party to be against EU-membership, and was 
in government with the two parties PiS (Law and Justice) and Samoobrona in 2006-2007 
(Holm-Hansen 2008:322). This party has since that election not been relevant, however 
(World Election 2011). The Republican Party of Czechoslovakia was a radical right populist 
party in Czech Republic that was represented in government in 1992 and 1998, before it 
declined and lost support, and eventually fragmented. Since then, radical right forces have not 
been capable of uniting, and despite proactive burst and high profile, they have remained 
electorally and politically marginal (Hanley 2010: 2). In Slovakia, on the other hand, we find 
the Slovak National party. This party has won seats in every election since 1990 (except for 
2002), and is described as ultra-nationalist, right-wing (Harris 2010:186-7).  In Hungary, it is 
perhaps even more interesting, considering the recent influence of the right wing nationalist 
Jobbik, which is known for its marches, nazi-like symbols and its hatred of Jews and gypsies, 
as well as its support for Hungarian minorities in the region. According to Jobbik’s member in 
Parliament, Gábor Staud, the Hungarian society never accepted the consequences of the 
Trianon Treaty of 1920, where Hungary was left with 37 percent of its prewar population, and 
28 percent of its prewar territory, and a third of all the Margyar’s were turned over to foreign 
rule (hungarianambiance 2011, Pauley 1972:88). Right-wing parties tend to be nationalistic 
and anti-democratic- and are challenging the state of affairs. 
Populist parties have also influenced all of these countries. One theory is that they also 
manage to attract voters in difficult times, or in the intoxication of disappointment of the 
transition, and that doesn’t seem to make these countries’ progress any steadier. The influence 
all such parties have had in the four countries is something that should not be overlooked; 
they do seem to be partly explained by historical legacies, which might be capable of 
affecting politics inside consolidated democracies. In several countries of Central and East 
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Europe, populist parties have scored surprisingly significant successes in the last couple of 
years (Mareš 2011:283).  It is important to emphasize that not all such populist parties are 
anti-democratic, but the most extreme (and therefore as well as problematic) populist parties 
often tend to press for radical reforms, challenging the state of affairs, and pose a threat to 
constitutionalism, in the sense that they put pressure on constitutional checks and balances 
(Akkerman 2003:150).  
The reason for the problem with media’s “lack” of independence remains rather 
confusing. I also believe that it can have a connection to their common communist past and to 
something that hides behind the scenes. Ellen Hume believes that the economic crisis in 2008, 
revealed fragility in democratic institutions, and gave a political setback against democratic 
reforms in 1990 (Hume 2011:14). In that case, it is the same theory as I mentioned above – 
communist legacy. The new media law in Hungary for instance, has been described as a 
phenomenon not seen in Central Europe since the collapse of communist rule, and the new 
government has established a strong one-party control over public and private media (Hume 
2011:37). According to Péter Molnár, a liberal member of the first post-communist Hungarian 
Parliament, cultural factors might have stunted necessary changes after 1989. There was a less 
turnover in people and policies, he says, compared to for instance the Czech Republic. More 
people collaborated with communism, because it was “softer” in Hungary (Molnár, as cited in 
Hume 2011:42).  
So the first theory is legacy. Developmental damage, lack of institutional effectiveness, 
and weak state capacity may also be explained this legacy, and I would assume that this is a 
factor which is holding certain reform process areas unsteady, or weaker. I also consider the 
lack of political will to be a part of it this theory, because of the unresponsiveness the political 
rulers had during the communist phase, and it might continue to have influence at the political 
arena today. Economy and economic development are also an important part of legacies, I 
will argue. I will try to avoid going further back into history than necessary - then it might 
become more complicated than it should be, and even though Czechoslovakia has a longer 
and wider democratic history than Poland and Hungary, we can see that the Czech Republic 
(and Slovakia), seem to be basically struggling with the same issues. That might be a proof 
that the longer democratic tradition in Czechoslovakia isn’t necessarily an important factor.  
In the end, I support my first theory by referring to Vachudova’s study of trajectories in 
post-communist states, which is a part of a literature in comparative politics; that study argues 
that the most important factor shaping the political and economic trajectories of former East 
European post communist states, is the legacies of the past (Vachudova 2005:21), and I 
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consider this to be a very strong theory. These are all legacies which might affect the 
countries progress today. Vachudova (2005:21) claims that important legacies include 
political traditions and economic development before communism, as well as during 
communism. If we compare possible relevant historical tendencies, Czechoslovakia is, for 
instance, not a striking example of native fascism in interwar Eastern Europe. The Sudeten 
fascism, which emerged in the country, appears not to be more than a “replica” and an agent, 
of the Nazi movement across the frontier, according to Joseph Zacek. The Slovak autonomists 
and separatists inside Czechoslovakia were often called “clerico-fascist”, at least after 1939. 
In other words, the country was not entirely immune to the Fascist appeal, however, the 
appeal of fascism was rather weak (Zacek 1971: 56-7). Hungary, historically, has been 
affected by anti-democratic movements, such as fascism and Nazism. For instance, the 
influence of the nazi movement reached its highest in the end of the 1930s, and the movement 
did not continue to grow, partly because of the fascistic tendencies in the government, which 
divided social support of this fascist faction (Ranki 1971:71). In the interwar period, fascism 
was not particularly important in Poland. At least numerically, it could not compare with even 
lesser political parties in the country, and it had no mass following. However, there were more 
traces of anti-Semitism (Wandycz 1971:97).  
 
H
1
 The shadows of the past (historical and communist legacies) is a strong indicator, 
explaining their potential risk for unsteady democratic progress, or backslide. 
Strength of civil society 
 
Some of the challenges after Communism were to develop liberal democratic institutions, 
market economy, and not least a civil society. "Uncivil society" and weak government 
commitment are generally viewed as key causes of the limited success in anti-corruption 
efforts to date (UNDP 2002:4, 7). Civil society has a role to play in holding the governments 
accountable, and what may be said of most civil societies in the region, is that they have a 
weaker tradition of self-organization and participation in governance processes. Government 
officials understand well the opportunities to use their positions for private gain, particularly 
in the context of transition, with all the constant changes, unclear divisions of responsibilities, 
and gaps in the legal system (UNDP 2002:7) After 1989 a strong civil society was, at least in 
the literature, meant as the ideal way to dislodge corrupt and incompetent governments, to 
fortify civil liberties, and human rights, to promote good governance and economic 
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prosperity. That could ensure the stability of democracy (Mungiu-Pippidi 2010:5). Just as 
social accountability is defined in the World Bank as an approach that relies much on civic 
engagements, which means a broad range of actions and mechanisms, that can be used by 
citizens, independent media, communities and civil society organizations, to hold officials and 
servants accountable. I expect this to be an important explanation regarding my thesis, 
because during communism, the growth of the civil society was stunted, people were taught to 
mistrust each other and to put their trust in the communist party. On the table below we can 
see the voting turnout in all four countries since the first election after communism. The 
turnout has been especially low in Poland, as we can see, while it has been declining quite a 
lot in the other two countries. In Hungary, on the other hand, the voting turnout has been 
remarkably stable. However, civil society there is also described as rather weak, judging by 
West European standards. It suffers from the same problem as other countries in the region, 
which means lack of broad membership base and funding limitations. At the turn of the 
century, for instance, as many as 75 percent of Hungarians did not belong to any civil society 
group and 86 percent did no voluntary work (Fazekas 2010:5).  
Figure 2.0 Voting turnout 
 
 
Poland is also an interesting puzzle, when discussing the communist era. Many Poles were 
engaged in building the elaborate organizational structures of the Solidarity movement in the 
1980s. As a matter of fact, 1/4 of the population were members of this movement, there was a 
large civic activity in the country at that time. There was also a strong activity in Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia as well, but not as powerful as in Poland (Ramet 2009:88). After the fall of 
communism, and the time after the first election, this situation has seemed to have changed in 
the countries, with declining voter turnout, and lack of engagement by the civil society. As 
Tworzecki points out, the forces behind civic engagement in the four rather new democracies, 
however complex, in the end turn out to be quite familiar. Although the northern tier states are 
regarded as cases of rapid and successful democratic consolidation, the same cannot be told 
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about their institutions of political representation (Tworzecki 2008:47, 58). But all post 
communistic societies will have special problems with the task of representation (Linz & 
Stepan 1996:269). 
Table 2.0 Strong v.s. weak civil society 
 Strong civil society Weak civil society 
Strong state Basis for responsive effective democracy Strong state autonomy, dangers of unresponsiveness, and 
potential for prerogative state power 
Weak state Overburdening strain on state capacities, 
ineffectiveness in responding to the demands of 
constituencies.  
Formless polity, ineffective and unresponsive state, high 
probability of regime breakdown 
Michael Bernhard (1996:19) has this table that can help us understanding the relationship between a weak/strong state and the strength of 
civil society.  
It can be explained by people’s expectations for the future, after the democratic 
transformation, that they became disappointed by the day-to-day reality (Sieminska 
2006:203). The main theory is that the lack of engagement by the civil society explains the 
possible lack of political will, and unresponsiveness, among the rulers.  
 
H
2
 The strength of their civil societies, is a strong indicator explaining their potential risk for 
unsteady democratic progress, or backslide.  
Patterns of transition 
 
After the end of communism, the countries went through a transition towards democracy and 
market economy, so that they could be capable of Europeanize themselves. One of the tasks 
was to deal with their communist past. And the dealing with the past, and the transition to 
democracy might be a very important variable, to explain their recent progress. Many critical 
choices were made during the transition and these choices are following them. If we compare 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, there is a difference, in the sense that in Poland and 
Hungary, there were negotiations in 1989, between the communists and the opposition. In 
Poland, one of the several claims the communists had, was the first election was to be “partly 
open”, which meant that many seats in the parliament would have to be reserved for the 
communists. In Hungary the transition was characterized by non-violence and round table 
talks between the communist in power, and the organizations of the emerging oppositions. 
There was also a genuine desire to reach consensus through negotiations. For Hungary, it was 
more about building democracy for the first time, opposition strategies were based on 
experience from historical processes and events (Bozóki & Simon 2010:209-10). The 
negotiations could take place, after learning from the similar situation in Poland. In 
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Czechoslovakia on the other hand, there was no strong reformist group in the communist 
party that might have eased the transition, by opening negotiations with the opposition before 
November 1989. At the same time, people in Czechoslovakia refused to forgive the 
communists, and wanted instead to seek punishment. Such punishment did not happen in 
Poland or Hungary (Moran 1994: 102-3). The now deceased president, Lech Kaczyński, 
argued that this lack of a more fundamental punishment for former communists, and the fact 
that many of them managed to keep their positions is the reason for Poland’s struggle with 
corruption and social difficulties, today (Holm-Hansen 2008:319). But this is false, since even 
the Czechs are struggling with corruption today. Besides, this theory assumes that only former 
communists have been corrupt, which is most unlikely. However, the post communist 
countries in Central Europe have dealt with their past in different ways.    
       The main point is this: Munck and Leff (1997:343) claim that transition, as a period of 
regime change is both formative and founding moments, because it sets a society on a path 
that shapes subsequent political developments. They define the mode of transition in terms of 
the identity of the actors who drive the transition process, and also the strategies they employ. 
They argue that these strategies and the modalities shape the new regime and politics, and this 
by affecting the elite competition, institutional rules, and disposition of key actors to accept or 
reject the new rules of the game. So not just by looking at the transition, but also by 
examining the institutional choices that were made and find the reasons for these choices can 
indeed be interesting, and this is my next theory.   
As I mentioned in the first theory, history and legacy, the rise of radical-right parties in 
the countries can also be explained by this process, following the dismantling of the Warsaw 
Pact, and the difficulties it created for these new-established societies, which gave an 
opportunity for a rise of right-wing tendencies. This might be even more relevant for Hungary 
and the rise of Jobbik, and support for populist Fidesz. Shocks from the transformation are 
mentioned as one factor that can explain the worsened conditions for the media’s 
independence. The peaceful transition from the communists looked to be an advantage at the 
time, but now, it might seem that not enough has changed. Some liberal intellectuals, like the 
communists before them, expected favorable coverage from the media when they took power 
(Hume 2011: 14), which one can assume is rather normal, but attempts to take control over 
the free press, do not signal a break with the past.  
Judicial framework and independence can be a result of the transition also, but according 
to Michal Bobek, it has more to do with the judicial mentality and self image. He points out 
that the Czech judiciary, with other Central European countries, still has a number of 
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transition problems (Bobek 2008:1). Since 1990, regulations since 1990 have allowed the old 
communist academic community to elect deans, who have largely protected the status quo, 
their own jobs, and incompetence, within the law faculty. This has had devastating effects on 
recruitment, and old unqualified professors remain on the job (Bobek 2008:6). It is surely also 
important if the countries have made the necessary reforms in the judiciary, since the 
transition began.  
Media ownership has a connection to the transition process too, like legacies. According 
to article 11, paragraph 2, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, “The 
freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected”. Council of Europe Recommendation 
No. R (99) recommends that “member states should consider the introduction of legislation 
designed to prevent or counteract concentration that might endanger media pluralism at the 
national, regional or local levels” (quoted in Hrvatin & Petković 2004:10-11).Media owners 
may in fact influence media content. Sandra B. Hrvatin and Brankica Petković have analyzed 
the media in different countries, including the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and 
Slovakia. They point out that media systems in the countries differ from one another; 
however, some trends are common to all;  so media concentration and  its impact on media 
pluralism, and independence need special attention, they claim (Hrvatin & Petković 2004:35). 
The same authors mention the possibility that there might be a lack of political will to 
transform the former-state run media into service media for the public. And when having in 
mind ownership, it might be that media firms are owned by people who are deeply involved 
with political power (Hume 2011:40). Konstanty Gerbert writes that even though the 
party/state media monopoly was broken up in the end of communism in Poland, the 
government to this day keeps 49 percent of shares of a major daily newspaper, and state 
broadcast media, especially TV, are totally subservient to whatever government is in power, 
making a mockery of their stated mission as public servants (Gerbert 2010:147).   
Also important under this theory, is the privatization process. One of the many tasks the 
countries had, after the fall of the iron curtain, was to go into such process. Aleksander Surdej 
shows how opportunities for corruption and corrupt practices in Poland, have been facilitated 
by political choices, regarding the privatization of state-owned companies, and the political 
climate for acceptance (or tolerance of) for enrichment at the cost of the state. He says one of 
the biggest dilemmas reformers had in all post-communist countries, can be summarized like 
this: how to privatize state-owned enterprises in the absence of sufficient capital (Surdej 
2005:13).  Privatization was done in some different ways in these countries, and they all had 
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their negative and positive results. The private sector is generally among the most corrupt 
sectors in these countries.  
 
H
3
 Pattern of transition, as founding moment shaping their societies, is a strong indicator 
explaining their potential risk for unsteady democratic progress, or democratic backslide.  
Constitutions and institutions 
 
My next theory is constitutions and institutions. New constitutions (and institutions) were 
adopted by all the countries a short time after the end of communism, and their impact on 
ordinary politics has many aspects; a constitution defines the ground rules to day-to-day 
legislation and government is to be conducted (Elster et al. 1998:64). Institutional making is 
therefore also relevant, as a result of the constitution. Do their constitutions and institutions 
have any important weaknesses that can make them vulnerable? 
The argument is that constitutions and institutions are said to define the rules of the 
“game” and if we consider variations in the details of constitutional design to have important 
effects on public policies, and even welfare within a country, clear weaknesses in institutions 
and constitutions inside these four countries, can turn out to be important. One can ask if their 
institutions were changed enough, during the transition - in absence of proper institutional 
mechanisms, where there is a higher possibility for manipulations and backdoors. Their 
constitutions have been amended several times since the transition, and such processes are 
obviously also important, since it can contribute to stability and durability of the 
constitutional regime, which may have effect on welfare, prosperity, health, and trust 
promoted by stable public policies (Congleton & Rasch 2005:537).  Kunicová & Rose-
Ackerman (2005: 598-9) argue that the essential determinant, which explains post-communist 
institutional outcomes, is the self-interest of politicians, who control the process of 
institutional choice, and politicians are more or less concerned with their ability to extract 
rents from the state itself. Electoral rules have been shown to affect the incentives the political 
actors has, to organize political parties, how parties and politicians compete for votes, and 
party discipline (Kunivocá & Rose-Ackerman 2005:574). This theory can have a connection 
to the transition theory, but both institutions and constitutions have been changed along the 
way in most of the countries, therefore I regard it as an own theory. Programs in fighting for 
instance corruption have been adopted by the various governments, and those in power can, 
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theoretically, create rent-seeking opportunities with a small oversight inside government 
(Kunicová & Rose-Ackerman 2005:585)  
 
H
4  
Weaknesses in their constitutions and institutions, is a strong indicator explaining their 
potential risk for unsteady democratic progress, or backslide. 
2.1 Method   
 
A sensible way to compare two or more countries is a combination of comparative case study, 
historical study and statistical study, in other words, combining different types of methods, to 
get causal explanations that are convincing, both empirically, and theoretically. The analyses 
will be based on secondary literature and existing data. When comparing the countries, I will 
keep in mind the methods of comparing; one is the method of difference/most similar 
systems, where I compare rather similar cases, which only differs on the dependent 
variable(s). The logic of the method of difference is as following; it compares political or 
social systems that share some common features, as a way of neutralizing some differences, 
while others get highlighted. Case selection is used in a way to control for causal effect. All 
cases share basic characteristics, but vary to some key explanatory factors (Knutsen & Moses 
2007:98).  The method of difference requires variation on the dependent variable(s).  
According to Lijphart, we can also distinguish between six types of case study, and the 
one probably most suitable for my thesis, is theory-confirming case study. Such studies aim to 
test an existing hypothesis or theory (Knutsen & Moses 2007:132-3). And that is what I will 
do - test certain theories upon the four countries. A theory-confirming case study tries to 
figure out the degree to which a given case fits a general proposition, and the explanatory 
power to the theories. It focuses on a particular case within a case study, which is singled out 
among other cases, and is analyzed within theoretical and empirical context of this set of 
cases. The deviant case may be likened to the “experimental” group (Lijphart 1971:693).  
       However, the basic point is that the choice of the aforementioned three different methods 
should make my results and evidence, stronger. The comparative case study  can produce 
limited generalizations, concerning causes, the historical method generate a trustworthy 
knowledge of what actually happened, and is used as building block for comparative research, 
while statistics, can prove possible causal relations, and makes the results even more 
convincing. Statistical method contains data analysis of events already occurred, and can 
bring better generalizations of the results. 
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2.2 Why compare these four countries?  
 
First of all, all these countries are situated in the northern tier of Central Europe, and are 
adjacent to each other. This is a very common reason to compare countries; comparability is 
more likely within an area than a randomly selected set of countries (Lijphart 1971:689). 
Second, they share common legacies, such as being parts of the Habsburg Empire for several 
centuries or, in the case of Galicia, from 1772 to 1918, and they were behind the iron curtain 
for over 40 years. At the end of communism, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were 
among the first countries that became free in 1989 (Slovakia of course separated from the 
Czech Republic on 1 January 1993), and later, they had to go through making important 
choices - which we might call common challenges. Since the end of communism, and until 
today, they have developed in a rather positive way – today they are generally considered to 
be consolidated and stable democracies, they have a functioning market economy, they have 
been NATO-members since 1999 and EU-members since 2004. Business and economic 
growth generally had a boost, for the last 10 years. However, they have not followed each 
other on the very same path in achieving their goals, even though these goals have been rather 
similar. For these reasons, I believe it is quite interesting and useful to compare them. The big 
questions are if their progress is unsteady, or if there is a high risk of it, and the same can be 
considered towards democratic backslide. If so, what are the reasons for it? 
 
With this being said, I believe I have been capable of justifying the choice of countries, and 
why I should compare them. 
2.3 Their risk of unsteady progress, or backsliding – a consideration 
 
One subject that has seemed to bother political scientists recently is whether or not the new 
democracies in Central Europe have finished their transformation and democratic 
consolidation, or not. For the full transition at least, one can definitely argue that this goal is 
accomplished, in the sense that if their goals after over 40 years of communism and planned 
economy, was to achieve a transitional change towards becoming a stable democracy with 
market economy, together with membership in NATO and in the EU.  If this was their highest 
goals, it can, according to Sabrina P. Ramet (with whom I agree), represent one symbolic 
completion of a transition from communist rule to a Western type of rule. That would mean a 
fully transformation, which includes an Europeanization of their countries. So the next 
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consideration is democratic consolidation. A democratic consolidation depends on a number 
of factors, such as international environment, economic stabilization, and marginalization and 
delegitimation of extremist political views (Ramet 2011: 3-4). So when can we fully suggest 
that democracy been consolidated? Ramet (2011:18-9) suggests these following criteria:  
 When corruption is down to a level where the country obtains a score of 4.0 or better 
on Transparency International’s corruption perception index 
 When there are two or three political parties dominant in the parliament, and when the 
number of parties that are able to elect deputies to the parliament has been stabilized at 
eight, or fewer. 
 When the educational system promotes liberal values. 
 And finally, when the electoral laws become stabilized 
These are all good criteria, which can be very useful to explain democratic consolidation. 
Perhaps we can even add an active civil society as well, which I suggest fosters democracy.  
The region has gone through a massive economic, political, and social transformation, 
with all the insecurities and upsets that involves (Mudde 2007: 221). However, one important 
point here is that new democracies tend to be vulnerable. If we for instance find signs of 
backslide on such criteria’s, there is a sign of instability. What could be their vulnerabilities 
towards unsteady process or democratic backslide in the first place? 
Ramet wrote in her book Social Currents in Eastern Europe (Revised edition, 1995), 
about possible propositions for the future. Especially her second and fourth propositions are 
important here. “In the short run”, Ramet wrote in her second proposition, “the greatest threat 
to the political consensus comes from the right. This is true for Germany, Poland, Slovakia, 
Hungary, and probably Romania (although Romania in a rather different way)” (Ramet 
1995:456). Democracies’ best chances seemed to be in the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Hungary (and Slovenia), while (in my opinion), Slovakia seemed at that time to have the 
worst conditions. However, she also considered Hungary’s political system not to be as solid 
as it seemed first, and the developments in the country during the last two years, might 
suggest that her prediction was right about Hungary. Her fourth proposition concerned 
people’s demand for social justice, which for four decades were pushed by the communists. 
After the transition, and after the large scale privatization, it increased the number of poor 
people, including unemployment. Discontent would grow, she predicted, when people would 
discover that the numbers of poor increased and that capitalism won’t make everyone rich 
(Ramet 1995:457-8). I believe these two points will be especially important in this matter.  
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According to older surveys from during the 1990s, showed in “Democracy and Political 
Culture in Eastern Europe” from 2006, some scientists asked themselves whether 
representative democracy can persist in the Czech Republic, considering the extremely low 
confidence in political parties, the parliament and the legal system (Mansfeldova 2006:116), 
which is a common phenomenon in the other three countries as well. Confidence in 
institutions is one relevant factor that can stabilize a democratic system in the first place. In 
Slovakia, the crisis and conflicts of the 1990s did luckily not lead to an end to their 
democratic process, but more worrying were the results regarding the democratic attitudes 
among its citizens. The support for the past political system has been higher than for the 
current political system, according to a survey from 1999 (Mihalikova 2006:199). I’m aware 
that this is an old survey to which to refer, but the main point is to argue that could also show 
signs of vulnerabilities inside the countries, and that it’s easy to experience backslides, 
keeping in mind all the challenges these countries had, and still experience, to a different 
extent from the one to the other. 
Other authors than myself have also noticed the trends recorded by Nations in Transit 
(Freedom House). Many of these authors and scientists, often then consider the average 
democracy score the countries have received, in a period of time (the final average of all the 
sides of the reform record, including those four measures I’m focusing on), and this average 
democracy score has also generally gone downwards the last 10 years. Jacques Rupnik for 
instance, noticed back in 2007, that these countries average democracy score had gotten 
worse, which we can see in Table 2.1 (except for Czech Republic, that has improved 
somewhat).  
Table 2.1 Democracy score 2002-2011 
(Freedom House 2011: 
Democracy Score in Nation 
in Transit reports: Poland, 
Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Slovakia).  
One of the problems after communism were the problems surrounding the transition and the 
results it has given afterwards, and how it lived up to people’s expectations, and this has given 
influence, and remains a threat to stabilization as far as I consider it. In the long run, it can 
lead to democratic backslide, because of the clear weaknesses, and then give rise to something 
that can develop into even further backslide: the rise of extreme populist and right-wing 
parties. As shown in theory 1, there has been influence of populist parties and right-wing 
Year                                          2002  2003  2004  2005 2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
Poland         Dem. Score 1.63 1.75 1.75 2.00 2.14 2.36 2.39 2.25 2.32 2.21 
Czech Rep. Dem. Score 2.46 2.33 2.33 2.29 2.25 2.25 2.14 2.18 2.21 2.18 
Hungary      Dem. Score 2.13 1.96 1.96 1.96 2.00 2.14 2.14 2.29 2.39 2.61 
 Slovakia     Dem. Score 2.17 2.08 2.08 2.00 1.96 2.14 2.29 2.46 2.68 2.54 
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parties in all of the four countries: Jobbik and Fidesz in Hungary, LPR, Samoobrona, and PiS 
(with the familiar Kaczynski-brothers) in Poland, Smer and the National Slovak Party in 
Slovakia, and ODS and VV (Public Affairs) in the Czech Republic. This tendency however, is 
smaller in the Czech Republic than in the three other countries, but the Czechs share some of 
the common problems experienced in the other societies (Rupnik 2007:18).  
Right-wing and extreme populist parties tend to be revanchist, and blame the opposition 
parties for problems, and tend to start so-called “clean the house” processes, which some 
authors claim that the Kaczynski brothers in Poland tried to do, while they were in 
government from 2005-2007.  These parties can be willing to go into authoritarian methods, 
to capture the state, and use nationalistic rhetoric. They can express skepticism towards 
democracy, capitalism, and the European Union, including suspicion of and intolerance 
against minorities (the last point especially relates mostly to Slovakia and Hungary). We can 
easily see what these tendencies can lead to.  
Let’s for instance go back to PiS and the Kaczynski-brothers. Adam Michnik (director of 
Gazeta Wyborcza), describes Poland ruled by the Kaczynskis as a “peculiar mix of the 
conservative rhetoric of George W. Bush and the authoritarian political practice of Vladimir 
Putin”. His argument is that their attack on the independent press, curtailment of civil society, 
power centralization, and their known exaggeration of external dangers, bore as a similarity to 
similar processes in Russia (Rupnik 2007:18). And this is even comparable to the situation in 
Hungary at the moment, where the more authoritarian style of the new government and 
president, to similar processes in lowering the media independence, judicial independence, the 
central bank, and changing of the constitution, which Hungarian authorities claim is their 
answer towards the corruption and the former mistakes made by previous governments - 
including lack of lustration. This is a threat to the liberal paradigm that had prevailed since 
1989, and is dramatic. According to a CBOS poll from 2006, three quarters of Poles consider 
democracy incapable of maintaining law and order (Rupnik 2007:19). This eventual backlash 
is “giving rise to unscrupulous uses of executive power as well as worrisome and potentially 
dangerous outbursts against basic principles of liberal-democratic constitutionalism” (Rupnik 
2007:20). The populists can use an anti-corruption rhetoric, to delegitimize the existing 
political and economic elites. In Poland and Hungary, we have seen that in order to “clean the 
house”; those power holders would need more power. “Clean the house” is related to the 
transition theory, however, one can ask if this (and I doubt it) is solving the problems with 
corruption, and the transitional problems they have all experienced, and perhaps it is just a 
bad excuse, or even a proof of inability. Will worsening of democracy, with even less 
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transparency be capable of solving such issues?  Charles Gati points out that after PiS had 
been two years in power, no major arrests or convictions for corruption had taken place in the 
country (Gati 2007:109). If society is felt to be in disorder and fragmented, the authoritarian 
impulse – which I later will show is rooted in many of the Central European political cultures, 
can prove to be irresistible (Elster et al 1998:34).  
However, why exactly does it seem that there was even a change a short time after the 
millennium, a change in the countries rather positive direction of democratic progress? They 
became EU-members in 2004, and after that, their willingness to make reforms, and continue 
this steady progress, might have led them into hibernation, it might seem. But obviously, they 
have little experience with democracy, and perhaps even a lack of comprehension of 
consensus and compromise. Habits from the communist period can still lie in the shadows, as 
a “psychological leftover” (di Somona Guerra 2011), and can perhaps start to show once 
again, when EU loosen up their influence.  
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3.0 Testing and comparison of theories – finding explanatory patterns 
In this section, I will test my 4 theories upon my 4 countries, to find similarities and 
differences. Hopefully, I will be able to find strong enough evidence to support my theories, 
in order to reject or confirm the hypotheses, for each country.  
3.1 Historical background  
 
A short history review is important to establish, to get to know these countries a little bit 
better, before we move on into finding answers and patterns. Firstly, in my theory part, I have 
mentioned history as one of the variables that might explain their unsteady progress in some 
particular areas. The history of state socialism does account for at least some of the features, 
which decided the breakdown, and shaped the period of transition. Secondly, one must 
remember that there were (perhaps important) differences among the countries of Central-
Europe. For instance, not all countries in the region were a part of the alliance system 
dominated by the Soviets, and their closeness or distance to the “Moscow Center” varied – 
these are among those facts, that helps to explain how these countries developed over time 
(Ramet & Wagner 2010:15). Besides communism, they have a common history, with the 
lands which today comprise the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary having been ruled by 
the Habsburg dynasty for several centuries, and with Polish Galicia, as already mentioned, 
having been part of the Habsburg Empire from 1772 to 1918.When it comes to democratic 
history on the other hand, Poland’s and Hungary’s democratic history, for example, is rather 
different compared to Czechoslovakia, even though a country like Poland, is considered to 
have been the second country in the world to have an written constitution, back in 1791 
(Gebert 2010:141). The country also had a rather impressing democratic model for its time 
from 1550 until the end of the 1700s (Holm-Hansen 2008:314), but then Poland disappeared 
from the map in 1795, until the end of World War One. Hungary had some short-lived 
attempts to achieve democracy (even though “Golden Bull” in 1222 can be mentioned, which 
granted rights to the nobility), but the country has generally only enjoyed some form of 
democracy from the 1990s (Boziki and Simon 2010:204).  Czechoslovakia remained 
democratic during the whole interwar period, although Prague’s policies in the interwar 
period discriminated against non-Czechs in employment, land reform, and language use, 
among other things, and especially against Germans and Hungarians.  
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3.1.1. From communism until today – short history review 
 
From 1948 and on, all the countries that were under the Soviets’ iron hand had to go through a 
process that involved destroying old institutions, and establishing new, communistic ones. 
The communist party was the only effective political party in these countries. People who 
were loyal to the party were chosen to fill up government positions. The new leaders 
established a system of censorship, to control information, to ensure that only views that were 
compatible with the communist leadership’s program were to be disseminated. They also 
adopted a central planning economy that allowed the central authorities to control all 
economic decisions, from production to distribution, and pursued the goal to industrialize the 
country rapidly. All private ownership of economic assets was generally eliminated, even 
though there were some exceptions in some of the communist countries. For instance, in 
Poland, farms were left in private hands. The structures in the society were also attempted to 
be changed, as well as people’s values and attitudes. There were for example several 
campaigns against religion, but in a Catholic country like Poland, the Church proved to be 
strong. Communist leaders forced people to turn culturally eastwards, such as in literature and 
music (Wolchik 1998:38-9, Bielasiak 1998:129). Western music and culture were not 
allowed, and to put the Soviets in a good light - history was rather manipulated. The 
communist system had its more “positive sides” though: basic needs such as free medication 
and medical supplies were basic rights for everybody. However, this may be said to have 
contributed to a culture which still exists today, with a more accepting attitude toward 
corruption, also among the ruling elite. This centrally planned healthcare for instance, spurred 
the tradition of giving “gifts” for a service already received, or that was to be received. 
Salaries were low, and it was usual to make small gifts in order to receive “better service”. 
These were all general matters that were typical for each of the countries behind the “iron 
curtain”. However, there were particular differences inside the countries:  In Poland, it proved 
more difficult to destroy the influence of the influential Catholic Church, in the society. 
Another thing that characterized Poland was the raising voices that combined demands and 
strikes, as a reaction to the upcoming economic and social difficulties during the period. This 
had a continuing influence in the regime, and it forced the regime eventually to loosen up 
their “iron hand” (Bielasiak 1998:129, 135-6). Ramet explains a concept of parallel society in 
Poland, as an independent or alternative society. In this sense it’s a living part of any society, 
and its breath varies with the breadth of allowable open activity. Solidarity advocated 
democratic change, and after being banned in December 1981, its members had to go 
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underground. People in opposition to the regime, realized that to be capable of having 
political groups, freedom, peace, and to build a democratic society in the future, they had to 
lay foundations, in the form of an underground society. And the opposition managed to 
achieve this goal by 1985 (Ramet 1995:86,119). Since then, Poland has gone through a 
democratic and economic transformation, which meant a rebuilding of their economies and 
societies - a common procedure for all post communist countries in Central Europe. Poland 
has also been struggling with economic chaos; combined with the economic “shock therapy” 
the country had to go through. It has eventually given results, but it had a big cost: 
unemployment grew high, and incomes started to differentiate the society. The level of 
unemployment has been as high as 20 percent, and the country has been affected by several 
corruption scandals and accusations against former, and still active, politicians from both the 
regime and opposition. 
The Czechoslovak situation was somewhat different: independent activists in the country 
were not capable of mobilizing large number of people, in the same way that Solidarity 
managed to do (Ramet 1995:120-1). Independent activism was surely less developed, Charter 
77 (a human rights group) activists focused on organizing informal discussion meetings for 
citizens, to discuss political and social issues, in a way laying the groundwork for a free-
thinking civil society. Compared to Poland, there was a lack of pressure from outside for 
reform; economic decline mobilized large parts of the population in Poland for a change, 
while Czechoslovakia had a higher level of economic development, which provided a buffer 
against the impact of Stalinist economic patterns of organization and politics (Wolchik 
1998:40-1). There was no strong opposition to the system, and there was a higher priority 
towards basic human rights, and equality of treatment, that tended to be issue-oriented. Small 
dissident groups occurred, but the most important one was Charter 77. Influenced by the 
situation in Poland, the so-called “Velvet Revolution” influenced the country in 1989, and the 
communist system collapsed suddenly (Wolchik 1998:50). After 1 January 1993, the two 
countries separated, and the Czech Republic was regarded as a country that was re-
democraticized. The Czechs had a stronger, if blemished, democratic tradition than the others. 
Many institutions were replicated from the First Republic (Leff 2010:162-3).They had a 
troubling start, but have been successfully democratized, marketized, and integrated into 
European institutions. However, fragile governments have influenced the country, with some 
negative results (Leff 2010:174). 
The Slovak road to democracy has been much more tortuous.  The Slovaks had to start 
from scratch, and some would say that the country had a semi-authoritarian regime, while 
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ruled by Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar (1990-1998). However, the 1998 election was a step 
in the right direction, and the country eventually became democratized, marketized and 
integrated, in the same way as the others (Bakke 2006:138). However, it remains unclear 
whether the country has become fully stabilized, compared to the three other countries (Harris 
2010:192). 
In Hungary, even though the country was influenced by the Hungarian Revolution in 
1956 during communism, with strikes and demonstrations, Hungary eventually went into a 
period of more liberalism, culturally and economically, to maintain a minimal level of 
contentment. However, workers in the country were increasingly fed up by the issues that 
followed with communism, with political and economic difficulties, and this ensured the 
emergence of an opposition towards the regime. The transformation went rather easily; 
however, institutional choices were made before the first election, and there was a high level 
of consensus between the parties on the biggest goals (Kürti 1998:82, Sitter 2006:159). The 
political system became rather stable, and politically, the country was among the most stable 
post communist countries in Europe. Political parties and the political system were stable 
since 1990, until the earthquake election in 2010, when new parties came along, and the rather 
undemocratic changes made by the new Fidesz government, have been described as a 
democratic backslide (Bozoki & Simon 2010:217).  
3.2 Theory 1: Legacies 
 
My first theory is legacies. This is a common theoretical explanation for post-communist 
trajectories, in the sense that this region is one perfect example, of how it had to be dealing 
with their past, in sociopolitical and economic developmental settings, and how it can 
continue to influence their progress. That also includes their vulnerabilities for backslide. I 
have decided to focus most on legacies from the communist era (which I believe is most 
important), even though I will mention and highlight important historical tendencies even 
before that, which have often been mentioned by social scientists as relevant explanations. I 
expect these different historical periods to have a different influence in these countries, even 
though the legacy of communism should be a strong indicator for all of them. I’m aware that 
there is a challenge to prove historical relevance for the issue I’m trying to explain, and how 
to decide how long back we should go into history, before the theory just loses its explanatory 
strength, and gets irrelevant. But for real evidence, suggests Ivan Volgyes, we must look at 
the physical layout of the land, the prevailing economic structures, the social system, and 
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political patterns (Volgyes 1995:2). By identifying structures, layouts and patterns, common 
to both the pre-communist and communist eras, I should be able to track down important 
legacies.  
Therefore, I have decided to focus on these three types of legacies: political, economic 
and societal. There is a broad literature on historical legacies for these countries, but they 
generally provide few very clear answers. I believe there are two reasons for that; one is that 
it’s hard to separate between pre-communist and communist legacies, because of their rather 
complex history. Then you have the influence of the EU after communism, which has 
contributed pushing reforms ahead more quickly, and perhaps was able to make many of these 
legacies less relevant, during the accession process for new member-states. But I would 
suggest that now that they have become full members, however, some of these legacies can 
become more visible once again. The argument is that communism suppressed some legacies, 
while it created new ones. Nationalism was considered to be rather suppressed during 
communism also, and now that people enjoy freedom and democracy in these countries, it can 
grow once again.  
I define legacies in line with Pop-Eleches (2007:910), who defines the communist legacy 
as “the structural, cultural and institutional starting points of ex-communist countries at the 
outset of the transition”, with its survival from the past. And the continuing presence of these 
starting points, if they continue to influence a country’s progress, can therefore be described 
as a legacy.  When defined like this, it will matter in some way; however, I expect that these 
legacies matter in a different extent in the four countries, as already mentioned.  
The Treaty of Versailles in 1919 gave birth to new states and changed frontiers that 
changed the map of Eastern Europe for generations to come. Countries such as 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland were created in the ruins of three historical empires, and 
experienced only partly successful nation and state building after having been included for 
centuries in larger empires. In 1946 István Bibó wrote the book The Distress of East 
European Small States, where he can be said to have foreseen what would happen, and have 
been going on, in most post communist states in Central Europe. Nationalism, for instance, 
was rather undermined during communism, while it has been able to grow after the transition 
to a higher extent. Bibó discuss the nation-state and the creation of the nation state as we 
know it, as a characteristic unit of Europe, with the fact that it is a product of nearly 1500 
years of development. The existing nation-states were made monolingual, by three factors: 1) 
political 2) cultural and 3) numerical hegemony of certain people. The borders of European 
nations have hardly changed a lot since the Middle Ages. There is one factor that is important 
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in this development: that political consciousness has not suffered from disturbance or 
pathological deformities – which didn’t occur in Western and Northern Europe (Bibó 
1946:14, 16-17). The situation was different in the Central and Eastern Europe. For instance, 
the formations of the Roman Empire made a mess of the countries’ political development, and 
the Ottoman Empire took over existing national frameworks, without providing any 
replacement for them. These factors confused the development of states and nations in the 
region - the region was not consolidated. However, the French Revolution eventually stirred 
modern democratic nationalism. The national feelings of Poles, Hungarians and Czechs (and 
Germans and Italians) caught fire, but creating nation states was still not an easy task, a task 
which was already accomplished throughout other parts of Europe, already in the 17th and 
18th century. The creation of populism occurred, however, together with a phenomenon that 
was specific particular in Central and Eastern Europe: linguistic nationalism (Bibó 1946:20-
1). When these nations became involved with border disputes with their neighbors, this 
caused a series of wars and catastrophes, and their security of national existence and territorial 
status got a kink. His point is that this was a source for the political hysteria in these Central 
and East European nations. Their troubles started at the end of 18th century, and can be traced 
back to developments and stabilization of the nations in the region (Bibó 1946:23-4).  The 
breakup Austria-Hungary permitted the unification of a multi-lingual historical Bohemia, with 
Slovak-inhabited areas as well as with some lands with Hungarian and Ruthenian majorities. 
However, there were inconsistencies: the Czech areas were tied to the new state by historical 
and ethnic continuity, the Slovak areas arguably by ethnic, but not historic ties, while the 
Hungarians and Germans were added against their will (Bibó 1946:29). After World War 
Two, Czechoslovakia expelled the Germans and Hungarians. A limited exception was made, 
for these minorities, if they were able to demonstrate that they had remained loyal to the 
Czechoslovak Republic and never harmed the Czech or Slovak nation, or if they had been 
active in the fight for its liberation (Pogany 2010:417). This suggests that calling 
Czechoslovakia “democratic” in the interwar period, was not entirely unproblematic. 
Bibó describes a backward and anti-democratic nationalistic nature in the region, based 
on these historical factors (Bibó 1946:36). The crisis of becoming nations, created a fear for 
one’s community. “A fear for the existence of community was the crucial factor which in 
these countries made the positions of democracy and democratic progress uncertain”. They 
experienced historical period’s thoroughgoing acceptance of democracy in itself, will expose 
national community to risks and catastrophes. This leads to the creation of “anti-democratic 
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nationalism (Bibó 1946:39, 41-2). This was described especially to be problematic in 
Hungary.   
I believe that this is an important contribution, understanding how historical legacies do 
and might potentially affect countries in the region – such historical factors have the power to 
influence their political culture, and trajectories. The support for and rise of extreme populist 
and right-wing parties can also be explained by these factors - stronger in some countries than 
others. Jobbik in Hungary is perhaps the clearest recent example - this party has achieved a 
surprisingly high level of support in the recent election, with 16.7 percent of the votes, and 12 
seats in parliament (Sitter 2011:254). With their anti-minority slogans and nazi-like uniforms, 
they make a good example. The Fidesz government’s recent actions in Hungary, changing the 
constitution, introducing more centralization of power, and restricting the registration of 
religious groups, PiS’s politics and support in Poland, including LPR and Samoobrona, and 
the same with Fico and Smer and the Slovak National Party in Slovakia, all serve as signposts 
of increasing right-wing tendencies. These parties have generally a lack of tolerance, express 
religious (mostly Catholic) values, suppress national minorities to a high extent, and are 
nationalistic, but to different extents in the countries, to which I will return. This point can 
even explain the higher skepticism towards the EU, which is a current fact in Hungary and the 
Czech Republic. The EU is after all a rather supranational institution. 
 If we take a closer look at Poland’s history, and how it might affect that country’s 
progress today, it’s a fact that Poland was carved up by Austria, Prussia/Germany, and Russia 
for most of 123 years, and that resulted in divergent institutional experiences in the three 
partition zones. In the interwar period, the country started with three legal systems in place, 
six competing currencies, and three unintegrated railway systems (Ramet 1997:21, 23-24) and 
the country had to start from scratch creating a constitution, organizing the parliament and 
public administration, and organize political elections. Even though there was a developed 
political class, and a developed multiparty system, this advantage did not create a political 
stabilization and institutional building in the country. Poland was weak and halting after the 
World War Two – the communist institutional transformation was accomplished after a short 
time. And at the end of communism, the new political elite had a hard time transforming the 
country. The communist institutional structure was highly developed and complex, after 40 
years of communist rule. The first election in the country was “partly free”, and important 
institutional restructuring was made while the communists were (formally) still in power 
(Korbonski 1995:140-1). Then one can even ask if the new rulers in Poland have managed to 
refresh their old institutions, and impede a solid break with the communist institutions. 
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Obviously, they generally seem to have accomplished that, as Poland, (including the other 
countries, perhaps with the exception of Slovakia), is regarded as a consolidated democracy, 
with a functioning market economy. However, that doesn’t mean that older traditions and 
legacies do not hide behind the curtains.  
A common feature among these countries is the fact that the new leaders that took control 
had little experience. The new political elites were in many cases former political dissidents – 
thus outsiders, and governance seems to have remained poor when it comes to governance, 
and there you have one pattern which is described by a legacy. The four decades with 
communism, and lack of democratic history even before that, are good examples, except for 
Czechoslovakia’s interwar period, which has already been mentioned. It is important to 
emphasize, however, that the country’s democratic ideal was not entirely fulfilled; keeping in 
mind some communist and fascist influence, but at least the country has the longest 
democratic history among these four countries. In Poland, we remember that Solidarity was 
led by shipyard workers, and the new political elites were in fact mostly shipyard workers, 
journalists, and history professors and this was also common to the other countries 
(Korbonski 1995:150-1). This makes sense; Václav Havel in the Czech Republic became a 
politician, before that he was a playwright, essayist, and activist during communism. And 
given their lack of experience, the new elites had to rely on officials from the communist 
regime for the institutional transformation. It was a potential problem considering the huge 
task of transforming these countries into democracy and market economies; the old 
institutional elements could hardly be trusted. Almost everything had to be replaced by 
something new, to make a strong difference, and make a stable and lasting progress. This is 
also the point by Jon Elster, Claus Offe and Ulrich Preuss, who point out; that almost 
everything would be affected by the past and the habits that the old regime left (Elster et al 
1998:18-19). In that case, even though replacing institutions and trying to impede a solid 
brake with the past is important, it might not help much either. Old habits can still influence 
the country’s progress.  
Sharon Wolchik illustrates a good point, which is that Czechoslovakia also had an 
enduring legacy, evident in both economic and political institutions, and from what people 
expect from their government (societal). This is also something all the countries share in 
common: people’s expectations towards the new elite that they had to fulfill, and communism 
has created both winners and losers. This has also led to smaller levels of trust towards 
politicians, and less optimism towards democracy and market economy. However, for 
Czechoslovakia’s sake, she claims that its interwar democratic experiences made people in the 
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Czech lands more willing to favor compromise than was the case in the three other countries, 
and are less likely to favor anti-Semitic views (Wolchik 1995:169). In that case, we would 
expect the Czechs’ democratic experience in the interwar period, to have a more positive 
effect. However, this is not entirely certain either; as István Pogány points out, the 
indiscriminate character and undisguised racism that were a part of the anti-German policies 
in post-War Czechoslovakia (and generally in the CEE area), as well as outbursts of 
murderous violence against German civilians, should not be overlooked  (2010:427-8). 
Hungary’s background history, as I showed by introducing some of Bibo’s work, should 
also have its relevant influence: the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire, a short lived 
dictatorship by the communists in 1919, and of course four decades of communist rule 
(Barany 1995:177), have left several heritages, that can have significant influence on 
Hungary’s development, including the risk of democratic backslide, or unsteady progress. The 
attitudinal political legacies have been harder to overcome.   
Nationalism seems more powerful today in Hungary and Slovakia, than in the Czech 
Republic and Poland, and considering that nationalism has the potential to contort and subvert 
national politics, makes it a clear challenge. 
Institutions 
 
At the end of communism, all the countries had to start from scratch (except for 
Czechoslovakia which could draw upon some of its interwar experience), creating an 
appropriate institutional framework, to tackle new social, and society programs. I would argue 
that their institutions and its functioning are also part of legacies. My argument is that during 
the communist era, constitutionalism and legality were not taken too seriously, in order to 
allow more elbow room for the rulers. This could help to explain the inefficiency of public 
institutions, and perhaps even the shortcoming of legal office, regulating political institutions. 
The selection of state officials, and the presence of a state bureaucracy connected to the 
communist era, had (and still obviously has) its influence. These members and rulers could 
not be easily replaced, because of the lack of expertise, including their personal networks - 
well qualified decision makers have been lacking, also in administrative and economic 
spheres (Barany 1995:181). And it will take time to make the necessary reforms, to deal with 
the present challenges. These points are shown by Rose-Ackerman (2005:28), who find that 
there are three institutional legacies important to keep in mind for the present situation in 
Hungary and Poland. First: under socialism these countries were governed largely by 
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government decrees and resolutions, and not the rule of law. Second: the planning process 
involved internal controls. Third, the socialist regimes did in fact institute some reforms, 
before the end of communism itself. In the first legacy, take for instance law making. Two 
similarities were that in Hungary, the Council of Ministers had broad discretion to enact 
decrees with legal force when the parliament was not in session. The government did not 
often bother to obtain legislative support for its actions. In Poland, the situation was similar, 
and this fact made reformers in both countries quite skeptical of granting legal force to 
unilateral government decrees or resolutions. Reformers wanted to constrain the scope of 
government unilateralism, and strengthen the parliament. The problem was that reformers did 
not mind holding government accountable for its remaining acts of discretion. Second: 
another communist legacy is the planning process that includes extensive paperwork and 
structure of control. This planning was internal to the state itself, it was never meant to 
generate participation and challenge from the citizenry. In this sense, bureaucratic rules work 
as a guidebook for officials. One can still find traces of this in their existing system of 
administrative law, and limit the external force of some provisions, of the administrative 
codes (Rose-Ackerman 2005: 29-30). Reforms are needed in these areas and others, which I 
will return later. The last legacy is from the end of communism, where the leaders wanted to 
deal with growing negativity, by introducing new institutions to increase governmental 
accountability, perhaps to make the regimes appear more progressive in Western eyes. And 
given this legacy, efforts to make a clear genuine accountability outside the electoral process, 
have not been a major focus of democratic reformers (Rose-Ackerman 2005 30-31).  
However, some would say that the continuation of old institutional forms and policy patterns, 
alongside the emerging ones, have helped to stabilize the post-communist countries during the 
1990s. But when the old structures fade away, it can also make them more vulnerable to crisis 
(Inglot 2003:243). In that case, this will certainly depend on how the country’s situation will 
change, and how the system will perform.  
Media 
 
The issue with the independence of the media after communism can seem like a puzzle. In the 
theory section, I mentioned that I consider the issue with media independence to be a legacy, 
even though I believe it has a connection to the transition process also. The media were 
liberalized after the transition, however; so the level of independence should be much stronger 
connected to legacy.  
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Since the transition, the media have generally played an important role in the process of 
constitutionalization - and media must be free, in order to have a free and liberal democracy, 
with freedom of speech, and the ability to be critical about society matters - in order to inform 
their population, without being attacked by any one. One important point is that the media 
may reflect how their process is going, and contribute to expose issues such as corruption. So 
why must the media still have to struggle for their independence after communism, even 
against the group of political elites that were fighting for freedom against the communist 
regime, in the first place? 
 First: let’s consider censorship during communism. Newspapers and media only 
presented news that was pro-regime, and particular negativities did not occur. The purpose of 
the communist media was to manipulate the public’s understanding of both events and 
institutions, but also to be capable of controlling the population (Ramet 1995:390). When the 
new leaders came to power, some of their goals were to free the press from state control. 
However, this obviously was easier said than done. In Poland, even earlier freedom fighters, 
such as Lech Wałęsa, basically warned journalists about not defaming the parliament, 
government, and himself, the president. Moral values and professional ethics also had to be 
respected. I agree with Jane L. Curry, who describes this as a sense of irony - the demanding 
freedom to the press, and then discomfort with the free press. A general pattern up to the 
middle of the 1990s was that the print media were speedily privatized, and holding on to a 
state monopoly on broadcast media. However, among the four countries’, the Czech Republic 
was then the country which had enjoyed the highest degree of freedom, compared to the three 
others.  Slovakia was ruled by Prime Minister Mečiar since the split up, and their media 
independence was affected by this fact. Ramet described Czech Republic as the best example 
of positive demonopolizing of the media, while the results were more mixed in Poland and 
Hungary, and even less propitious in Slovakia (Ramet 1995:399).  One must remember that 
negativism in itself is a quite new phenomenon in post communist Eastern and Central 
Europe. This is a good reason for why the media from time to time have been a more 
controlled part; they prove that things can be out of control, or bring up negativities, that will 
make the leaders, their parties, or the country, look bad. It was rather expected that these 
countries’ transitions were not going to become easy, and even though they have been capable 
of reaching most of the important points of transition, the negative sides of transition, and 
legacies, still influence their societies, and will continue doing so. Writing negative articles 
about the ruling elite, will obviously put the ruling elite in a negative light – which they will 
try to avoid. “Tolerance”, and the lack of it, is a word I would suggest to be used in this 
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matter, and to show what I mean by tolerance’s context to media independence, I want to use 
examples from “Reporters without Borders”. 
In 2001, editor of the Polish newspaper Wiesci Polickie, Andrzej Marek, was sentenced to 
jail for three months, for libeling an official in the city of Police (Reporters without Borders 
2007 1). In 2007 a Catalan feminist, who was writing for a Spanish daily, faced trial for 
“defaming” Poland. Her article said Polish democracy was suffering from several ailments, 
which included the political influence of the Catholic Church official homophobia and 
widespread racism. Then president Lech Kaczyński was outraged by this article (Reporters 
without Borders 2007 2). This suggests that the press may still experience problems when it 
comes to such “sensitive issues”, which is confirmed by Reporters without Borders, who 
claim that the problem in Poland is that a section of the political class still refuses to break 
with older practices that are left over from the Soviet era (Reporters without Borders Poland). 
According to Jacek Brzuszkiewicz from Gazeta Wyborcza, press freedom in Poland is held 
back by the country’s laws (he was sentenced to prison when he was convicted of libel). 
Article 212.2 in the Polish legislation provides prison sentences for journalists (Reporters 
without Borders 2007 3). 
 Hungarian journalists have experienced similar issues. Andras Bencsik was the first 
journalist to be sentenced to jail after the end of communism, for press offences, and libeling 
a politician. Reporters without Borders stated at the time, that they did not consider it wrong 
that a journalist could be punished for writing defamatory articles. However, for international 
standards, prison should never be imposed for press offences (Reporters without Borders 
2004). In 2010, when the new government led by Victor Orbán took charge, the Hungarian 
situation became even worse. The Hungarian parliament adopted a law that overhauls the 
state-owned media, and even created a supervisory Media Council. The law was passed on 21 
December 2010, and became effective from 1 January 2012. The Media Council (that consists 
of 5 members) has the right of oversight, and can also impose heavy fines, for content that is 
not “politically balanced or violates human dignity” (Reporters without Borders 2010).1 
 Slovakia began a major reform of its media law, in order to liberalize its provisions, and 
to meet the European Union’s democratic standards. But the vote on the so-called Press Act 
did give a rise to national controversy. The law was condemned by Reporters without Borders 
and OSCE, because of Article 6, which gives the executive and the Ministry of Culture direct 
                                                          
1 Reporters without Borders expressed the view in February 2011 that the European Commission’s response to the Hungarian media 
law was inadequate (Reporters without Borders 2011 1).  
 
35 
 
control of the media, on sensitive issues. Also, anyone believing he or she has been defamed 
or insulted may demand the imposition of fines and a right to reply – which limits journalistic 
freedom. However, the press in 
Slovakia enjoys genuine 
freedom (Reporters without 
Borders Slovakia), and the 
aforementioned law has 
currently been amended (The 
Daily 2011).   
The Czech Republic is 
struggling with lack of 
transparency and openness, in 
order to throw off secrecy in 
society and in the 
administration, and to ensure that the press has the possibility to work for the public interest. 
In February 2009, a reform of the criminal code and procedures against journalist and media 
went ahead in the Czech Republican National Assembly. This reform contained new laws 
which ban the publication of the content of phone tapping, by the police, and ban publication 
of information from the police services. Reporters without Borders argue that this is a directly 
attack on journalists’ sources (Reporters without Borders Czech Republic). It is also 
problematic, in the sense that a journalist’s job and right is to inform the public. In 2011, 
military police raided a public TV station in the country, and searched an investigative 
journalist’s office. Reports without Borders were shocked that this could happen in an EU 
member country. The journalist was known for having investigated corruption cases, and the 
military police searched for a report, which he had prepared making several television 
programs of (Reporters without Borders 2011 2). 
 These examples from Reporters without Borders illustrate my point, that investigative 
reports about society’s problems or sensitive issues, and real information about politicians, 
have made the media almost into a battleground. Many of the new leaders in these countries, 
have struggled against the press’s freedom, by “attacks” on them and their articles. Parties 
fight to own their “own” newspapers that can put them in the best light, and try to avoid 
negative articles, which, the readers might say, is normal. However, in this case, it reflects old 
traditions. If we look at the developments, according to Reporters without Borders Press 
Freedom Index (Table 3.0) we find an interesting pattern. Press freedom in Poland was more 
Table 3.0  Ranking Reports without Borders Press Freedom Index 
 
Poland Slovakia Czech Republic Hungary 
  Ranking Ranking Raking Ranking 
2005 55th 8th 12th 9th 
2006 60th 8th 5th 10th 
2007 57th 4th 14th 17th 
2008 48th 10th 16th 23th 
2009 37th 45th 24th 26th 
2010 32th 35th 23th 24th 
2011/12 24th 27th 14th 40th 
(Press Freedom Index 2005-2011/12) 
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restricted while PiS and the Kaczynskis were in power, and since then, Poland’s ranking has 
improved drastically. In Slovakia, the media press freedom seems to have worsened quite a 
bit under Prime Minister Fico. In the Czech Republic, the situation has remained somewhat 
rather steadier, even though it worsened somewhat from 2008-2010. In Hungary, it has 
drastically worsened since 2010.   
The fall of communism was rather sudden. The new elite had to consider if they would 
allow complete freedom, or impose controls. In the post communist times, one can claim that 
the authorities could not meet (all) popular demands, and negative information from the press, 
could reduce their already weak standing (Curry 1995:72, Ramet 1995:391). We already 
know that governance is not considered to be the best in the region in the first place, and that 
takes us to the next point. 
Economy and governance 
 
The economy and its progress are a strong indicator of communist legacies, with ineffective 
planned economy, and ineffective industries, with lack of competition, with which the 
countries will have to continue struggling for decades. I would suggest that this legacy has a 
strong connection to governance, in combination with other sides, such as the psychological 
aspects – communism did change and eradicate many of people’s values and beliefs – such as 
honesty, and that decades with communist policies created a demoralizing effect on people 
(Korbonski 1995:147). 
We have seen the level of commitment, turnout and trust in politicians and social 
institutions declined. One important fact is that people’s expectations, against the ruling elite, 
are also a part of a communist legacy. Large parts of the population still expect the (new) 
governments, to provide many goods and services for free, or at low costs. This very same 
group of people had welcomed both democracy, and market economy, which they hoped 
would benefit them, with generous amounts of consumer goods. Many Poles, for instance, did 
not see this as a clear contradiction – the new leaders will have to solve this contradiction – 
which will take time, and it’s difficult. Czechoslovakia, however, did not experience an acute 
economic crisis that occurred in Poland in the same period, but despite a better starting point, 
its economy suffered from many of the same ills that usually beset countries that were former 
planned economies. However, it was more felt in the Slovak part of the country, than in the 
Czech Republic. Dissatisfaction with political developments and leaders as a result of the 
reduced living standards was higher in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic. People’s 
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expectations of the state, to provide security and welfare to the citizens, were similar in 
Poland, but particularly higher in Slovakia (Wolchik 1995:158-9, 170).  The communist 
practices did influence Hungary’s potential in a particular way, and made their developments 
difficult; living standards decline as a result of the planned economies' flaws, working morale 
and lack of modernization and creativity is also a legacy, which continues to influence all the 
four countries (Wolchik 1995:186-7, Slovak Spectator 2012, Meyer 2011).  
I believe this has relevance for explaining national governance, and according to Nations 
in Transit’s measures, this is still an issue, and according to “Innovation Union Scoreboard”, 
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are below average in accessing innovation 
performance. The region lags behind Western Europe, and it’s explained by the fact, it is a lot 
of catching up to do. The level of foreign debt is especially high in Hungary, according to 
Eurostat’s statistics from between 2009-2010, where it’s above the EU27 average. Also in the 
other three countries, the level of debts has risen, but they are at least below the average 
(Eurostat 2011). The level of public debt in Hungary (2010) was as high as 80 percent of 
GDP, Poland had 55 percent of GDP, and Slovakia and the Czech Republic, had both around 
40 percent (Transition Report 2011:30). Their negative economic legacies will be there for 
decades, and the ruling elites will have to struggle with them. How they manage to solve them 
will depend on their governance, experience, and efficiency. The same when it comes to 
dealing with corruption, including making the necessary reforms. The problem with these 
economic difficulties and legacies is that it can in the mean time create greater negativity 
against democracy and market economy together with contributing to further rise of populist 
and right-wing parties, when keeping in mind other legacies from communism and people’s 
expectations. Governance has had an unsteady progress according to Nations in Transit. 
Governance have been marked by many shifts from one victorious party to another, and 
strangely enough, it seems to have changed, according to Nations in Transit, around 2004, 
where their scores became worse. Many authors seem to agree with the fact, that governance 
was especially weak after the transition. And those who know their political development, 
including the development of party systems in these countries, noticed that there was a 
personalization of politics: past splits and more personal conflicts has been the result of 
politics, rather than of political options. At least through the 1990s, most parties in the 
countries did not have distinct platforms, but distinct leaders, who had (and still have) a 
campaign against “them” (those involved in the communist regime). Shortly after the 
transition, the heroes of the revolution lost their heroic stature once they became rulers; they 
became a new “them”, according to Jane L. Curry (1995:68). Two examples are Lech Wałęsa 
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and Václav Havel. The main point is that politics have often not been marked by compromise 
and coalition building, but by increasingly sharp and radicalized ideological statements. The 
normal day to day issues of economic and social characters, a concern for the population, 
have often been rather ignored by the elite. The public has not been first priority for these 
policy makers (1995:68, 75), and I strongly believe that this is still the case. I have several 
times mentioned the rise of populist and right-wing parties in all of these countries, and Jane 
Curry confirms that a “populist democracy” is one of the forms of government that may result 
from historical legacies, such as communism, the transformation process and the imposition 
of democratic institutions (Curry 1995:81). Along the 
same lines Lizal & Kočenda (2000) wrote in their 
article about the political elite in the Czech Republic, 
claiming that the political administration does not attract 
particular skilled people: Wolchik confirms this theory, 
saying that the communist period left its imprint of the 
country’s new political elite. One had to replace large 
number of officials, but especially in the beginning, it 
was difficult both to find enough appropriate candidates 
who were willing to serve as government officials. 
Changing personnel in other areas, such as the judiciary, 
also went rather slowly. And the problem is that these 
officials continued on to the same attitudes they had in 
communist times, where citizens’ participation is 
concerned (Wolchik 1995:171).   
A potential problem is obviously the social issues 
that communism has left unresolved: the levels of 
inequality have risen to a high level since the transition, 
and are an indicator for their social development. As 
already mentioned, this is a new situation for people in 
these countries, keeping in mind that people were more 
equal in the communist period. Hungary has had the 
highest increase in inequality, and according to the 
World Bank Report, Poland and Hungary are among 
the worst countries in Europe, when it comes to general 
Figure 3.1 Income inequality (Zaidi 
2009:9) 
Figure 3.0 Average income level (Zaidi 
2009:9) 
39 
 
income inequality (Zaidi 2009:9), which we can see in Figure 3.1. The situation is far better in 
the Czech Republic, and better in Slovakia. According to Figure 3.0, income levels are low in 
all of the countries, on the other hand. The proportion of poor people in Poland is also on the 
rise, and the centre-right government has so far had a stronger focus on other areas: such as 
pensions and healthcare (The Guardian 2011). 
 So there you have an explanation, for the quality of national governance - its stability, 
effectiveness, and accountably, and why progress seems to have been unsteady. 
Some authors, like Vachudova, claim that the end of communism created a vacuum, in 
the sense that it necessitated rewriting the rules of the economy and the state. Those in power 
could early on benefit themselves, even if adequate rules had already been written; these 
politicians and actors could rely on their connections, dysfunctional state institutions and 
corrupt judiciaries (2009:44). The new democracies have tried quite cautiously to keep much 
of the existing social welfare state in place. Therefore, the quality of some services has 
deteriorated, while others, for instance health care, have experienced privatization through 
pervasive corruption. A safety net (in a different way from earlier), still exists – through 
public programs and ties of family and friendship (Rose-Ackerman 2005:28). But Hungary 
for instance, struggled with huge social issues even before communisn, issues such as 
unemployment, and was for a long time leading in statistics of suicide and alcoholism. At the 
end of communism, there were moreover few social problems that did not affect the country, 
such as the educational and the health care systems. At the same time, the Hungarian society 
became more intolerant of both national and ethnic diversity (Volgyes 1995:192). Anti-
Semitism and harassment of gypsies were examples. And today, the recent high support of 
Jobbik, illustrates that this is still an issue. 
So far I have found that legacies contribute strongly to explain the unsteady progress, or 
even risk of backsliding in these systems, with continuation of old negative habits, and 
negative influence from the past, which seems to be following these countries like a “ghost”. 
Communism inculcated many bad habits in people living in these societies, relevant to issues 
such as governance, inefficiency, lack of political will, and distrust among people as well as 
in institutions, and people’s expectations towards the ruling elite, that would be difficult for 
the ruling elite to be able to fully satisfy (Elster et al 1998:60-1). The past can and does seem 
to shape the values, habits and thinking of people. Even a politician’s political discourse or 
rhetoric as well is important – because the past matters. And we can’t expect that these values 
and patterns change all at once.  I will return to governance under theory 3, patterns of 
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transition, because I believe these two (legacies and transition) are connected when it comes 
to governance.  
3.3 Theory 2: Strength of civil society 
Strength of civil society is the second theory I will examine in my thesis. I believe the 
strength of civil society in this region is far too weak to be able to strongly influence the 
political rulers, in order to achieve better governance, and to fully deal with some of the 
legacies from communism. Civil society can be defined in the following way: “a web of 
autonomous associations, independent of the state, which bind citizens together in matters of 
common concern” (Korbonski 1995:142). Some such as Andrzej Korbonski, even identify 
civil society as an opposition, or a second society, with domestic and political societies, that 
can contribute making a difference in the countries, and to be a second voice upon the ruling 
elite. That is exactly the reason for why I consider civil society to be important.  
Civil society is also highly considered to be influenced by the legacy of the past, and 
public mobilization rather disappeared after the transition. Patterns of voter turnout have been 
different across the countries; however, public activity is very low in these societies. Public 
space and its institutions were regarded as adversaries; so they were distrusted, and civil 
society and the idea behind it, never got off the ground. Considering the fact that civil society 
was generally undermined in the communist period, this seem to be another factor that 
contributes to the weakness of civil society today - people know their right to vote and be a 
part of public life, but people in these countries don’t feel particularly represented by the 
politicians in the first place, and political behavior in large parts of the population in Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, can be described as passive. It is worth 
mentioning that organizational membership is much lower in Central and Eastern Europe, if 
you compare it with that in older democracies and other post authoriatarian states. Surveys 
and interviews conducted in East Germany and Russia in the communist era reveal that 
distrust, and their “voluntary” organizations had a negative impact, including disappointment 
with the transition process (Rose-Ackerman 2005:35).   
In my opinion, there are basically two words that I would suggest explain this 
phenomenon well. The first one is disappointment of people’s expectations after the 
transition. The next word I will use (again) is tolerance - and the lack of it. I’ll start with the 
latter word: Its place was taken by an uncivil society, that combined rudeness, mistrust and 
lack of respect for other people’s values, behavior, national or ethnic origin, which can 
contribute to making people less willing to participate. Even at the height of Solidarity, the 
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idea of respecting individual rights and freedom was not fully developed or broadly accepted, 
by either the masses or the elites. The same is true when it comes to the notion of 
compromising, even though authors, such as Wolchik, have remarked that compromising has 
been regarded as easier in the Czech Republic than in the other three countries. Even the 
Catholic Church has had its role, even in the Czech Republic which is nonetheless very 
secular; however, the Catholic Church cannot exactly be regarded as an example of tolerance. 
But the lack of tolerance in the Catholic Church is not the basic point here, because all 
organizations outside the state can be said to be a part of civil society. The point is this: in 
Poland, the beginning of the democratization process seemed to have released a new wave of 
chauvinism, with the surfacing of reports, that contained traces of anti-Semitism, the rise of 
Belorussian nationalism, and even taunting of children who were Protestants or agnostics, for 
not going voluntary in Catholic religious instructions (Ramet 1995:360). Similar things 
occurred in the other countries as well, but again to a lesser extent in the Czech Republic. No 
one can claim that these are facts that would lead to a (more) active civil society. It also 
became more visible with the fall of the iron curtain, with more openness and the abolition of 
censorship in the society, with freedom – and intolerance and chauvinism are not very 
compatible with liberal democracy. Even since the transition, it was actually foreseen that all 
these countries would have to struggle with the shaping and stability of their new democratic 
standards, and issues such as intolerance were a serious challenge that the countries would 
have to confront in the future: in such a society, the individual is unfree in the society itself, 
and without this freedom no constitutional provision can make much difference (Ramet 
1995:454).  
Petr Kopecký describes an uncivil society, with civil society in this region. What he 
means by “uncivil” is defined by organizations with non-democratic (or right-wing) extremist 
ideas. We can consider religious freedom a natural part of democracy, with basic values and 
human rights, and which provides a register of official toleration in their societies. One way to 
consider it, is by looking at which groups are banned, which ones have more privileges than 
others (subsidies and property transfers), including the provisions in the laws that regulate 
religious freedom. Groups of citizens on the political extremes have had their influence in all 
of these countries, as already mentioned, and have done so without regard for the rules of 
procedural democracy. Far-right extremists have somewhat increased their influence even in 
the Czech Republic in recent years, forming alliances with established political parties. 
In Hungary, there is no state religion; every registered group is entitled to the same rights. 
To register, the group must have at least 100 individuals and have a charter and elected bodies 
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for both administration and representation (US Department of State: Religious Freedom 
Report 2010 Hungary).
2
 The rise of anti-Semitism in Hungary prompted concerns though, 
especially with the rise of Jobbik, which concerns not only the Jewish community but also 
Romany (US Department of State: Religious Freedom Report 2010 Hungary).  
The parliament recently adopted the “Law on the Right to Freedom of Conscience and 
Religion, and on Churches, Religions, and Religious Community. In this law, only 14 of 362 
Hungarian religious organization that were registered under the previous law (from 1990), 
will be officially recognized. Among the discriminated groups in Hungary, were the 
Methodists, Pentecostals, Adventists and reformed Jewish communities, the Salvation Army 
and Jehovah’s Witnesses, as well as all the Islamic, Buddhist and Hinduist congregations. 
Those which were not included on the list of recognized groups, had to demonstrate their 
presence in the country for the last 20 years, including going through several procedures to 
eventually get approved (Bandow 2011). Some religious communities have regained their 
status, however, after protests, and in February 2012, the Hungarian parliament amended this 
church law, to expand the list of officially recognized churches from 14, to 32. Among the 18 
groups which were now added to the list of recognized religious communities, were the 
Methodist Church, the Pentecostal Church and the Coptic Orthodox Church, and the 
Hungarian Islamic Council (Krause 2012). However, one cannot deny that decisions and 
attitudes that occurred before the law was amended, in a more positive direction, reflected 
negatively on Hungary’s democracy, and I believe it has a connection with the level of 
tolerance. According to “Religious Freedom Report” from 2010, religious freedom was said 
to be protected by the constitution, and the government generally enforced these protections, 
which is common with the other three countries, according to the same reports. However, up 
to 2010, the government’s level of respect for religious freedom improved during their 
reporting period, which shows that the new Fidesz government has effected in a step 
backwards for democracy, and tolerance in this area. There was also an increase in anti-
Semitic rhetoric during times of political friction, and economic uncertainty, where also 
extremist groups have grown in both size and numbers. 
The Slovak constitution and other laws protect religious freedom, and the government has 
generally enforced these protections. Registration of religious groups is not required; 
however, they must register in order to receive government benefits, including subsidies. The 
                                                          
2
 The government did continue to work to facilitate the restitution of religious properties that were confiscated during the communist era, and 
gave equal opportunities for all religious organizations to receive back control over their former properties. Between 1991 and the end of 
their reporting period, 3,688 properties were returned to religious organizations, by the methods prescribed in the law (US Department of 
State: Religious Freedom Report 2010 Hungary). 
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Roman Catholic Church as the largest group receives the largest subsidies. However, an 
amendment to the religious registration law puts smaller religious groups at a disadvantage. In 
order to register as a religious organization, 20,000 adult members who are citizens, or 
permanent residents, must submit to an “honest declaration” to attest their membership, 
knowledge of the articles of faith, and basic tenets. This is why there is a potential 
disadvantage for smaller religious groups. Smaller groups are able to function, but have 
complained that they have been in legal limbo with authorities (US Department of State: 
Religious Freedom Report Slovakia).
3
 
In Poland, the constitution and other laws protect religious freedom, and the government 
has generally enforced these protections. All groups that are registered enjoy equal protection 
under the law. Religious communities may register; however, they are not required to. In 
order to register, they must submit the names of at least 100 members, and other information, 
and those that are registered, receive the same privileges, such as reduced taxes. Even though 
the constitution gives parents the right to raise their children in accordance with their own 
religion, there have been reports that accommodating the needs of religious minorities are a 
problem. Even though the constitution, as in the other three countries, separates religion and 
state, crucifixes hang in the parliament, as well as in other public buildings, including public 
school classrooms (US Department of State: Religious Freedom Report 2010 Poland).
4
 
 In the Czech Republic, the constitution and other laws also protect religious freedom, and 
these rules and law have generally been enforced. About 32 percent of the Czech population 
claim to believe in God, and only 38 percent view themselves as atheists. Only 25 percent of 
citizens under the age of 29 profess to believe in God (2009 numbers). All groups that are 
registered receive tax benefits, and subsidies in the country. There is a two-tier system of 
registration, where the first (lower) tier must have at least 300 adult members permanently 
                                                          
3 Some property restitution cases have remained unresolved. Many properties taken during communism were returned in existing 
condition. However, there were many churches, synagogues and cemeteries that were in generally poor condition. The law of restitution from 
1993 did not provide compensation for damage done during communism, and religious groups often lacked funds (US Department of State: 
Religious Freedom Report Slovakia).  
 
4 The government has continued to work with both local and international religious groups, for property claims and similar sensitive 
matters from both the Nazi and communist era. Even though the government is cooperating with a variety of organizations, problems as 
regards property restitution and preservation remain only partly settled. There was a concern for the slow pace of Jewish property restitution. 
Of 3,063 claims from the Catholic Church, 2,842 were partially or entirely concluded by December 2010. The Jewish community submitted 
5,504 claims, and by December 2010, 1,908 claims had been partially or entirely concluded. The Lutheran had 1200 claims, and 929 cases 
had been partially or entirely settled by November 2010, and 212 of 472 claims by the Orthodox Church had been partially or entirely 
concluded (US Department of State: Religious Freedom Report 2010 Poland). 
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residing in the country. They receive limited tax benefits, and impose annual reporting 
requirement, and a 10 year waiting period before it can apply to the full second-tier 
registration. To register at the second tier, the organization must also have a membership 
equal to at least 0.1 percent of the country’s population, and they are entitled to a share of 
state funding. There are also 32 state-recognized religious organizations. Of these 32 
registered, 10 of them have the permission to teach religion in state schools 
5
 (US Department 
of State: Religious Freedom Report 2010 Czech Republic).  
Let’s go into the importance of a strong civil society; to do that, I will use Robert 
Putnam’s findings, from local elections in Italy: Robert Putnam published his book, Making 
Democracy Work – Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, in 1993. Here he analyzed institutional 
development, performance, and its connection to civic community, or society. His book 
explains pretty well why it is important and necessary to have an active and well functioning 
civil society, based on an experiment of establishing a regional government in Italy. Based on 
their experience, more civic regions in the country were characterized by an active 
engagement in community affairs, by egalitarian patterns of politics, law following, and trust. 
In less civic regions on the other hand, different kinds of participation were organized 
vertically, and not horizontally. Corruption and mutual suspicion were regarded as a 
“normal”, because lawlessness was expected, and people even felt rather powerless and 
exploited.  His basic finding was that the more civic engagement and context, the better the 
government, and the less corruption there would be. Effective and responsive institutions 
depend on republican virtues and practices, and its expected better governance in these active 
civic regions. Without norms of reciprocity and engagement networks, according to Putnam, 
amoral familism, clientilism, lawlessness, ineffective governments and economic stagnation, 
would develop (Putnam 1993:182-3). Civil society may even play a role in shaping people’s 
social attitudes for involvement, self-organization, cooperation, trust, and respect for moral 
and legal standards. Civic education can be regarded as a socializing process, taking form 
through several instances in people’s life. The state can also in an active way support this 
process, by establishing suitable institutional and legal environment (Makowski 2009:123).I 
will return to this point. 
                                                          
5 The government, similar to the governments in the other countries, has continued to resolve religious communal property restitution 
problems. Most Catholic churches were returned during the 1990s, but land and forests remain in the state possession. Since 1989, most of 
the state owned properties claimed, has been returned to the Federation of Jewish Communities, by decree (US Department of State: 
Religious Freedom Report 2010 Czech Republic).  
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The general consensus has been that poor development of civil society in post-communist 
Europe is one of the important causes of the assumed lack of democratic consolidation 
(Mudde 2007:213). Cas Mudde also shows, however, that the relationship between political 
parties and civil society has been problematic, and political parties (in Western Europe) have 
historically mainly been part of civil society (Robert Putnam also considers political parties to 
be part of civil society(1993:149)), and this also contains for Central Europe, where Mudde 
give example of the Slovak National Movement (which functioned partly inside the state, and 
included political parties and movements), and Samoobrona in Poland, as a civil society 
organization and political party (Mudde 2003:159). There also seem to be regional pattern of 
interaction between political parties and civil society in the transition period.  
Interestingly, Slovakia has seen a series of small local protests, and this sort of thing dates 
back to the pre-communist period of state and nation-building. Thus, civil society after the 
transition isn’t necessarily non-existent, but it’s largely local and small-scale. This is also a 
legacy, considering the fact that friendship and neighborhood networks represented more 
meaningful forms of associations, rather than the more controlled and politicized 
organizations, during the communist era (Mudde 2003:166). The basic forms of contentious 
politics were resistance rather than protest.  
The data shown in Figure 3.2 and 3.3 are the latest results 
from European Social Survey round 5 (2010), and gives 
us a hint of their level of commitment in society. More 
examples are placed in Appendix 2. These two figures 
shows the numbers of persons who “Worked in political 
party or action group during last 12 months” (Yes v.s. 
No), and the one below shows the number who 
“Contacted politicians or government during the last 12 
months (Yes v.s. No). Based on the results shown in the 
figures, with the ones in the appendix, it seems that the 
Czechs (based on those who have answered yes) are 
somewhat more active politically among these four 
peoples, while the Slovaks are not far behind. Poles and 
Hungarians are somewhat less active.
6
  
                                                          
6
 All variables used to make these figures, are chi-square tested, as the reader can see in Appendix 6. I have tested significance upon two and 
two countries (those that seem somewhat more active, versus those less – Czech Rep. and Slovakia, and Poland and Hungary),  all variables, 
except for “Worked in Political Action Group during last 12 months, and Worked in another association last 12 months are significant. 
“Taken part of lawful demonstration” was only significant for the Czech Republic and Slovakia.  
Figure 3.2 Worked in political party or 
action group during last 12 months (ESS5) 
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Democracy can exist without a strong civil society. 
However, I would argue, following Mudde, that 
democracy can profit from a civil society that is 
functioning, critical, and even supportive, and then it 
also would need a supportive and critical democratic 
state (Mudde 2003:162). Unemployment, poverty, youth 
crimes and anti-minority attitudes are some of the rather 
unwanted consequences, of the transition. Many studies 
confirm that youth violence and aggression tend to 
swing to extreme levels, in times of social, economic and 
political crises (Kürti 2003:52). That is one indication 
that a civil society exists, but in a different (and often a 
more difficult circumstance), when undemocratic 
conditions and the lack of rule persist. A general pattern in the countries is that NGOs can 
easily be registered. People’s views on NGOs in each of the countries are generally positive, 
and they provide learning and mobilizing upon civic participation, and it seems that there are 
increases in the number of people in voluntary organizations. People in Poland even feel more 
empowered than earlier (from 7 percent in 1992 to 36 percent in 2010 according to a survey) 
and feel that they can have more influence on national matters than earlier (Wolszczak 2010). 
The NGOs’ I’m discussing here include groups such as Transparency International and 
Reporters without Borders, both prominent organizations.
7
 
Michael Bernhard wrote in 1996 that many factors which contributed to weakening civil 
society after the transition, proved to be of ephemeral (Bernhard 1996:327-8).  
I find some indications that reveal that civil society since the transition is actually “more” 
active when it’s completely “necessary”. One example is from Slovakia, at the time when 
Mečiar lost power in 1998; it is described to be partly because of stronger activity from civil 
society, with a successful mobilization of voters (84.2 percent turnout in 1998 compared to 75 
percent in 1994), and NGOs were also said to have an important role in this mobilization 
                                                          
7
 In Hungary, NGOs’ economic support (public funds) was cut or frozen, by the new Fidesz government, (partly as a result from the 
economic crisis), which makes them financially vulnerable; and that is similar to NGOs’ situation in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. 
Economic support from the EU has been very important for NGOs’ in all the countries, in order to survive. In Slovakia, Prime Minister 
Robert Fico even tried to minimize their influence before the Radicova government took over, but Fico recently returned to the leading 
position. In the Czech Republic, President Klaus had earlier expressed the view that NGOs’ should not attempt to interfere in public policy, 
and government work, which is problematic, as they work as watchdog organizations, upon legislative, governmental and judicial 
procedures. In Slovakia, civil society is in fact considered by experts to be among the most dynamic in Central Europe, and was earlier able 
to exert strong influence upon the government’s agenda. Slovak NGOs have had an increasingly important role in supporting democratic 
activities in Central Europe. In Poland, social capital is among the lowest in the EU, but the country has, like the three others, lively and 
influential NGOs’. More recently, there was a strong civil society revival in 2005-2007, when disappointment with the rule of the Kaczynski-
brothers, mobilized various organizations in protest. The turnout in 2007 was the highest since the 1989 election (54 percent), which led to 
the replacement of the PiS-administration, by an early parliamentary election (Wolszczak 2010). 
    Figure 3.3 Contacted politicians or gov. 
official during last 12 months (ESS 5) 
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(Harris 2010:190, Potocki 1998). One more recent example is from Poland, where the PiS-
government lost power in 2007 after an early election, with among the highest voting turnout 
since the transition. This was also the case in Hungary, when Fidesz came to power in 2010, 
after the social democratic government was said to have led the country into “economic 
disaster”. One must also keep in mind that governments in this region have rarely continued 
after four years of governance. Public protests have of course also occurred in difficult times, 
with people protesting against what they consider to be “bad rule”, as happened most recently 
in Hungary against the Fidesz-government’s actions, and even more recently in the Czech 
Republic. My point here is that civil society has become stronger than it was in 1989. But of 
course people participate to a lesser extent, than in Western Europe. This is (again) explained 
by legacies, and their expectations after the transition, and it is still under development. I 
would suggest that this will continue to improve through the upcoming decades. Kopecký 
claims that organizational density, or membership, does not provide enough indication about 
the actual involvement of existing members in their organizations. He suggests that 
membership can obscure other forms of participation and engagement, such as mobilization 
that is temporary, on single issues (2003:7), which again illustrates my point. 
Education 
 
Ever since the end of communism, educational levels in the countries under study have been 
rising. However, the percentage level of people with higher education is generally lower than 
the average among OECD-countries, if we take a look 
at the results in Figure 3.4. In Poland, the level of 
percentage level of people with higher education has 
risen from 9.9 percent (2002), to around 20 percent 
(2008). In Czech Republic and Slovakia, the numbers 
are respectively around 12.5 percent (2008) and 14 
percent (2008). In Hungary the number was as low as 
9.4 percent in 2001, and now it’s around 18 percent. If 
we compare that with other countries in Europe, the 
average is 28 percent, and for instance in Norway, 36 
percent of the population has completed higher 
Figure 3.4 Level of higher education 25-64 
years old 
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education (Statistisk Sentralbyrå 2010).
8
  I would argue that this is a potential problem. I’m 
aware that using education as an indicator for the strength of civil society can be problematic; 
however, my point and argument here is first of all, that higher education makes society more 
sustainable. Second of all, educated people often tend to be more active in society, are more 
often members of organizations, and even tend to have higher support for democracy (OECD 
Better Life Index-Education). Many studies tend to show that support and vote for right-wing 
parties is explained by level of education, and I suggest that it can have a connection to the 
educational system as well, based on values and the teaching people receive from school, and 
school books. One must keep in mind that civil society may refer to groups of people that 
have organized themselves to advance their own objectives, and these are not, as we have 
seen, always gentle movements. Voting and support for right-wing parties are often explained 
by dissatisfaction with the current system, and how it’s working. Considering the fact that 
extreme right-wing movements tend to grow in difficult times (in this case, the difficulties 
that came along with the transition, and not least the economic crisis), civic and citizenship 
education can have a positive effect in society. Siemienska (2006:209, 215) finds that level of 
formal education and interest (and age) in politics, are predictors of tolerance and social trust 
in Poland, based on results from World Value Survey from the late 1990s. And I want to use 
Richard Taylor’s arguments, from the book Higher Education and Civic Engagement from 
2007: I believe that the concept of citizenship education is central for the development of 
healthy politics and democracy. It can develop a “good society”, for imaging, discussing – 
and even tolerance. It is even more important than ever, keeping in mind migration and multi-
culturalism, as a result of globalization (2007:3). That is why it’s important that governments, 
and NGOs, will continue working with getting people more involved in society, and even 
continue to promote, and support higher education, and manage to deal with the fact that the 
educational system can still be influenced by its past. In chapter 7 in the book Democratic 
Transition in Croatia, Wolfgang Höpken has written about civic identify and nationalism in 
                                                          
8 If we take a look at high school degrees on the other hand, the situation is somewhat more positive. I find that in Poland, 87 percent 
of adults aged 25-64 have earned the equivalent of a high-school degree, which is much higher than the OECD average of 73 percent. 
Among younger people, 93 percent of 25-34 year-old has earned the equivalent of a high-school degree, again higher than the average of 80 
percent in OECD. In Hungary 80 percent of adults aged 25 to 64 have earned the equivalent of a high-school diploma, and 86 percent of 25-
34 year-olds have earned the equivalent of a high-school degree,. In Slovakia, 90 percent of adults aged 25-64 have earned the equivalent of 
a high-school degree, again, much higher than the OECD average of 73 percent. Among younger people, a better indicator of the Slovak 
Republic’s future: 94 percent of 25-34 year olds. That is also higher than the average of 80 percent. In Czech Republic, 94 percent of adults 
aged 25-64 have earned the equivalent of a high-school degree, and 94 percent of 25-34 year olds have earned the same (OECD Better Life 
Index - Education). The average of people that has earned the equivalent of a high-school degree is above average among OECD in each 
country, for people between 25-34 years old, which are a bright indicator for their future. Level of education is also the most important socio-
demographic factor that differentiates between the categories of the democracy-autocracy index, according to the survey, referred to by 
Siemienska in “Democracy and Political Culture in Eastern Europe” (2006: 231). Strong democrats usually belong to those groups with the 
highest level of formal education, and in that case, education is both relevant and important for democratic progress in these four countries, 
and generally makes their societies more sustainable.  Supporters of right-wing parties also tend to be low-educated.  
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East-Central and Southeastern Europe, where he claims that textbook reform was faced with a 
number of challenges in East-European post communist countries, and there were also 
country-specific challenges that set the frame for each country’s performance in this field 
(2007:165).
9
 One example is the treatment of minorities in these particular four countries. The 
Copenhagen criteria for minority rights have increased pressure on these governments to pay 
more respect to minority rights education, but the way minorities are presented in history 
teaching, however, is often inadequate. One example is the Roma in Hungary, who are largely 
ignored in textbooks. Another tendency that can undermine support for democratic values, 
tolerance, and education for peace, is the tendency for historical books to present a nation’s 
own history in terms of suffering and struggle. Höpken also emphasizes that Polish textbooks 
are sometimes characterized by such stereotypes (Höpken 2007:179, 180, 184). The Helsinki 
Foundation also claims that Poles exhibit either “aggression or excessive curiosity” toward 
ethnic minorities, and that education is the key to tolerance, for cultures and minorities, and 
that Poland does not have any multicultural education (The News 2011). Civic education has 
been forgotten, Grzegorz Makowski says about the issue with the weak civil society in Poland 
(Visegrad). Civic education have a new place on the agendas in many European countries, 
considering globalization, and increasingly political and economical issues. Especially in post 
communist Central Europe, issues related to civic education have become more urgent; with 
educators concerned to prepare their citizens for political practices, and attitudes, including 
participation. This has also required reforms of the educational system and preparations 
(Torney-Purta 2002:129). Keeping in mind what I have written about tolerance and 
nationalism in the other countries earlier, this suggests that education is relevant for the 
strength of civil society.  
It’s worth mentioning that according to a survey conducted by British Demos and 
Political Capital institute, it does not seem that Jobbik-supporters come from low-educated 
and unemployed groups. Instead the pollsters find that these supporters tend to have strong 
cultural and ideological bindings, and economic incentives are secondary considerations. 
Many of Jobbik’s supporters are also young men, and 1/5 of its supporters in the study, had 
University education (and most of them are EU-skeptic) (Hungarianambiance 2012). This 
example suggests that it is not only level of education that is important, but also how the 
                                                          
9 “Deideologization and an almost total shift in the educational objectives and the didactic principles of history teaching and history 
textbooks therefore became the main task with which all former communist countries were challenged in their textbook policy once 
communism had been terminated”(Höpken 2007:165).  
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educational system promotes citizenship. Education and citizenship have a connection with 
tolerance, political interests, and civic activity, so how these countries have dealt with their 
educational legacies, and how well their educational systems are working, is relevant. That is 
why education is an indicator, showing their strength of civil society, and keeping in mind the 
lower level of tolerance, and nationalism that lives in these countries.  
3.4 Theory 3: Patterns of transition 
Patterns of transition are the next theory I shall examine. Choices made at this stage would 
and could follow these countries, and influence their progress, for decades to come. The 
transition included a “demonopolization” of power: economically that means privatization; 
politically it means dismantling the political structures that underpinned communist rule, and 
introducing new institutions and procedures (Ramet 1995:385). The transition to a market 
economy required the institutionalization of the new economic rules of the game: regulation 
of competition, bankruptcy, private property, banking etc (Bakke & Peters 2011:15). By 
looking at how these countries have developed since 1989, politically, socially, and 
economically, one can try to figure out how these early choices have worked out, and identify 
weaknesses. These states needed to construct their political systems from scratch, and the 
leaders did in fact make heavy use of foreign and especially American expertise to draft new 
laws, and to construct new institutions (Elster et al 1998:17). There was of course a question 
of institutional design, and power distribution. CEELI (The Central and East European Law 
Initiative) can also be mentioned in this sense; it developed rule of law strategies, and 
provided technical legal assistance in each the countries studied here (American Bar 
Association).  
Each of the four countries examined here embarked on the post-communist transition in a 
different way. In Hungary and Poland, it was a peaceful transition, with Round Table 
negotiations. Key leaders in the two countries supported a gradual and peaceful transition, and 
one of the reasons why they did so, was that a large proportion of the population was in fact 
associated with the old regime. Many had been Communist Party members, and many had 
worked for state institutions. Also, the old elite gained power by obtaining some of the 
privatized state property, which in fact gave them a stake in the system, and they were 
generally not any longer interested in returning to state ownership. Essentially, they were 
bought off. Many of the former communists also transformed themselves into social 
democrats. According to Grzymała-Busse (2002) (as sited in Rose-Ackerman 2005:27), this 
tendency was not general; this occurred only (immediately) in Poland and Hungary, after the 
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regime change. For instance, teachers were not fired on basis of membership in the 
Communist Party. Some say that these communist dignitaries were the first to benefit from 
the privatization process, which was launched at the beginning of 1990s, and former 
communists easily became capitalists, while many Solidarity members slid into poverty, after 
the fall of communism (Maksymiuk 2009). I will return to privatization later. 
Early after the transition, problems were starting to surface.  In Hungary, inflation 
reached 30 percent in the early 1990s, it was short of energy-supplies, and thousands of 
Hungarians became homeless (Ramet 1995:357-8). Unemployment rose tangibly in all the 
countries, and remains an issue in all of the countries, but to a less extent in the Czech 
Republic. In the middle of the 1990s, Sabrina Ramet placed the Czech Republic and Hungary 
in “first category countries”, which had seemingly laid a sturdy basis for a functioning 
pluralist system, with constitutional safeguards for democratic procedure, and a degree of 
trust in public institutions. In the second category, she placed Poland and Slovakia. In this 
category, political personalities have loomed larger than political institutions, and peoples’ 
trust in the institutions are weak and where dangers of destabilization were high (Ramet 
1995:386). When it comes to press freedom, in the middle of the 1990s, freedom was best 
assured in the Czech Republic and Hungary, while only partially achieved in Poland, and 
more shaky in Slovakia (Ramet 1995:395).  
Legitimation is one important word, for a successful accomplishment of their tasks. One 
of the challenges here relates to holdovers from the communist past. However, no matter how 
much politicians appealed to democratic values and nationalism – the ruling elites often use a 
different way to achieve legitimation, and that was by manipulating memories of the past 
(Ramet 1995:398).  The rules of the political transition were negotiated between leaders of the 
opposition and the leaders of the communist party. While in office, post-opposition 
governments in the four countries did put in place a quite comprehensive economic and 
political reform (Vachudova 2005:26). However, as Vachudova points out, Poland, Hungary 
and the Czech Republic went into shaping a liberal democracy, while Slovakia went 
temporarily in the direction of illiberal democracy. The lack of competition allowed Slovak 
opportunists to take power, and control the new institutions - illiberal democracy took hold. 
Elections were mostly free and fair, but there was little interest in creating institutions that 
were shaped in a liberal democratic way. The second government, headed by Mečiar (Prime 
Minister between 1993 and 1998), stopped privatization, and transformed it into a rather 
corrupt system. The opposition in the country was too weak to make a particular influence, 
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until 1998 (Vachudova 2005:38, 44). So the Czech Republic and Hungary had the best 
progress during the 1990s, Poland somewhat less, and Slovakia was doing worst. 
Speaking of the challenges the new elite had, however, some of them was to deal with 
legacies from the past, and the (negative) consequences of transformation, facing all the 
changes that had to be made for the transformation to be successful post-communist political - 
the new elite could be regarded as rather weak (Elster et al 1998:18). The legitimation of the 
new system has perhaps been one of the most difficult issues in each of these countries. 
Without strong legitimation of the new system, the countries are vulnerable to backslides or 
unsteadiness. Old democracies have a deeply rooted consensus on values and procedures, 
while new ones don’t. A new democracy must, like older 
democracies, also be capable of meeting the challenges 
with right-wing and populist parties, nationalism, neo-
fascism, and religious bigotry, and manage to deal with 
corruption, chaos, crime and social violence (Ramet 
1995:455). The greatest threat to a stable democracy, 
as I have been trying to show, will probably come from 
the right. Democratic governance will and would also 
have to struggle with the more negative sides of the 
transition – such as higher unemployment, lack of 
trust, higher differences among people etc.  If they 
won’t be capable of resolving those issues in a 
satisfactory way, a vicious circle can occur.  
More than two decades have gone since the 
transition. The European Bank publishes each year a 
Transition Report, which tries to track down post-
communist countries’ developments since the 
transition and people’s vision on their current 
development. How do people consider the political 
situation pre and post transition? According to Figure 
3.5 and 3.6 from Transition Report 2007, there is one 
country that stands out, and that is Hungary; almost 80 
percent of the Hungarians included in the survey 
considered the political situation to be worse (2007), 
Figure 3.5 Political situation (Transition Report 
2007) 
Figure 3.6 Satisfied with life (Transition Report 2007) 
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than it had been in 1989. Only 10 percent consider it to be the opposite. In the Czech 
Republic, the numbers are more split; there is almost a 50/50 distribution between worse and 
better than in 1989, with about 40 percent for each category. In Slovakia, almost 40 percent 
think the situation is worse, while about 20 percent think it is better. In Poland, about 30 
percent thinks the political situation is better than in 1989, while more than 40 percent thinks 
the opposite. This gives us an indication how people regard the transition process, but in 
Hungary, the result was most dramatic. In the same report, there is a much higher 
dissatisfaction with “life now” in Hungary, compared to the three other countries. In Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia, people are generally much more satisfied with life now. 
People’s view about living standards, before and after 1989, is also much more negative in 
Hungary, compared to the other three, where higher proportion of respondents gave positive 
assessments (around 50 percent versus a bit above 20 percent in Hungary). However, at least 
on the more positive side, there was an agreement in 2007 among the four countries that 
democracy is better than authoritarism, and there is a much higher pro market  attitude vs. 
planned economy (Transition Report 2007:49-52). However, those who support Fidesz and 
(especially) Jobbik today can probably not be said to consider democracy to be better than 
authoritarism. I have also viewed the Transition Report from 2011, to find effects on people’s 
visions, before and after the economic crisis, which influenced the countries largely: the 
current economic crisis reduced people’s material well-being and consumption of households. 
Did it change people’s views about democracy and the economic system also? According to 
Transition Report from 2011, it did. Results from this survey (the European Bank) in 2010, 
compared to another survey from 2006, shows clearly that the number of preferring 
democracy has gone downwards. People’s support for markets has also gone downwards. The 
reader can see these tables in Appendix 3. When it comes to the blame for the economic 
crisis, many people tend to blame the West: more than 70 percent in Slovakia, above 60 
percent in the Czech Republic and Hungary, and around 50 percent in Poland, of those 
surveyed (Transition Report 2011:66).  
Let’s now at the end take a look at how people in these countries trust their parliament, 
politicians, political parties, over 20 years since the transition. From Figure 3.7 and 3.8 on the 
left (from European Social Survey 5 2010), we see that trust in politicians and parliament is 
dramatically low (the figures are based on a 0-10 scale where 10 is the highest). It seems as if 
the trust, when this measure was taken, is the highest (but not very clearly) in the Czech 
Republic and Hungary. It could be that the Hungarian results are different now, keeping in 
mind people’s expectations of the new Fidesz-government, which promised to handle 
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corruption and economic difficulties.  Trusts in politicians seem generally lower than trust in 
parliament. This definitely tells us something about how people’s expectations have been 
meet through the years, and can tell us something how people 
view their governance.  
In Poland, for instance, all governments since 1989 
have wanted to work against (unwieldy) bureaucracy 
and make the public administration truly professional; 
however, the country is struggling with old habits and 
political interests. The first comprehensive law on civil 
service operations was not adopted until 7 years after 
the transition, and since then, it has been frequently 
and hastily changed. Public administration does not 
seem to be ready to face challenges in the modern 
world, according to Krzysztof Burnetko (2009:51, 53). 
One highly problematic issue, says Burnetko, is the 
fact that no government since 1989 has breached 
principles that are seen as rather mandatory in any 
modern European states – a law on civil administration 
that would reform the state administration, to speed up 
their effectiveness.
10
  
Growing public negativity toward democracy and 
markets can combine to stall a transition, or lead to an 
anti-democratic backlash in society, and more 
authoritarian parties, that need someone to blame. The 
Hungarian situation seems to be most problematic, and 
I suggest that it can help us to explain the recent 
developments in the country. Jobbik, a far right 
nationalist party, has presented itself as a type of “anti 
                                                          
10 Even when this act went into effect in Poland, the Polish state still remained ineffective bureaucratic (Burnetko 2009:53). PiS lost 
power in 2007, and eventually, the PO and PSL-parties forced through an administration reform in 2008. The turbulence, writes Burnetko, is 
affected by the political unfettered ambitions of politicians that try to appropriate it according to their own party interests. This is shown by 
the disputes around the civil service act, and the practice for implementing it, and it has been influenced by parties at all the different specters 
in Poland. This has not been the case in for instance the Czech Republic, the authors say – where civil services is working without much 
disturbances (2009:59).   
 
Figure 3.7 Level of trust politicians 
ESS5) 
Figure 3.8 Trust in parliament (ESS5) 
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party”, according to Nick Sitter, because of the way it has eschewed the term “party”, and 
because it has criticized the other established parties for corruption, and presented itself as a 
pure clean alternative (2011:260). Jobbik even scored a breakthrough in the European 
Parliament election, back in 2009, where Jobbik’s leader cast himself as “real” Hungarian 
fighting against traitors, with the slogan “Hungary for Hungarians”. The reason for the rise of 
such parties has already been discussed; however, it seems that it can be explained by factors 
that are typical for such parties (Sitter 2011:260-1). Fidesz has denounced cooperation with 
Jobbik, but some would say that there is a possible line between the right-wing in the Fidesz 
party, and Jobbik  However, recent polls shows that people’s support for these parties is 
declining, but the opposition is rather fragmented, and support for Fidesz and Jobbik is still 
high (Norwegian Helsinki Committee 2012:9,13). 
Let’s take a closer look at the countries’ governance - there are several indexes that 
measures governance in former communist countries. Among them is the World Bank, and 
BTI (Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index. The World Bank measures every second 
year six aggregate governance indicators, based on publicly-available disaggregated data. The 
Bank’s data show the country’s performance every second year, from 1996 until 2010, in six 
governance dimensions. It includes the following: 1) Voice and Accountability 2) Political 
stability and lack of violence terrorism 3) Government effectiveness 4) Regulatory quality 5) 
Rule of law and 6) Control of corruption. Higher values indicate better governance ratings. 
The four tables can be found in Appendix 4. Governance in the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Slovakia is usually appraised more positively than governance in Hungary. To be more 
precise, in the Czech Republic, all areas go rather steadily, compared to the results from 1996. 
The exception is corruption, which had a decline, compared to the results from 1996. In 
Poland, all areas experienced a decline in particular periods, or backslide since the 
transformation, except for regulatory quality. However, all the areas seem to be on the right 
track again, including where corruption is concerned. Slovakia had a steady progress in these 
areas, except for voice and accountability (possibility to participate in elections, freedom of 
expression and association, and free media), and corruption, where there has been some 
erosion in the last recent years. Back steps in some areas occurred, such as political stability 
though. Hungary, on the other hand, experienced more of a backlash in most of these areas in 
the recent years, after having a rather steady progress. Voice and accountability still score 
well, but have gone backwards, political stability has declined, government effectiveness the 
same, regulatory quality remains steady, rule of law has somewhat worsened, and the same 
can be said where corruption is concerned. The governance of the new controversial 
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government, led by Fidesz, has not 
been tracked quite yet, but as the 
country is being said to move into a 
more authoritarian ruling, one 
shouldn’t expect it to improve a lot 
(World Bank: Worldwide 
Governance Indicators). 
 
BTI (Bertelsmann Stiftung) on the 
other hand, measures the state of 
democracy, the market economy, 
and the general quality of political 
management in 128 transition and 
developing countries. Here I have 
chosen to compare 2006 and 2012, 
to be able to find a tendency, or pattern, in the developments, two years after these states 
became EU-members, and how their process looks today. The results can be seen in Table 
3.1. The Czech Republic has continued to improve, since 2006.  Slovakia has worsened 
somewhat since 2006, but not dramatically, and the process can be called unsteady rather than 
backsliding. Poland has improved since 2006 on the other hand, and seems to have been 
improving more with the rule of the PO (Civic Platform), compared to the years with 
governance by the populist parties PiS (Law and Justice), Samoobrona, and the right-wing 
party LPR (League of Polish Families). Hungary on the other hand, has recently been 
backsliding, rather than having an unsteady progress. At the different indices, the country has 
been falling drastically, especially at the point with management index. However, the two 
countries that are doing the best overall seem to be the Czech Republic and Poland, with 
Slovakia close behind, and Hungary last (BTI 2012 & 2006 Country Reports: Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). This is what I will call an important pattern that 
demonstrates the negative effects from extreme populist and right-wing parties.  
The Czech Republic has experienced weak governments though. In early 2012, ten 
thousands of people protested in the streets of Prague, calling for an early election, and 
protesting corruption, tax rises, and spending cuts (The Guardian 2012). The country was also 
without a government for seven months, back in 2007. 
Table 3.1 
World Bank 
Worldwide 
Gov. indicators 
 
 2006  2012  
Hungary Scale Score Place Score Place 
Status Index 1-10 9.2 5 of 128 8.48 12 og 128 
Political trans. 1-10 9.4 4 of 128 8.35 17 of 128 
Economic trans. 1-10 8.9 7 of 128 8.61 11 of 128 
Management in. 1-10 6.8 15 of 128 5.47 48 of 128 
  2006   2012 
Poland Scale Score Place Score Place 
Status Index 1-10 8.9 9 of 128 9.05 6 of 128 
Political trans. 1-10 9.2 9 of 128 9.2 8 of 128 
Economic trans. 1-10 8.6 10 of 128 8.89 6 of 128 
Management in.  1-10 6.4 23 of 128 6.79 13 of 128 
  2006  2012  
Czech Republic Scale Score Place Score Place 
Status Index 1-10 9.2 3 of 128 9.61 1 of 128 
Political trans.  1-10 9.5 3 of 128 9.65 2 of 128 
Economic tran. 1-10 9.0 5 of 128 9.57 1 of 128 
Management in. 1-10 7.0 10 of 128 6.57 18 of 128 
  2006   2012 
Slovakia Scale Score Place Score Place 
Status Index 1-10 9.1 6 of 128 8.88 8 of 128 
Political trans. 1-10 9.2 9 of 128 9.0 10 of 128 
Economic trans. 1-10 8.9 7 of 128 8.75 7 of 128 
Management in. 1-10 7.3 6 of 128 6.80 12 of 128 
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Privatization (and media ownership) 
 
One of the tasks of restoring economic stability was the privatization process. However, as 
Ramet points out, it was a component of economic revival, but also highly controversial. One 
good reason was the method used to privatize, which turned out to have weaknesses (1995: 
381). One of my theories (connected to the patterns of transition) relates to how this 
privatization was done in the transition period, and the weaknesses occurred in this process, 
that has continued to follow them. One of the biggest areas of corruption in each of the 
countries today, is for instance in the private sector.  
After the transition, the countries did not entirely follow each other in the same 
privatization path: Hungary started to embark on its privatization program quite early (from 
1988), and there ensued a “spontaneous privatization”, by communist appointed managers. 
These often received favorable terms, when purchasing the firms, and many of these firms 
were sold at discounted prices to foreign investors – but at a profit to the sellers. A second law 
was passed in 1989, that established procedures for further privatization, and in 1990 a State 
Property Agency was created, to oversee the process. One important fact that made Hungary 
different from the others was that the government initially restricted the purchase of shares to 
citizens, and they agreed to finance sales of enterprises (Ramet 1995:382, 384). 
In the Czech Republic and Poland a voucher system was used, where citizens could buy 
shares in the enterprises. The Poles were somewhat more cautious and moved more slowly 
than the Czechs, however. The privatization process in Poland was anyhow not without 
controversy either - recriminations over alleged corruption, and also how it neglected people’s 
interests, were early debated. The Czechs followed a somewhat different path, and were less 
cautious. Vouchers were distributed to all adult citizens for a smaller fee, and by the end of 
1991, 16.4 percent of the economy was turned into private hands. Slovakia provided a 
contrast to the other states. There privatization started more rapidly somewhat later, and locals 
feared unemployment and layoffs (Ramet 1995:383-385).   
Privatization became remarkably corrupt in for instance Slovakia, in the sense that the 
governing elite giving out state property to just a fraction for what it was worth, to their own 
political supporters, family and friends. The problem was obviously the lack of overview, and 
that the potential higher revenue could have been used in variety of ways, from tax cuts and 
paying off debts, and even infrastructures. Comprehensive and transparent economic reforms 
proved way too costly at the time, and besides, as Stephen Holmes points out: “successful 
office holders throughout the post-communist world have no immediate interest in the 
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creation of political transparency or a rule governed polity and economy” (as sited in 
Vachudova 2005:48). And Vachudova concludes that the level of competition was important, 
with the presence or absence of an opposition to communism (2005:59). Many of the new 
owners of enterprises did not try to resell them either to more competent entrepreneurs. 
Bureaucracy is currently the problem nowadays, and hinders the easy resale of shares, with 
the result that people resort to bribes (Tupy 2006:17), which again can be connected to 
governance, and lack of necessary reforms.  
In Slovakia, large-scale privatization occurred much later. The Czechs on the other hand, 
created new wealth through capitalism early, while Slovakia maintained much of the old 
socialist traditions. However, they all had huge baggage from previous times, and many of the 
effects of privatization were not foreseeable at all. Therefore, both privatization and foreign 
investment efforts did revolve around communist legacies (Tuma 2010:13). As already 
mentioned, these privatization processes involved much scandal, and we can take the example 
of the Czech Republic. There privatization went through investments in vouchers by ordinary 
people. Only 500,000 of 16 million citizens bought vouchers in the first period, and these 
were mostly former communists who twisted the system into their own advantage, even 
though the Klaus-government (Prime Minister 1992-1997) actually wanted to return firms to 
their previous owners. However, no clean up was done in this system that was inherently 
illegal and it didn’t create equal opportunities for people. Another privatization method was 
later adopted, in order to speed up the process. This, however, hurt several Czech firms, 
because it did not invest the collected funds in the corresponding firms, but more to people 
who tried to benefit from the struggling economy at that time. Firms were plundered, and 
bribery and scandals often occurred. However, the process in the Czech Republic did push the 
country into becoming one of the leading countries in the region at this point, even at a huge 
cost. Corruption was not cleaned out of the former system, and the privatization process even 
collapsed in 1997, because of corruption (Tuma 2010:15-16).  
 Even though Slovakia had much slower progress at this point, it had the same “bad start”. 
Vladimír Mečiar had a stronger focus on Eastern Europe, and the GDP fell dramatically, in 
combination with rising unemployment. Mečiar cancelled privatization plans, and later put 
many of his friends and former communists in key positions, and maintained tight state 
control, even of privatization agencies. In a privatization campaign in 1994, he put his close 
allies in control of several firms. These allies quickly plundered these enterprises for their 
own profit, and let the firms default. A planned voucher process was postponed several times, 
and Slovakia’s economic transition did really not begin until 1998 (Tuma 2010:17-8). The 
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rapid privatization did benefit the Czechs more, however, which again proves how important 
governance and leadership is, in making good decisions.  
The most visible forms of corruption in private businesses, involves the selection of pre-
specified partners in public tenders. Bribes are also not marginal, and hiding parts of their 
activities are also common, to reduce taxes. Given the absence of a more proper institutional 
mechanism and robust protection of ownership rights, the free market can create more 
opportunities for both economic contest and manipulation (Lizal & Kočenda 2000:13,20).  
The privatization process obviously created huge possibilities for personal gain and 
corruption, which have continued. Today, those who took part in this process continue to 
benefit from the wealth they obtained (Tupy 2006:17). One must keep in mind that the fight 
against corruption during the transition was expensive, and knowledge was lacking, which 
explains the lack of proper framework and institutions, with clear laws and regulations. Given 
the reasons provided, we have a pattern that the privatization process, with the government’s 
early choices, did create some of the weaknesses in their societies that continue to influence 
their progress, even though this process was necessary.
11
 
Media  
 
Since I have mentioned privatization, I will also emphasize the relevance of media ownership 
in these countries, because of its possible influence on media independence, and ownership is 
also considered to be an issue in these post communist countries. Legislation is important, and 
to be capable of having a free media to flourish, it is important to have a proper regulatory 
framework (Nyman-Metcalf 2011:236). It is necessary to regulate media ownership, because 
owners are in a position to influence media content. The independence of journalists and the 
media rests in the hands of media owners (Hrvatin & Petković 2004:12). It is hard to imagine 
                                                          
11 However, one can in the end consider how the different privatization methods benefited these countries in the end. Károly Attila 
Soós published a book in 2011 about primary and secondary privatization in Central Europe. In his survey, he observed that the character of 
political transition had a big impact on secondary privatization, and weaker impact on the methods, and speed of primary privatization. 
Primary privatization did create a highly dispersed structure of ownership in 5 of the 6 countries in his study, but a less dispersed in Hungary. 
This was because of the outcome of the voucher mass privatization, or insider privatization, and small owners were disproportionately 
represented (2011:149) He also compared three of my four countries (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic), with Slovenia, on privatization 
and the character of political transition. He showed that the development of manufacturing and foreign trade was stronger in the Czech 
Republic and Poland, than in Slovenia. GDP growth was faster in Hungary than in the Czech Republic, but slower compared to Poland. 
Income inequalities were the highest in Poland, however. In population’s level of economic activity, Hungary was behind Poland and the 
Czech Republic. His conclusion in the end is that the Slovenian slow, cautious, consensus-seeking pattern of transition was more successful 
in at least social developments, but less successful in economic development than the model chosen by Poland, one of the more rapidly and 
courageously reforming countries. The differences between Slovenia and the two other countries are smaller (Soós 2011:157-8).  
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a free and pluralistic society where all media are controlled by the state, or if one, or few 
person(s), or one or few firm(s) controls all the media in a country. Owners of media should 
ensure editorial independence, and not be a certain mouthpiece of authorities. With the fact 
that we can look at the media as a watchdog for society, I will stress this importance.  
In 2004, there was published a book about ownership patterns and their effects on media 
pluralism and independence, that included the new member states of Central Europe. This 
book finds the following in each country: 
In Slovakia, media ownership was dealt with very vaguely during the first seven years of 
their independence. In 2000, the Slovak parliament adopted a new Law on Broadcasting, 
which included anti-concentration clauses, and ownership transparency rules. There were 
concerns about how these clauses would be enforced. There are no anti-concentration or 
ownership transparency rules for the press though, and no provisions shielding editorial 
independence from owners or publishers (Šípoš 2004:448-9). Only one nationwide TV 
channel was privatized in Slovakia by 2004, and only one of the top three newspapers are 
without a foreign owner. Media ownership in the country, however, is in several pairs of 
hands. The dominant media group revolved around Pavol Rusko, and he was the Minister of 
the Economy back in 2004. This group has been criticized for reporting in a manner favorable 
to Rusko’s interests, and his political party (ANO). Ivan Kmotrik is the second most 
important media owner, holding a 50 percent ownership share in TV Joj, the largest 
newspaper distributor, four big printing houses, a book publisher and the largest advertising 
agency in the country (Šípoš 2004:451, 453-4). State-owned media also remain significant; 
however, after 1998, the country has achieved a respectable level of pluralism, even though 
the code of ethics from 1990 remains little respected in the local media scene (Šípoš 
2004:458).  There has been little public pressure on publishers and broadcasters towards 
transparency and disclosure of conflicts of interest also.  
Hungary is dominated by market forces. There is a strong foreign ownership in the 
country, a declining political press, and growing numbers of tabloids, commercial radio and 
TV channels, a weak public service broadcasting sector, and deeply divided journalistic 
community (Gálik 2004:192). The Broadcasting Act of 1996 has many anti-concentration 
provisions, on market share and ownership, and has been changed several times since then. It 
is also important to mention that leading state officials, members of the judiciary, party 
officials, and so on, are excluded by law from being broadcasters (Gálik 2004:194-5). Public 
service broadcasting seems to bare a wasteland, according to Gálik; the first half of the 1990s 
did not bring much change to the legal status of the former state radio and television. The 
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(then) newly chosen democratic government did interfere with the daily operation of the two 
broadcasters and the excuse was that the country was facing a long transition process, and that 
democratization had been not completely accomplished. Hungarian public service media have 
been regarded as politically biased, weak economically, dependent on subsidies from the 
state, and internally divided (Gálik 2004:209). More interestingly, big media outlets try to 
avoid becoming involved in political matters, as a business policy. They are powerful enough 
not to bow to politicians, and even the political press has lost ground to tabloids as well (Gálik 
2004:212). However, in the report, Gálik finds no sign that foreign owners of political dailies 
want to interfere with the daily media practice in the country (Gálik 2004:215). 
In Poland, the current media ownership landscape is a result of two divergent strategies, 
originating at the time of the transition in 1989, with state run privatization and deregulatory 
policies that concern the print press, and helped to establish a system of press, which was 
dominated by private ownership and a model of market supply and demand. Both media 
pluralism and ownership issues are regulated by laws. However, editorial independence from 
both owners and publishers is not explicitly regulated by the current media law in the country. 
Journalistic independence is protected by a clause of freedom of speech, however. Anti-
concentration rules are described as rather soft; they tackle only come certain points of the 
problem (Klimkiewicz 2004:364).  Preventive censorship of social communication and the 
licensing of the press are also forbidden, under the constitution. However, one legacy, in line 
with my evidence above, is that the censorship and media control associated with the 
communist era, remain a visible legacy in Poland (Klimkiewicz 2004:372). As in Hungary, 
the media are dominated by foreign owners, mostly German, and small media companies also 
continue to merge with powerful owners. The Polish press has become pluralistic, but not 
really independent. There is an imprecise and non-agreed definition of this term though. 
According to a Polish journalist, reporters are censored or quietly corrupted by local 
authorities. Threats against publishers have also occurred, if they fail to publish favorable 
articles (Klimkiewicz 2004:389, 393). A study made from the 1990s, revealed that 42 percent 
of the journalists considered their freedom to be restricted, through pressure from owners, 
editors, stations and supervisors. Attempts to reform media regulation have failed for several 
reasons, such as political and economic interests, and the inconsistency of policy objectives 
(Klimkiewicz 2004:395).  
In the Czech Republic, most of the media are in private hands, and the country has no 
limit on foreign participation, or minimum ownership restrictions in general. The only limit 
on cross-ownership was enacted by the Broadcasting Act of 2001. However, concentration in 
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the media has not reached an extent that could potentially endanger media freedom or 
pluralism. It was during the transition, when there was a focus on far-reaching rejection of the 
former communist political system, which led to the unfolding of free market forces, and 
mass privatization, which included the media (Šmid 2004:142-3). Six national daily 
newspapers are under control of five owners, published in the country. No publisher occupies 
any monopoly or dominant position in their national daily press. However, the regional press 
is fully controlled by the VGP publisher, Vltava-Labe-Press, which published 45 daily 
newspapers in Bohemia, and 9 in the Moravia district, including one evening paper in Prague, 
and 17 weekly papers, and 2 independent regional weeklies (Šmid 2004:152-3). This has been 
criticized from several standpoints. But in general, the daily press is independent of political 
parties and any obvious particular interest group.  The country got a full-fledged mixed 
public-privatization system in radio and television broadcasting early in the transition. 
However, a menace for the media may result from economic, rather than political pressure. 
Not only because of the concentration of ownership, but also on the size of their media 
market, and there are smaller chances to survive in a smaller market in general (Šmid 
2004:154, 161).  
Based on this comparison, we see that the general pattern in each country, however with 
differences, is unclear or inconsistent regulations, together with some issues of ownership, 
and their possible influence on journalists and the press. This can both be explained by 
legacies, and the transition process.  
Corruption 
 
Anna Grzymala-Busse has a very good comparative chapter about privatizing the state, and 
party funding strategies. She finds that political parties often took advantage of the 
opportunities they got, inherent in privatization. If it was less regulated, this gave a higher 
possibility for state exploitation. However, if the countries had a more robust competition, and 
more state funding was regulated, access to privatization resources limited, and its benefits 
dispersed across several parties (2007:221). The financing of the parties is one dark side of 
the post-transformation democratic politics. Several scandals contributed to this issue, which 
is also one of those factors which have lowered the trust towards political parties in the 
region.  
Corruption in itself has had a big influence in all of these countries though. I mentioned 
that I regard this also as a legacy. But I will now show that it has a strong connection to the 
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transition as well, related to how the countries have approached this issue. Its biggest roots 
and scoop, I would claim, came largely from the communist period itself, because typical 
actions that we relate to corruption today were considered to be a normal way of daily life, 
and with the fact that communism did influence people’s opinions and way of thinking in a 
negative way. 
 In the transition, opposition movements positioned themselves as less corrupt than the 
regime. They were outsiders in the first place, but their explicit moral orientation is worth 
mentioning: consider Solidarity’s ties to the Catholic Church in Poland or Václav Havel’s 
moralism during the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia, for instance.  There is the fact that 
people’s focus on and clarity about corruption increased at the beginning of the 1990s, but we 
shouldn’t forget the increasing openness in the society, compared to earlier times. Kubicek 
claims that this was arguably because of the ambiguity of the political and economic 
environment, often exploited by former communists with insider connections and economic 
resources. One could not point the finger at the new political elite, and blame it for the 
corruption problems in these countries; even though it would be wrong to believe that the new 
elites have been totally clean (Kubicek 2009:330). It turns out that there has been a different 
level of political will inside these countries, for dealing with corruption in the first place, and 
even the new elites, and the “anti-corruption elite” aren’t always clean either.  
Several institutions that measure corruption levels in these countries, state that law 
provides criminal penalties for official corruption. For further comparison and trying to 
measure this variable, I have used information from Freedom House, Civil Society against 
Corruption reports, and Transparency International.
12
 T.I. develops tools to work against 
corruption, in cooperation with other NGOs and civil society. T.I. also makes an index based 
on people’s perception of corruption in society, among businessmen and analysts. One 
potential problem with using T.I’s index, however, is that it can be problematic to use its 
measures, for comparison over time, as it is based on public perception of corruption. 
However, a country’s score might at least give us an indication of how corruption is an issue 
in these societies, and how their institutions manage to handle it. Freedom House has 
measures and ratings over time based on experts’ analysis. These experts look at public 
perceptions of corruption, the business interests of policy makers, laws concerning financial 
disclosure, conflict of interest, and the efficiency of anticorruption initiatives. The reports 
                                                          
12
 T.I’s definition of corruption is as follows, and hits the spot pretty well:”Corruption is abuse of power in trusted positions for personal 
gains.” TI also distinguishes between corruption in “accordance with the rule”, and corruption “in spite of the rule”. The first one includes 
bribes to achieve a beneficial treatment which the receiver is committed by the law to perform. The latter includes on the other hand bribery 
to achieve a treatment which the receiver of the bribe isn’t allowed to perform (Transparency International). 
64 
 
made by Civil Society against Corruption, and its work, is dedicated to civil society activists 
against corruption, journalists and scholars, and they search for anti-corruption initiatives that 
have been made. They have tried to track down trend analysis of corruption in the countries; 
of what kind of corruption we are talking about, and the countries government’s strategies to 
deal with these issues.  
Transparency International’s ranking from its corruption perception index in 2011, on 
how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be, puts Poland in 41
th
 place with a score of 
5.5, Hungary on 54
th
 with a score of 4.6, the Czech Republic in 57
th
 with a score of 4.4, and 
Slovakia in 66
th
 with score of 4. The score is based on a 0-10 scale, where 0 is most corrupt. 
Even though their positions cannot be recognized as particularly good, they are at least placed 
higher than West-European countries such as Italy and Greece, and they are doing rather well, 
if compared with other countries in Eastern Europe. If we compare numbers from 2008-2010, 
Poland has improved since 2008, while corruption in Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia has worsened. Now, let’s go deeper into each country:  
According to Freedom House, corruption in Slovakia is long-standing and widespread. 
The Fico administration has been blamed, for not continuing to build on the anticorruption 
legislation passed by the preceding government, when corruption actually was said to 
improve, and instead opened new opportunities for further corruption in the country. In May 
2010, the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) found out that the Slovak parliament 
had introduced only one of its sixteen recommendations that were related to transparency of 
party financing and penalties for corruption into their criminal code. They even believe that 
the Fico government showed a lack of will to bring perpetrators to justice, and reports on 
rampant abuse of power in the distribution of public funds were later discovered, when the 
new administration was in place. Fico also attacked the media in the country – keep in mind 
the media’s desired role to be independent to inform their citizens. The previous government 
that was in power from 2010, until it collapsed in October 2011, made a clear plan to combat 
corruption as a top priority, by releasing a program of increasing transparency, and 
strengthening public control over the administration of public funds. One example is that this 
government started to publish information online, on all contracts which had been completed 
by state administration under the previous government (Mesežnikov, Kollár, Vasecka 2011).13 
However, in March 2012, Fico and his party Smer took the leading role once again. The new 
election was influenced by a major corruption scandal, which involved most of the centre-
                                                          
13
 This was also done with business contracts between the government and private companies which therefore could not go into effect until 
they had been released on the internet for at least ten days 
65 
 
right parties in the government coalition. This was revealed in a secret intelligence report, 
which showed how higher politicians from several parties had accepted bribes from private 
persons and companies, that managed to receive lucrative contracts in exchange (Dagbladet 
2012). So even though the now replaced government had ambitious ideas for dealing with 
corruption, this corruption scandal just proves that corruption continued to be present in 
Slovakia, and that even politicians who swear to deal with it, may also be affected by 
“skeletons in their own closets”. In Civil Society against Corruption’s report from 2010 
(Pawelke 2010), the author offers evidence which reinforces my theories, that Slovakia’s 
background, including the changes that came along in the end of communist rule, and the 
transition period, can explain the prevalence and extent of corruption.  
According to a corruption perception survey from 1999, corruption was considered to be 
much worse during the period 1994 to 1998, than even during communism. I would suggest 
that an increasing level of openness is one good reason for that; however, Slovakia was as we 
have seen rather backward in that period. Lack of transparency, both in privatization and with 
the use of state funds, weak civil society and public service, absence or weak legal norms to 
hinder corrupt practices, low risk, and broader public tolerance for corruption, were 
considered to be the reasons for their high level of corruption during the 1990s. Experts gave 
Mečiar a large part of the blame. Even press freedom was reduced, with a high level of 
passivity - there was almost no attempt to tackle corruption. The “Clean Hands” program in 
1995 was proposed to enact new laws, and amend those that already existed, but it was 
ineffective, and never fully implemented. The new government from 1998 brought about a big 
change however, and corruption levels declined during its term in office. The Mikuláš 
Dzurinda led government was not entirely clean, but at least it managed to pass important 
reforms against corruption, with a mix of EU pressure and lobbying from civil society.
14
 
Under Dzirunda’s second government from 2002-2006, the Slovaks also established the 
Anticorruption Department. The Parliament also passed a new law to combat corruption and 
organized crime, with stronger punishment for crimes connected to corruption. The EU and 
the World Bank also played a role in these efforts, however, more in policy transfer and 
assistance than forcing through reforms (Pawelke 2010).   
When Robert Fico took over as Prime Minister from 2006, on the other hand, the country 
was considered to be sliding backwards in this area once again. Fico and Smer lost the 
                                                          
14
 A national anti-corruption program was developed, that included a higher level of transparency, which was intended to improve the 
functioning of the judiciary and prosecution. A Freedom of Access to Information Act was also passed, that changed the relations between 
the public administration and citizens. The levels of corruption actually decreased in those areas that had implemented these reforms, while 
levels of corruption increased or remained the same where the reforms were postponed. 
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election in 2010, but are now back in governance. This certainly suggests that the effort to 
fight against corruption is very much influenced by the specific government. There is 
corruption in all the political parties, and there seem to be only small differences in the 
number of scandals in each of them. However, some parties are obviously more willing than 
others to fight corruption.
15
  
In the Czech Republic, Freedom House believes that improvement has occurred together 
with the country’s maturation through the years. Most people live their daily lives without 
engaging in corrupt behavior, but there have been complaints that there is still a need to bribe, 
or “give gifts” to expedite services from the public administration. Also, anticorruption 
measures are considered to be insufficient to fully tackle the problem, and lack of 
transparency over cases, such as major business deals, remains a huge problem. While the 
country’s highest control body, NKU, discovers irregularities, politicians tend to ignore its 
findings, and tend to call the agency incompetent. One of the problems is not just the political 
elite, but also poor performance of the anticorruption police, and the state attorney’s office 
(Druker 2011). 
The Civil Society against Corruption report from 2010 shows that despite minor 
improvements, corruption and lack of transparency remains a longstanding problem in the 
country. Corruption remains a big issue, and is something most Czechs want to deal with. 
That is also why basically every political party running in the election wants to be seen as a 
corruption fighter. However, many of those systematic improvements necessary are still 
lacking; such as depolarization and professionalization of the public administration.
16
 In 2005 
GRECO published a report, which revealed that the Czech government took measures, but 
corruption still remained a large problem, especially in the public administration. A better 
legal provision, establishing a liability of legal persons for offences, and having appropriate 
sanctions, was necessary. The ODS government has taken steps in the right direction, by 
introducing a grand strategy and fighting corruption, which involved the establishment of a 
national anticorruption hotline, operated by T.I. Czech Republic, with new penal codes and 
                                                          
 
15 More recently, a Transparency group evaluated anti-corruption efforts by parties and MPs in Slovakia. It brags of the efforts made by the 
now (former) government, and T.I. expected Slovakia’s score on rankings to improve because of these changes. However, Smer and SNS 
were ranked worst, as they had supported few legislative proposals positively (Bagin 2012). Transparency International Slovakia, before it 
ended its cooperation with the government in 2008, had a strategy of “constructive criticism”, of the government. The government was 
criticized for not implementing programs, but before that, its proposals formed the basis for anti-corruption programs at the beginning of 
2000s (Pawelke 2010) 
 
16
 T.I. argues that the biggest problems in the country are still political corruption, uncontrolled lobbying, and lack of independence in the 
judicial system and tamed public service. The areas that are perceived to be most corrupt are the construction industry, health care, police and 
civil servants. 
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new restrictions. However, it has been criticized for being much too vague, and for lacking 
concrete objectives and measurable benchmarks. As in Slovakia, the Czech government in 
1998 implemented a program called “action clean hands”. Minor changes were carried out, 
however, and few cases were taken to court (Rihackova 2010). Lack of political will and 
weak implementation seem to explain that.  
Freedom House considers Poland to have well-developed institutions to deal with 
corruption, such as the Central Anticorruption Bureau (CAB) which was established back in 
2006. The recent ruling parties, PO-PSL also created a separate office that was responsible for 
developing strategies, dealing with corruption in the public institutions as well.
17
 The 
problem, however, is that more recent developments make one believe that the anticorruption 
institutions are not free of corruption themselves, with some leaders having partisan political 
interests. The ruling elite does not always seem to take investigation and “cleanup” very 
seriously either.
18
 However, according to a CBOS survey, 56 percent of Poles believe that 
there is a political will to fight corruption in general, but only 38 percent believe the 
government has made satisfactory efforts so far (Jasiewicz 2011). 
The report from Civil Society against Corruption shows that according to a trend analysis 
from the late 1990s and early 2000, the perception of corruption has gradually deepened. This 
trend did bottom out in 2005 and 2006, and since then, it has started to decrease, or at least the 
perception of it. Poland has ratified a number of anti-corruption conventions, such as OECD, 
UN and Council of Europe conventions, but the country has not ratified the Additional 
Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention, and it is not a party to the European Convention on 
Transfer of Proceedings (Wolszczak 2010). CPI notes an improvement in the late 2000s, as a 
result of institutional reform and civil support for fighting corruption (Wolszczak 2010).    
In 2005, PiS used anticorruption as one of its prominent slogans. Many scandals were in 
fact uncovered during its term from 2005-2007, and the party even got into an open conflict 
with the health care sector employees, and doctors, accused of taking or extorting bribes. But 
during its electoral campaign, one of the Samoobrona deputy ministers in the coalition 
government was sentenced by the court for corruption. The current PO administration claims 
that its implementation of anticorruption strategy goes well, despite some delays.
19
 Corruption 
                                                          
17
 Even the Internal Security Agency (ABW) and the Central Bureau of Investigations (CBS), and police units and state prosecutors, also 
participate in this combat. 
18
 Three politicians from the PO were either dismissed or resigned from their own posts, accused of corruption in the so-called Gambling 
Affair.  The investigation that followed was described as rather confusing and murky, with a lack of transparency. The seriousness of the 
incident was downplayed, and two of the politicians were cleared for any criminal wrongdoing eventually. In a case from 2007, with the 
hearings, revealed many questions of the work of state prosecutors, the ABW and CBS. 
19
 There are some contrary views in this claim though - specifically that the PO has been way too slow to tackle the roots of corruption 
(Wolszczak 2010). 
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perception seems to be highest where politicians, health care professionals and courts and 
prosecutors are concerned. Health care is also the area where most respondents have reported 
that they had handed in a bribe (2000-2006), and statistics from GRECO, show that during 
2005-2007, there were 7,390 cases of active bribery of public officials detected. 6288 of them 
led to an indictment. The role of anti-corruption NGOs has a big impact, especially at the 
local level. However, lack of transparency, regarding obtaining public information, remains 
an issue (Wolszczak 2010).  
According to the report from Civil Society against Corruption, in the recent decade, 
governmental campaigns and projects consisted of a “program for fighting corruption”, were 
adopted in 2002. It was intended to regulate laws and regulations, and cooperation between 
government and civil society. It was implemented in 2004, while in 2005, CAB was 
established as well. Within this framework and the Anti-corruption strategy, trainings on 
ethical public service and anti-corruption were carried out. The EU and OECD were among 
those actors sponsoring them. An anti-corruption hotline has also been set up. In 2009, the so-
called “Anti-corruption shield” was also set up too, to fight corruption. It was surrounded by 
secrecy though, and the results of it remain unclear. One important point is that since 1989, 
Poland has struggled to create a professional, protected and depoliticized civil service that can 
provide corruption-free, high quality service to its citizens. PO-PSL government has recently 
managed to deal with one important anti-corruption step, and that was making the general 
attorney office more independent. However, corruption has in recent years seemed to decline 
slightly. This has also been noted by Poles: a CBOS survey showed that there were fewer 
numbers of Poles admitting that in the recent 3-4 years, they had faced a situation where they 
had to pay a bribe – it had declined from 20 percent in 1997, to 9 percent in 2006-09. This is 
also a possible indication that the frequency of paying bribes has declined (Wolszczak 
2010).
20
 
Hungary has recently fallen behind the region’s average score in T.I. The new Fidesz-
government has promised to tackle the issue, but no significant actions have taken place in 
recent years. It has also created a higher level of public disillusionment with the democratic 
process as a whole. The most affected sector, in common with the three other countries, is the 
health care sector. Party financing and public procurement are other issue areas. Recent 
                                                          
20 The end statistics in the report also proves that corruption is slowly declining in Poland, which is a bright indicator for the country’s 
future. However, the country is still far from being effective enough in this matter. T.I. said in March 2012, that the Polish anti-corruption 
framework indeed had considerable gaps, and that both citizens and leaders were doing too little to prevent it. The regulations developed 
often do not work in reality (Transparency International 2012 Poland).  
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estimates show that graft actually occurs in 65 to 75 percent of all public procurement 
processes, and a serious overhaul has, according to Nations in Transit, never been seriously 
considered. The reason is considered to be lack of public pressure, and the largest parties have 
little incentive to change a system that serves their own interests. More importantly, I would 
suggest that centralization, which seems to be one of Fidesz’s tactics, may even give rise to 
further corruption. Transparency is a basic rule, dealing with corruption in the first place. 
Hungarians openly condemn corruption when asked, but according to survey, quite a few 
would actually report it (Kovács and Hevesi 2011), which seems to be a common legacy with 
the other three countries. People consider corruption as negative, but people are less bothered 
to be reporting it, because many of them consider it to be a normal part of daily life. So 
including lack of political will and implementation, people’s attitudes in that case also need to 
be changed. 
According to the Civil Society against Corruption report, Hungary received a suitable 
legal framework that would match European standards in the accession process. However, the 
period after accession has given rise to a slower development in regulation. The country has 
legal regulations, but investigation and enforcement are lacking. Surveys show that corruption 
has been growing during the last 10 years, and until 2007, there was no single body created 
for investigation or prosecution of corruption. Corruption is also getting harder to track down, 
because more simple corrupt relationships have evolved into more elaborated and 
institutionalized ones.
21
 In 2009, a GCB survey showed that 70 percent of the population 
considers the government’s efforts to fight the issue with corruption, to be ineffective 
(Fazekas 2010). So let’s take a look at anti-corruption programs that the Hungarian 
governments have adopted during the last decade:  
In 2001, the Fidesz government introduced the Comprehensive Strategy against 
Corruption that contained regulations regarding declaring income, assets and interests by the 
MPs. Anti-corruption slogans were common in this period, among the different parties, to win 
support. In 2003 the Parliament passed a “Glass Pocket” law, for increasing transparency of 
public spending, conflicts of interests, income and assets of politicians, and some public 
servants. In 2006, a law on lobbying was passed, which spelled out regulations about contacts 
between representatives of interest and politicians/civil servants. However, multiple reports 
show that Hungary lacks a clear legal framework for regulations, which thus can open 
possibilities for corruption. In 2007, several other programs were launched, such as “New 
                                                          
21
 However, corruption in business to business happens lesser than in business to government relations, often as a result of high taxes and 
complicated procedures. Bribes for more favorable conditions will then obviously be an optimal solution. At least money spent on the central 
level is in fact often more transparent in Hungary, especially those regarding EU-funds. 
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Order and Freedom”, to coordinate and amend the law on party financing (which has been a 
big issue in the country). Anti Corruption Coordination Board was established to draft an anti-
corruption strategy. However, the government did not implement it entirely. An Anti Money 
Laundering Action Plan was also accepted. But the country lacks a law for protecting so-
called “whistleblowers”, which could help to find and handle corruption, so unclear and weak 
implementation, and lack of practice rules, still allows corrupt activities in the country 
(Fazekas 2010), common to the other three countries. 
T.I. still considers Hungary to be very vulnerable to corruption; the organization has even 
criticized the government for failing to deliver on its promises (Eder 2012).
22
 In that case, 
Fidesz ministers have so far not changed their rather “irresponsive attitude”, common to 
governments before them. After all, Transparency International found in a report, that Fidesz, 
the party that fought against corruption verbally in the latest election, and found culprits in the 
camp of the opposition, turned out to be characterized by corruption itself. More interesting is 
the fact that many of the voters seem to have forgotten the fact that government corruption in 
the first Orbán government, was considered worse than at any other time in Hungary’s recent 
history (Scheppele 2012).  
Various studies imply that corruption inhibits both productive investments, and can lower 
GDP growth – indirectly by having impact on the number of firms, or to individuals who 
choose to operate informally in the shadow economy (Virta 2007:1). The black economy’s or 
underground economy’s share compared to GDP is interesting here as well; Friedrich 
Schneider shows that the new European Union members, such as Poland and the Czech 
Republic, have a larger shadow economy, compared to “old” members of the EU. However, 
on average, South European countries have a higher shadow economy than in the Central and 
Western Europe. According Schneider’s data, however, which shows the size of the shadow 
economy of 31 European countries in 2010 (in % of GDP, based on calculation on the size 
and development of shadow economy, with Multiple Indicators and Multiple Courses 
estimation procedure), one can find that Poland has the highest percentage among the four 
countries, with 26.1 percent, Hungary 23.8 percent, the Czech Republic 17.2 percent, and 
Slovakia also have 17.2 percent (2010:1-2).
23
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 It reports that overall corruption level have remained unchanged since 2007. It is also concerned for the higher level of centralization made 
by the government, considering the fact, that strengthening independent institutions is a basic trust inside a democratic society. Promised 
changes have yet to be adopted 
23
 Schneider and Dominik H. Enste wrote in an earlier article that shadow economy is caused by several different factors. The most 
important ones are: the rise of the burden of taxes, and social security contributions, more regulation in the official economy, forced  
reduction in (weekly) working time, earlier retirement, unemployment, decline of civic virtue, people’s loyalty to public institutions, with 
declining tax morale (Schneider & Enste 2000:82). 
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Comparison of these societies today two decades after transition 
 
At the end at this point, we can take a closer general look at these societies today, two decades 
since the transition, to see their current situation. Poland is the biggest country among these 
three, with 38.5 million inhabitants (2007 estimate), and its unemployment rate is 11.8 percent 
(2010)(CIA Factbook). According to 2003 numbers, 17 percent of the population is below the 
poverty line (more updated numbers are not available). Hungary has almost 10 million 
inhabitants (2011 estimate), and an unemployment level of 10 percent (2011 estimate). People 
below poverty line comprise 15.9 percent of the population (2007 estimate). The Czech 
Republic has 10.2 million inhabitants (2009 estimate), and an unemployment rate of 7.9 
percent (2009 estimate), and below poverty line around 10 percent (among the lowest in the 
EU). Slovakia has 5.4 million inhabitants (2009 estimate), an unemployment rate of 10.92 
percent (2009 estimate), and 20 percent are below poverty line (2005 estimate) (more updated 
numbers is not available). Membership in voluntary organizations is, as we have seen, rather 
low in all the countries.  
Since the end of communism, Poland has been characterized by unstable party 
formations. Parties have vanished, been dissolved, regrouped and resurfaced - its party system 
was not fully consolidated until as late as 2005. The Czech Republic and Hungary on the 
other hand, were politically the countries in the region that had the clearest similarities with 
West-European countries (Bakke 2008:298, Sitter 2008:330). Already early in the 1990s, both 
Hungary and the Czech Republic had typical right-left systems, and their party systems have 
been two of the most stable in Central and Eastern Europe. In Poland, however, during the 
1990s, there were two blocs in Polish politics: one involving parties with a background from 
the communist regime (transformed into social democratic parties), and one based on the 
background of opposition. But since 2005, there have been two right-of-center parties that are 
struggling against each other to create government, and to win the presidential election 
(Holm-Hansen 2008:314). 
Before the division of Czechoslovakia, the Slovak parties and movements had 
representation in the Slovak National Council, and in the federal assembly from 1990-1992. 
From 1994 on, Slovakia had its own parliamentary elections. The Slovak road to democracy 
has been rather tortuous, as previously mentioned. The changes in the country after 1998, led 
to a higher consolidation, and because the nationalistic party of Mečiar was weakened, the 
right-left dimension became stronger and more visible in Slovakia, especially after 2002 
(Bakke 2006:138), which occurred earlier in the three other countries. There is a sense of 
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instability in Slovak politics, with inter-party fragmentations, where new parties come and go 
for each election (similar to Poland, during the 1990s). In 2006, it was still, according to 
Elisabeth Bakke, an open question of when the party system would finally stabilize 
(2006:147), in rather the same way as Erika Harris asks if Slovakia is a consolidated 
democracy or not (Harris 2010:197). The reason is that democracy has been slow in coming, 
and remains slow in consolidation, because of lack of consensus of its substance that isn’t 
fully developed. 
 Slovakia is described as more economically developed, than politically developed (27 
percent of the population works in the industry, and compared to the other states in the region; 
Czech Republic: 38.6%, Hungary: 30.9 % and Poland: 29.2 %) (Harris 2010:197, CIA 
Factbook). Especially the post-2006 government managed to achieve a good economy, with 
8-9 percent growth (Harris 2010:192). Earlier the country struggled with high unemployment, 
and economic decline, but the economy has recently moved in a more positive direction. The 
country had an economic downturn during the crisis in 2009, but is currently on the right foot 
again, according to available data. However, according to some recent articles in the Slovak 
Spectator, unemployment has been rising, and is higher than it has been for the last 7 years 
(Bagin 2012). Also, the Slovak Economy Ministry has reported, that in June 2011, Slovakia is 
one of the “catching-up” countries compared to other EU-members, when it comes to 
innovation performance, which is well below the EU27 average (The Slovak Spectator 2012). 
Innovation is important for further economic growth, and for improving living standards. The 
GDP per capita (2010) is $22,000, and GDP purchasing parity (2010) is $120, 2 billion (CIA 
Factbook Slovakia). 
 The Czech Republic is described by the CIA Factbook as a stable and prosperous market 
economy. The country has currently had a positive economic growth (real GDP), however, 
the Czechs will might be struggling with an aging population, unstable social care and 
funding, and concerns about corruption. GDP purchasing parity (2010) is $261,3 billion, GDP 
per capita $25,600 (2010)(CIA Factbook Czech Republic). The country also had an economic 
decline during the crisis, but has also gone into a more positive direction currently. 
Since the liberalization of the economy Poland has been a success story. During the 
economic crisis, it was the only country, among these four, with a positive GDP growth. Its 
GDP per capita still remains clearly below the average of the EU countries, but the Poles are 
on the same level as people in the Baltic States and Hungary. Since becoming EU-members, 
the economy has been boosted, and has been expected to improve even further. Low level 
corruption is one of the issues that hold back the private sector from performing full potential 
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though. The GDP purchasing parity is $721, 3 billion, GDP per capita is $18,800 (2010 
estimate) (CIA Factbook Poland).  
Hungary has also successfully made the transition from a centrally planned to a market 
economy. The private sector accounts for more than 80 percent of GDP, and both foreign 
ownership of and investments in Hungarian enterprises, are widespread. However, the country 
has had problems to service its short term debts – brought on by the global economic crisis in 
2008, together with declining exports, which resulted in an economic contradiction of 6.3 
percent in 2009. The new government from 2010 has made a number of changes that include 
cutting taxes, and imposing “crisis taxes” on several companies and institutions. In 2010 the 
country experienced a big boost from exports, and is expected to have further growth. 
Hungary’s GDP per capita is $19,000 (2007 estimate), and a GDP purchasing parity is $186,7 
billion  (Bozoki & Simon 2010:228, CIA Factbook Hungary). A table that shows the four 
countries economic development since 1991 until 2010 can be found in Appendix 5.  
3.5 Theory 4: Constitution and institutions  
My last theory is constitutions and institutions; do they contain any clear weaknesses that can 
contribute to risk of unsteady progress or backsliding – democratic instability, or perhaps 
inability to act when necessary?  Between 1989 and 1992, all four of the countries adopted 
new constitutions. The impact of constitutional change on ordinary politics is huge, because a 
constitution defines ground rules within which legislation and government are to be 
conducted. The legitimacy of the process will affect the extent to which those rules are in fact 
obeyed. Constitutions did not play an important role during communism. They were not 
meant to constrain or obligate the power elites (Elster et al 1998:63-4, de Raadt 2009:325). 
Some constitutional changes took place immediately after the collapse of communism, to 
delete references to communism, and the leading role of the party (Elster et al 1998: 70). 
However, as we have seen, the past has been dealt with in different ways in these countries. 
For instance, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are all countries with 
parliamentarian governance, but in contrast with Hungary and Slovakia which have only one 
chamber each with 386 representatives, and 150 representatives respectively, the Czechs and 
Poles have bicameral legislatures, and in the Czech Republic the upper house has 81 
members, and the parliament has 200 members, while in Poland the Sejm has 460 members 
with 100 in the Senate. The legacy from between the two world wars has been less important 
in Slovakia – the reason might be the fact that Czechoslovakia was dominated by the Czechs  
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- its centralized institutions and economy disadvantaged the less numerous Slovaks (Harris 
2010:183). A senate was never under discussion.
24
 
Poland adopted a temporary Constitution in 1992, as a result of disagreement among the 
new political elite, because the country was rather fragmented at the political scene in this 
period. A final constitution was eventually adopted as late as in 1997. In Poland (and 
Hungary), the communist constitution was amended. Constitutional ambiguities were visible 
in Poland, especially regarding the distribution of executive authority, and the 1992 “small 
constitution” was a case in point (de Raadt 2009:330). The Constitution from 1997 has been 
proposed to be changed, especially by voices inside PiS and by its leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski. 
The reason is that the constitution is said to have too much connection with the communist 
regime, and its developments after communism. The law making process is also being 
criticized, because of the relatively low level of legal culture and knowledge in Polish society, 
with the deficiency of legal services for the general public. The new law often does not satisfy 
the needs of the society, but only reflects the current expectations of the political parties and 
different kinds of pressure groups (Winczorek 2009:21). It is proposed to change this law 
making process, however, because it is heavily criticized by civil society organizations, 
journalists, academics, and even politicians. The current constitution was already as a draft 
criticized by the national-Catholic and Euro skeptical perspectives, for being “too liberal” in 
                                                          
24 The president is elected by the government in Hungary and the Czech Republic, while it’s elected by the people in both Slovakia and 
Poland, each fifth year, while each parliamentary election in each of the four countries is held every four years (Bakke 2006:141, Sitter 
2008:333).  In Poland the president has greater power; he chooses the new prime minister, he can suggest new laws, exercise a veto, is the 
chief of the armed forces and plays a higher role in the Foreign Policy of the state (Holm-Hansen 2008:318). The electoral systems have been 
changed somewhat underway in all of the four countries. Slovakia uses the Hagenbach-Bischoff method (a variant of the d’Hondt method – 
first Hagenhach to delegate seats, and then uses d’Hondt for the remaining sets. d’Hondt tends to favor larger parties and coalitions, and the 
bloc boundary is set to 5 percent (Bakke 2006:142). Since 2002, the Czech Republic has used a moderate PR electoral system, with d’Hondt 
calculation method, just like in Poland (Bakke 2008:301-2, Holm-Hansen 2008:318). Hungary has a complex mixed electoral system, as a 
compromise from the Round Table talks that contains characteristics from the consensus model and the majority model. 386 representatives 
are chosen from single circuits, and half are distributed proportionally, with a 5 percent bloc (Sitter 2008:333). Recently, the Fidesz-
government changed the election law, and the shape and size of electoral districts have been altered. The number of parliamentarians was 
reduced from 386 to 200, and the new law makes it more difficult for new parties to gain influence. Even ethnic Hungarians outside the 
country have the right to vote. Now, for some reason, winning parties will even receive extra votes, with the element of compensation, that 
earlier used to compensate the losers. Participation will make participation by smaller parties almost impossible. The new election law is 
called “undemocratic” (Norwegian Helsinki Committee 2012:7-8, Hungarian Spectrum 2011).D’Hondt: This method allocates seats in party-
list proportional representation. It slightly favors larger parties, compared to Sainte-League. When all the votes have been tallied, successive 
quotients are then calculated for each of the lists. The formula used, is V/(s+1), where V is total number of votes one list received, and s is 
the number of seats that party has been allocated so far (0 for all parties initially). Whichever list with the highest quotient gets the next seat 
allocated, and their quotient is recalculated given their new seat total. This process is then repeated, until all the seats have been allocated 
(Electorama).  
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the area of civil rights and freedoms. Allegdely, the constitution does not provide sufficient 
protection for the traditional religious values, and protection of Polish sovereignty. There 
have even been suggestions to replace the proportional representation system in elections to 
the Sejm, with plurality voting in single-member districts. The thinking behind this, is that it 
could strengthen the connection between voters and their electorate, which would make them 
more accountable and limit political parties’ influence on the composition of representative 
bodies, which is actually described as rather harmful (Winczorek 2009:22, 24). Increasing 
efficiency has also been proposed; this would be achieved by reducing the number of 
members in the Sejm and Senate. However, another weakness is that there is no possibility to 
shorten the term of the parliament by legal procedure in a way to punish the Sejm for 
insubordination. Moreover, as in Hungary, the constitution has a long list of freedoms and 
rights for its citizens - economically, culturally and socially. Even though it can only be 
regarded as a direction for state policies, for instance, Art. 65 p. 5, indicates that public 
authorities aim at having full productive employment, and implement programs to avoid 
unemployment, as well as organizing support for occupational training and advice. This may 
create huge expectations among citizens which the state cannot fully satisfy. It can be argued 
that is diminishes the whole importance of the constitution (Winczorek 2009:29).  
Hungary adopted a new constitution in 1989-90, by series of patchwork amendments that 
eventually created a new document. Basically all of the fundamental constitutional provisions 
were in fact amended. Elster et al found Hungary to be the only country where an enduring 
democratic constitution was in fact created by a non-democratically elected parliament. New 
rules for the political game were created, such as a multi-party system, free elections, a 
constitutional court, and a strong presidency. Some remnants of communist ideology 
remained, however, but not any particular important ones (Elster et al 1998:64, 70). The 
Hungarian constitution has been in focus recently, with the changes made and adopted in 
January 2012. In an article in Hungarian Spectrum from November 2009, one can read that 
Viktor Orbán was dissatisfied with the constitution of that time, and he was not alone. What 
Hungary had then, as already mentioned, was a reworking of the Stalinist constitution of 
1949. The changes made during the transition were indeed extensive, but many people argued 
that the text was a haphazard document, and not coherent. One of the reasons for that is that 
there are number of promises that could not be guaranteed as rights. For instance, that “the 
Hungarian Republic recognizes and ensures everybody’s right to a healthy environment”, and 
the right to work, and is guaranteed free choice of trade and profession. This can perhaps not 
be guaranteed in a capitalist system, and is perhaps unnecessary to mention in a democratic 
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state’s constitution. This constitution was often referred to as the “communist constitution”, 
and Orbán, among others, admitted that he didn’t have any respect for it. According to 
analysts, this is no more than a gesture of the far right, that also does not have any respect for 
the constitution, and that they want to create a new world order based on its own ideas, which 
have nothing to do with parliamentary democracy. Orbán’s objections were not directed 
entirely against those examples above, but he was “missing the soul of the nation” (Hungarian 
Spectrum 2009). The new Fidesz-government changed the Hungarian constitution effective 
on 1 January 2012. With a qualified majority, the government has pushed through a wide 
range of new laws that have the potential for wide implications on society, and institutions. 
The new constitution has raised concern, and it was said to be very speedily done, with lack of 
deliberation, or consultation with the opposition. Media and judicial independence have been 
weakened – checks and balances are weakened, the law on the central bank has limited that 
institution’s independence, and the electoral law has been changed to the ruling party’s 
advantage (Norwegian Helsinki Report 2012:5-6). 
Czechoslovakia was dissolved on 1 January 1993, and one of the reasons was 
disagreements about the constitution. However, the constitution was eventually a result of 
compromise, even by the former communists, by referring to the Czechoslovak bill of rights. 
References to the First Republic’s constitution were also used to justify several provisions 
(such as having a Senate, PR, 3/5 majority for amending the constitution and so on) (Elster et 
al 1998:73, 75).  
In Slovakia, a new constitution was adopted in September 1992, as a last document of 
several drafts. For Elster et al it seems that the constitution was put together in a hurry. They 
claim that it is rather vague, and clumsily formulated. For instance, the parliament is allowed 
to recall the president, with a 3/5 majority, and the parliament have the power to elect and 
remove executives, the prime minister and the president (1998:74-5). de Raadt confirms that it 
resulted in a strong legislature, where a majority could dominate both cabinet composition 
and legislation, and even a weak system, upon checks and balances, and unclear distinction in 
the president’s responsibilities (2009:329). Such weaknesses were also visible in Poland.  
In the book published by Elster et al in 1998, the constitutions of Hungary, Slovakia, the 
Czech Republic (and Bulgaria) were compared. There the authors conclude, after their 
comparison, that the constitutions all reveal a strong commitment of their drafters to the 
binding force of the constitutions. This does reveal a break with the past, in that case. A 
characteristic is the less important role of the judicial branch, which shows a higher trust in 
the parliament than in the courts, as defenders of rights and interests. Hungary was different 
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from the others, in the sense that it has a rare combination of numerous institutional 
guarantees, and positive rights. This has been criticized for leading to distortion of rule of law, 
and the welfare state. However, these rather new constitutions were then, according to the 
authors, weakened by internal inconsistencies. Elster et al further claim that the Hungarian 
constitution is prone to cause strife among the government’s main organs, over their powers, 
which are not well demarcated. The Czech Republic is less affected by this, however. The 
Czechs’ citizenship conception is different: the Czech concept is liberal rights based, while 
the Hungarian concept has elements divisive of the Republic, and the Slovak concept is based 
on two principles, rights and duties. Such inconsistencies can make these countries more 
vulnerable to political instability. The Czech constitution is least vulnerable, because the 
scheme of powers is well balanced, and is the only one that excludes all forms of direct 
democracy. But it can be vulnerable under major social and economic crises, with its concern 
for institutional stability and individualistic conception of civil society (Elster et al 1998: 
93,107-8).  Some experts disagree somewhat, and believe the Czech constitution also has 
clear weaknesses. One problem is that it was also drafted in a hurry, with the collapse of 
Czechoslovakia, and one of the weaknesses, is the inability of the president to call early 
elections. In various democracies, presidents with bigger power can dissolve parliament under 
some circumstances, and call for early elections – similar to what is possible in Poland, but 
this was not possible in the Czech Republic until recently, when the constitution was amended 
(2009) (Lazarová 2009).  
Finally, I can mention that all of the countries have eventually gotten an ombudsman, 
which has the task of protecting civilian’s and group’s interests or rights: Poland at the end of 
1980s, Hungary in 1990, while Slovakia and the Czech Republic established ombudsman 
offices as late as 2001 and 1999 respectively.   
Judicial 
 
By the middle of the 1990s, Hungary was considered to be the most successful among the 
four northern tier states, in establishing judicial independence, although Poland also gradually 
had retired judges who had been hired during the communist era (Ramet 1995:389). 
 In Poland, during the Round Table Talks, the judiciary was one of the most important 
topics during these negotiations. It resulted in serious institutional reforms, as well as passing 
of laws derogating various legal institutions, which were used for political control over 
judiciary. And since 1989, the judiciary has remained the least transformed branch of 
78 
 
government, both structurally and politically. In 1989, there was no attempt to change all the 
personnel in the judiciary. The argument was that it was important to keep stability in the 
system. The idea was that the system itself would eventually clean itself up, and that it was 
impossible to do anything else. A smooth transformation was done, and according to Adam 
Bodnar, history shows that this was a rather good move.
25
 The increase in the number of cases 
after communism has been problematic for the judiciary in Poland, however, up to now 
(Bodnar 2009: 32-33, 38-39). According to an analysis of daily practice of the judiciary 
shows that it is at least highly independent from political pressure. But a potential problem is 
the level of salaries of the judiciary. They were for many years underpaid, which caused huge 
frustration among judges, and the problem is still not completely solved. There has also been 
tension between the judiciary and the executive branch. Freedom House does not deny that 
Poland has an independent judiciary; however, the biggest issues are lack of efficiency, and 
delays in administering cases. State prosecutors have proceeded slowly on investigations 
towards corruption, which gives rise to concern that they are in fact subject to political 
pressure (Jasiewicz 2011:427-8). Another conflicting area is the system of judicial 
appointments. In the current practice, it is actually people affiliated with the judiciary who 
have the biggest chance to win. The NCJ (National Council of Judiciary) has been in conflict 
with the former president in appointing judges upon their recommendation. The years 2005-
2007 were difficult years for the courts, which showed that they are still vulnerable to 
political threats. Kaczynski’s party PiS claimed that it was the court that should be blamed for 
the high level of criminality in the country. However, the courts did show independence, by 
not reacting to attacks by PiS. They ruled according to laws, even in political sensitive cases 
(Bodnar 2009:35-6). Political attacks on the judiciary, together with the low level of 
efficiency, undermine the trust in the judiciary, and it’s a democratic problem. However, the 
Polish judiciary basically needs serious reforms which cost money, but also strategies and 
persistence to be able to reach them.
26
 The Polish court can be regarded as independent, but it 
has certain difficulties. There have been many attempts to reform the judiciary, but the 
reforms so far have been rather superficial, and not regarded as a priority (Bodnar 2009:46, 
49). However, its shortcomings improved drastically since the PiS-led government lost power 
                                                          
25
 All vetting of judges was made in accordance with the Vetting Law of 1993, to spell out if people in public 
functions had collaborated with the security police. New judges were also elected shortly after the transition, 
working with those from the regime. It took a long time however, before the renewing of personnel had taken 
place. 
26
 The accession to the European Union opened a new chapter for the judiciary, and it has been a success in how judges have learnt to 
interpret EU laws and operate in a multi-dimensional legal system. However, lack of competence is the reason why the judges can’t fully 
enjoy the possibilities of cooperation with ECJ (Budnar 2009:47). 
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to the PO-led government. Their violations of civil rights were rather obvious (BTI Poland 
2012:7, 8).  
The judiciary in the Czech Republic faces basically the same challenges as in Poland. 
According to a 2010 Human Rights Report by the US Department of State, Czech laws do 
provide for an independent judiciary, and governments in the Czech Republic have generally 
respected its independence. However, some political pressure has occurred in some instances, 
and judicial effectiveness remains an issue, because of complicated procedural rules, that have 
delayed judgments for years. Structural deficiencies and lack of specialized judicial training 
also contribute to that result (Human Right Report 2010 Czech Republic). BTI (Bertelsman 
Transformation Index) 2012 writes that the judiciary is free from unconstitutional 
interventions by other state institutions, and Freedom House (2011) confirms that the 
judiciary has proven to be strong against political intervention. However, the long hearing of 
court cases is a huge problem, but at least choosing of judges is transparent, and covered by 
the media. However, some sources would disagree, and claim that the judicial system is not 
completely free from political intervention, and corruption. According to a counter-
intelligence service report, organized criminals have many contacts inside the judiciary. An 
act to introduce sanctions against power abuse came into force from 2006, but there are 
several loopholes in this legislation and according to media, corruption appears to be rather 
pervasive. When it comes to protection of national minorities, the government from 2006-
2009 (the Mirek Topolánek government) created an Office for Human Rights and National 
Minorities. However, the current government from 2010 abolished this agency (BTI Czech 
Republic 2012:9-11, Druker 2011).  
In Slovakia, checks and balances are regarded as rather effective within the parliamentary 
framework. However, relations between the executive and judiciary drastically worsened 
under the previous Fico government, with its attempt to control the judiciary and limit its 
independence. The deteriorating state of these relations is described as worrying. The Slovak 
judiciary’s weaknesses are rather similar to those of the Polish and Czech judiciary, which is 
related to overload, growing abuse of proceedings against judges, and corruption. The current 
situation is described as rather complicated, and politicized. The country does have laws and 
institutions, to deal with power abuse. However, the political culture and loopholes often 
allow people in public office to avoid any prosecution. This weakens the rule of law, and was 
said to have been even more visible under the Fico-government, and even civil rights 
protection became weakened under this government. The government even got blamed for 
weakening participation, by both public and NGOs. The Slovak ombudsman has also asked 
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for a broadening of his competency, to cover more rights and freedoms of individuals (BTI 
Slovakia 2012: 9, 11-12).  
Finally, it seems that the Hungarian situation is the worst case at the moment. As I 
mentioned earlier, Hungary and the Czech Republic did best in the middle of the 1990s, even 
in this area. Now, however, the executive has a monopoly of power; checks and balances have 
been weakened drastically by the new Fidesz government. Fidesz used its 2/3 majority, and 
made rather drastic changes. One was that the government installed loyal supporters in 
important state institutions that most likely will damage 
these institutions’ independence and constitutional 
functions. The National Bank’s supervisory board 
has also been replaced by Fidesz supporters. Peter 
Holt, who was among the new prosecutors, actually 
refused to initiate legal procedures in several cases 
regarded as scandalous, under his earlier term 
during the first Orbán government. No cases have 
been initiated involving companies that are Fidesz-
related, however; the media have reported several 
such cases. The new government even tried to 
influence the judiciary. Office abuse in Hungary has 
become widespread, and was one of the reasons for 
Fidesz’s slogans against corruption during the election. Civil organizations have also been 
weakened, because both democratic and civil rights have obviously gone backwards (BTI 
Hungary 2012:8-9). The lack of transparency and accountability has not been solved, and 
Fidesz has, as we see, weakened the courts’ power (Kovács & Hevesi 2011). The Fidesz 
government has filled new positions in the constitutional court with its own political allies, 
undermining the authority of the court on several matters, like giving limitations in the 
management of the state budget. The retirement age has been lowered from 72 to 60; so 
around 200 judges have been forced to retire (Norwegian Helsinki Committee 2012:7).  
We can at the end look at Figure 3.9, with a comparison of people’s trust in the legal 
system, in each country (based on a 0-10 scale, where 10 are the highest). This result is not 
very positive, and shows clearly that people’s trust seems to be generally low, which amounts 
to a huge democratic deficit. Legal systems work according to law, and have a huge impact on 
people’s everyday life; therefore trust in the legal system is extremely important. We see that 
many have responded in the middle category, which I believe is a sign of insecurity and 
Figure 3.9 Trust in the legal system  
ESS5) 
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skepticism of the legal system’s work, but in the general picture, people are somewhat more 
positive in the Czech Republic and Hungary, while the least positive in Slovakia. The ESS5 
dataset is from 2010, and the Fidesz government was rather new then. People had high 
expectations of Fidesz, since its leaders promised to take care of corruption and make up for 
the failures the government before them did. Therefore, trust could be higher than it is 
actually now. 
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4.0 EU 
The interesting question now as is how the governments in each of the countries handled the 
goal of becoming members of the European Union, and how the EU affected them in that 
sense, especially in the four issue areas examined here, and the risk of unsteady progress or 
democratic backslide. Becoming EU (and NATO)-members was one of the highest goals at 
the end of communism. This was very clear, despite the supranational tendency, with less 
national sovereignty, and perhaps increased economic vulnerability. It had large benefits, and 
it was a clear indication of finally becoming an integrated part of the West. The benefits, says 
Vachudova, created an asymmetric interdependence that would shape these governments’ 
dealings with the EU – until they became full members, and perhaps even thereafter 
(2005:63). All of the countries started early to negotiate on becoming EU-members, but the 
transition was easier for Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic, than for Slovakia, even though 
Slovakia eventually managed to get on the right track, and became ready for membership at 
the same time as the three other countries.
27
 All the most important parties in Slovakia have 
been pro EU, while Poland is an interesting case in this matter, because despite the 
eurosceptic administration of the PiS (currently one of the two biggest parties in the country), 
and even with anti-EU, and radical right party LPR, a poll from 2007 showed that 89 percent 
of the Poles were supporting EU membership, and only 5 percent were against. This 
compared to a poll in 2004, where 70 percent were positive and 21 percent were against 
(Bakke 2006:151, Bobiñski 2007:2-3). I would assume that the growing support for the EU is 
probably the result of the EUs remittance which is starting to show results, in the cities, but 
also among farmers and in the backward regions. When Poland was led by the PiS and the 
late president Lech Kaczynski, however, he was often a source of tension inside the EU. The 
Czechs on the other hand, seem to be generally less positive about EU-membership. President 
Klaus has indicted the EU, first as prime minister, and later during his presidency, for being a 
bureaucratically overregulated leviathan, with a federalist agenda, which also threatened 
Czech economic autonomy. Public trust towards EU spiked upwards to nearly 2/3 in support 
in 2004, but by 2007, the support went down to 50 percent (Leff 2010:175). The Czechs seem 
to be more suspicious about EU-membership in general. The Slovaks, on the other hand, are 
among the most pro-EU members (Harris 2010:192). In Hungary, the European question was 
agreed among the parties at one time. However, critical stances were hidden behind this fact. 
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 In the Czech Republic in 2003, 77.3 percent of the population voted yes to EU-membership (with 55.2 percent turnout), while in Poland 
the numbers ended up quite similar (77.45 percent voted yes, and the turnout was 58.85 percent), while in Slovakia the numbers were as high 
as 93.71 percent of 52.15 percent turnout, and in Hungary, 83.7 percent of 45.6 percent voted yes towards EU-membership (Holm-Hansen 
2008:324, Bakke 2008:307, Sitter 2008:339, European Election Database Slovakia) 
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Many parties have eventually got softer eurosceptic stances, and the euro-barometer shows 
that Hungary is among those EU-countries that has the lowest support towards membership. 
The turnout in the EU membership election was only 45 percent, and the debate in Hungary 
was rather limited (Sitter 2008:328). However, it is the right-conservative parties that are 
considered as the most EU-critical. Nick Sitter explains this by reference to historical 
considerations, with a focus on national independence, identity and self rule, which seems 
familiar with what already mentioned István Bibó wrote in his book, right after World War 
Two. Recent changes in economic policy and the independence of the Central Bank have 
drawn threats of legal action from the EU (Sitter 2011:249). The EU Parliamentary elections 
in each of the countries, however, do not seem to interest people very much, when 
considering the turnout in these elections. However, the willingness they all seemed to have, 
to fulfill the acquis communautaire, shows that entry into the EU was a clear goal in itself 
(Ramet 2011:16).  
What role has the EU played, and what role does it still play, where these Central-
European countries are concerned? Is the EU in a position where it can influence the 
countries, if they experience a democratic backslide, which is currently the issue in Hungary? 
Since the mid-1990s, institutional changes in Central and Southeastern Europe have continued 
in tandem, with the processes of international organization enlargement. Changes were 
frequent and visible on both the months and years proceeding May 2004. The 80,000-page 
acquis communautaire, which contains the whole body of EU-laws, decisions and regulations, 
had been reached.
28
 
For the first five years after 1989, the EU’s influence was rather limited in each of the 
countries. Adopting Western institutions and rule was a goal in itself. Often, as I have already 
mentioned, the case with Slovakia gets mentioned, as an example that demonstrates the EU’s 
conditionality.  Tim Haughton acknowledges that the EU ensured specific changes, but its 
“transformative power” was rather limited (Haughton 2007:233). Vachudova (2005) explains 
the EU’s transformative power upon “active” and “passive” leverage. Passive refers to the 
attraction of membership in the first place, for instance the economic benefits. The active 
refers to the criteria for membership, starting with the Copenhagen Council in 1993. This 
contains requirements, for the states to be democratic, function in accordance with the rule of 
                                                          
28
 The accession process goes as following: according to article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, which constitutes the legal basis for 
any accession, the EU is open to all countries in Europe. However, every member must adhere to Article 6(1), which contains a claim on 
which the EU is based: freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights, fundamental freedom and rule of law. All countries that want to 
join must be able to qualify upon a number of criteria’s or the Copenhagen criteria. When these are satisfied, negotiations can begin. The 
accession negotiations are the cornerstone of the process, and cover adoption, implementation, and application of the acquis. They are 
intended to help the candidate countries to be able to fully meet their obligations when they join the EU (Europa.eu). 
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law, respect for minorities, having a functioning market economy etc. States that want to 
become members, must meet the Copenhagen criteria, and transpose the EU’s own body of 
law (acquis) into their own laws (Haughton 2007:235). There is no doubt that active and 
passive leverage is a suitable way of describing EU’s power. Becoming stable democracies 
and developing functioning market economies were goals valued for their own sake. Would 
these reforms have occurred, if the EU had not existed?  
First of all, there was a key motivation in these countries, in the transition period, to 
replicate Western economic models. Secondly, keeping in mind the fact that the EU’s 
transformative power may have had a bigger influence in Slovakia, keeping in mind the more 
difficult accession process the country had compared to the other countries, and had to catch 
up, while in for example Poland and Hungary, the countries went into reform paths, thanks to 
the former communists who re-established themselves in social democratic parties. In that 
case, Poland and Hungary might be said to have drawn more inspiration from Western 
Europe, not from the EU itself. Accession negotiations started in 1997, when Slovakia was 
left out. So the three other countries had already achieved having an approved progress in the 
first place.  
When the accession process started, however, there was a need to both direct and manage 
the accession process that needed institutional change and innovation. The Czechs, for 
instance, created a big raft of new institutions. However, the administrative reform was often 
slow and reluctant, and threats from the EU of exclusion were actually considered to be low. 
At some stages, the EU’s policy was decisive, especially just before the opening of the 
accession process. Criticism of the Czechs’ judicial system provoked the adoption of reforms 
in the country. However, in other areas such as minority protection, the EU had little or no 
impact (Haughton 2007:239-40). Many argue that the case with Slovakia did show the impact 
of conditionality, but some, like Haughton, disagree that this was the case though. He argues 
that there was minimal interference during Mečiar’s rule. Besides, after the Mečiar 
government was replaced in 1998, the Dzirunda government was far more enthusiastic about 
the EU. The new leaders were desperate to catch up with their neighbors. The EU (with other 
institutions) reinforced, rather than changed policy in the country. Because of criticism, the 
Slovak parliament in 2001 adopted broad amendments to their constitution, which paved the 
way for a reform of the judiciary, provided an ombudsman, and reform of the administration 
and so forth, as a response. However, Haughton reminds us that the Dzirunda government 
wanted to open accession negotiations as fast as possible (Haughton 2007:242). His argument 
is that the EU had a stronger impact in the middle of 1990s, when these countries introduced 
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policies which accorded with the EU’s demands, and that the EU was most powerful, when 
deciding whether or not to start the accession process.  
An instrument EU has used to support countries in this region, in their transformation to 
liberal democracy, was financial and technical assistance. The PHARE program stimulated 
the massive reforms that had to be made, but several political conditions also had to be met of 
democratic kind, and it included issues such as fighting corruption. The EU has provided 
financial help to fight corruption. But despite a number of tools to support the countries’ fight 
against corruption, the level of corruption has failed to decline. Why is that?  
Considering the level of corruption that was the case even during the accession, it seems 
that corruption was not an important point among the criteria’s, of becoming members in the 
first place. During the accession process, negotiations between the commission and the 
countries governments seems to be focused more on transposition of the acquis 
communautaire, and less on purely democratic issues. Administrative and bureaucratic 
considerations were more important than democratization. Fighting corruption is laid down in 
the acquis though, and candidates are obliged to accede to international anti-corruption 
conventions. But there was a limited legal framework on corruption, and the EU’s influence 
also had its limits. Eline De Ridder explains it, by the fact that the EU has struggled with 
inconsistency: one example is that it was not able to force the Czech Republic earlier to ratify 
a UN convention against organized crime, but it had not even been ratified by countries which 
were already EU members (De Ridder 2009:72-73). 
The influence of the EU has generally been described as rather unclear and vague, upon 
issues such as media independence, judicial reform, the promotion of civil society, local 
government and other areas as well: in other words, on typical democratic issues. It seems that 
these Central-European countries mostly followed their own paths in these areas. The EU did 
of course call for improvements, or strengthening of policies and institutions – but without 
any particular specification for it. In fact, the EU has never reached any clarity on what 
constitutes a consolidated democracy in the first place, and the EU doesn’t even have any 
clear and enforceable anti-corruption framework of its own. A number of instruments have 
been created, such as the EU money-laundering directive, but without clear common rules or 
standards for the countries (De Ridder 2009:74). Another point is that the EU has more 
recently let in new states which are plagued with even higher levels of corruption: Romania 
and Bulgaria. This is another example that the normal framework before, upon, and after the 
accession doesn’t seem to work well enough, and has limited institutional power. If it works, 
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it’s before the accession to fulfill specific criteria. The European Union is built on the 
assumption that its members are in fact democratic states, and ruling according to law.  
Vachudova (2009) looks at corruption and compliance in the post-communist members in 
EU. She confirms that most of the requirements have been accomplished, despite some areas, 
like the reform of the public administration, which leave room for improvement (2009:43). 
The fight against corruption is not a part of the acquis, but perhaps should have been. During 
the accession process, the fight against corruption played a small role (Vachudova 2009:50-
1).  If we follow Vachudova’s arguments, then this EU leverage should be applied well before 
the accession. A combination of EU leverage, together with domestic pressure towards the 
same goal (media and civic groups) should be a good formula for fighting corruption, 
according to scholars who have studied post-communist Europe. State administration and 
judiciary have been the main laggards on the other hand (Vachudova 2009:60). However, 
even though a post-communist country, with weak and new institutions can rely on 
multinational institutions, external pressure may prove to be difficult, as they challenge its 
sovereignty, and its own popular control (Rose-Ackerman 2005:37). Euro skepticism has been 
rising in most of the countries, and further rise might be expected. A good reason for that is 
perhaps what the EU stands for; it stands for rule of law, a single market, shared legal norms, 
and the adoption of European policies. Some of the new members believe strongly in the 
nation-state, in the sense that it is the prime framework of democratic politics, but its 
influence on EU policies is too limited (Rupnik 2007:23). The economic crisis has, as I have 
shown, created an even higher increase in skepticism about democracy and the market system, 
and people in these countries tend to blame the West. Up to the accession, incoming members 
cannot be said to have any particular choice, but to comply with EU criteria. After the 
accession, EUs leverage and accountability remain important – for continuation of complying 
with their criteria, and for further improvements and stability of their progress. That will also 
depend on EUs capacity, and power, to continue influencing new member states (Rose-
Ackerman 2005:49). 
Membership was achieved in 2004, and after membership was accomplished, as I have 
shown, their democratic progress (according to Nations in Transit) has in certain areas 
seemed to be going downwards. I also asked in the introduction if we couldn’t expect that 
with EU-membership in place, their progress would continue further, and remain steady. 
Perhaps not - these were all big goals, and some have been accomplished. Now it can be more 
difficult to make and aim towards higher ambitious goals, and high-minded plans, according 
to Charles Gati (2007:111). If that is correct, maybe the lack of skills and will among the 
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ruling elite is even more visible now, than previously. They no longer have the same 
incentives to implement reforms. The result could be unsteady progress, or even backsliding. 
This is exactly what Philip Levitz and Grigore Pop-Eleches find, that the new post communist 
EU-countries (up to 2007) are generally not back sliding, but that they have experienced more 
of a slowdown in the reform progress, of governance reforms, since the EU-transition. There 
has been a change in political stability, government effectiveness, judicial framework and 
control of corruption – their statistics show significant slowdown in these areas (2009:464). 
The European Bank confirms Pop-Eleches’ finding, that the transition countries in general has 
made further progress in both structural, and institutional reforms over the past years (2007), 
but at a slower pace than previous years (Transition Report 2007). This is also the finding by 
Ulrich Sedelmeier, who finds that the EU’s influence in candidates on the context of 
enlargement in Eastern Europe, was indeed greater than on member states (Sedelmeier 
2011:17). He admits that there is still a scarcity of studies that analyze if the new members of 
EU continue to comply with the EU’s political conditions (2011:27). Cross-national studies 
show a mixed picture, rather than backsliding.  
Hungary’s backslide is not the first democratic issue with which the EU has been 
concerned. Back in 2000 when Jörg Haider’s party came to power in Austria, some EU 
members suddenly got worried. He was the leader of a right-wing party, and then, the EU 
reacted in a way that has been described as rather symbolic, imposing “childish sanctions”. 
But later, some asked if there was anything wrong with the democracy in Austria in the first 
place. However, also other leaders, such as Jacques Chirac, had difficulties in handling the 
National Front back home in France, and Berlusconi in Italy was a man “nobody dared to 
touch”, or oppose (Mueller 2011). Many seem to be clear that there are limits to what the EU 
can do about a country like Hungary. It might be that the EU had some influence upon 
Slovakia at the start of its accession process, but it was local politicians who dumped 
nationalist Prime Minister Mečiar. According to Jacques Rupnik, the EU sets certain limits to 
populism, and mentions Austria in 2000 as an example. That case showed the EU’s influence 
- and its limits. But one must remember that these Central European countries are rather 
dependent on the EU, not the least economically. Especially Hungary will feel the power of a 
sanction of this kind, keeping in mind its recent economic difficulties, and its needs for funds. 
On the other hand, imposing sanctions is a very dramatic thing to do, because it will affect 
many more than just the politicians in the Fidesz-government, in Hungary, which is Central 
Europe’s biggest debtor. But Orbán’s changes threaten Hungary’s economic stability in the 
first place, since investors are rather worried by the recent developments. However, at least 
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the EU could do more than it does now, some would say, perhaps even his colleagues inside 
the EU. But criticizing colleagues does not seem to very common either: few ever complained 
about Berlusconi and his grip on the Italian media (The Economist 2012). So what eventual 
EU-pressure manages to do is also unclear at the moment.   
A Hungarian official has said that he is willing to negotiate the new central-bank laws, so 
the story has not ended quite yet. Civil society has begun to protest against the Fidesz 
government. In January 2012, there were ten thousands protesting in the streets of Budapest 
against the constitution (BBC News 2012). However, Fidesz still has a broad support in 
Hungary, and the opposition remains currently weak. 
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5.0 Conclusion 
In my thesis I have tried to address the following issue: The shadows of the past? What 
explains the unsteady progress at some certain areas of the reform process in post communist 
Central Europe? I decided to compare four countries in the northern tier, to check if there 
were similar or different explanations, including the risk of their backsliding in the first place. 
The EU’s role upon this has also been discussed. Principles of liberal democracy include 
respect for human rights, tolerance, and peaceful and regulated transfer of power and 
legitimacy, even independent and professional media that can criticize and “control” power 
abuse – these are basic in a liberal democracy. I find that these four countries, with Slovakia 
as a partial exception, had a rather steady democratic progress after transition; however, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic, before EU accession, were among the best examples, while 
Poland was close behind. After becoming EU-members, their progress seemed to have been 
going more unsteadily. That is, however, less the case in the Czech Republic, and the Czechs 
have less risk of democratic backslide, even though the country has been struggling with 
rather weak governments that have collapsed in the recent years, and the Czechs are perhaps 
going to experience that again in 2012. The support of and influence by right-wing and 
extreme populist parties is lower, and Czech society has a higher level of tolerance, and less 
influence of nationalism, and I believe Czechoslovakia’s interwar experience with democracy 
(in spite of systematic discrimination against Germans, Hungarians, and Ruthenes, and even 
in some ways against Slovaks), and early industrialization, benefit the country today. The 
Czechs also have fewer unresolved social issues in their society, with lower level of inequality 
and unemployment. This situation can change however; they are vulnerable to economic crisis 
like everyone else – and people’s trust in politicians, parties and institutions etc. is already 
very low, just like in the other three countries. In Poland, the country currently seems to be 
heading in the right direction. After a troubling decade through the 1990s, with unstable 
governments and political parties, and with a tendency of negative influence from populist 
and right-wing parties in the last decade, the country seems to be on the right track – Poland’s 
progress is again steadier. However, low trust in institutions, high unemployment and 
inequality, low income, low level of tolerance, and earlier and still somewhat high support of 
extreme populist and (but currently in a lesser extent) right-wing parties, are among factors 
which can explain their possibility for unsteady progress, and their risk for falling into such a 
situation.  
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In Slovakia, the country has basically the same problems, with low social trust, high 
unemployment, low level of tolerance, nationalism, and economic difficulties, and with 
stronger support than in the Czech Republic and Poland for populist and right-wing parties 
that get vote for getting someone to blame for their current situation. But currently, the 
Hungarian situation is the worst. Hungary was among the most successful countries after 
1989, together with the Czech Republic, but especially with the social democratic government 
of MsZP, and the financial crisis, this positive direction seemed to have changed. Debts and 
social tension have been growing, which has resulted in large support for the right-wing party 
Jobbik, and populists and government led Fidesz, gained large support, and still continue to 
have so. Because of the 2/3 majority the Fidesz-government received, the new government 
pushed through a full range of reforms, in the constitution, the media, the justice sector and 
electoral system. The independence of institutions and of the media has worsened 
dramatically. All these changes provoked high criticism and concern that the country is 
sliding in an authoritarian direction, with a focus on “centralization”. Nationalism and lack of 
tolerance seem to be the biggest issue in Hungary also, and the country seems to be very 
vulnerable to continuing social difficulties, which have plagued the country for over a 
century. The new government has lost some support since the election, however; the 
opposition is weak, and therefore Fidesz will still remain easily in power at least for the time 
being. The high support for Jobbik is a great concern, and some would say that there exists a 
possible connection between Jobbik, and the most extreme-right grouping in Fidesz. 
The four theories I have examined, which might explain possible unsteady progress or the 
risk for it, and backsliding, were historical and communist legacies, patterns of transition, 
strength of civil society, and constitution and institutions. I find that legacies are a strong 
theory, relevant for all of these countries, for unsteady progress, or even risk of backsliding, in 
the four issue areas on which I’ve been focusing. The past is not dead; it will take much more 
time to assess the consequences and appeal of both communism, and pre-communism to 
escape its influence. However, based on my findings, it seems that legacies have somewhat 
less negative influence in the Czech Republic, than in the other three countries. Perhaps 
because of the way they have dealt with their past, the Czechs have been more successful in 
this regard. I have in my research also found that populists and right-wing parties have had 
strong influence in most of these countries, recently in Hungary, but the least in the Czech 
Republic. And I find evidence that their democratic progress goes more unsteadily and 
backwards when right-wing and “extreme” populists are in power. The problem with these 
parties, as far as I see it, is that they play on people’s disappointment with the effects of 
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transition, with social issues, economic difficulties, unemployment etc, and manage to catch 
voters. However, even though they promise to handle these difficulties, and blame the 
opposition, they don’t seem capable of actually turning their respective countries in a better 
direction, but rather pull the countries democratically backwards. This is especially the case 
now in Hungary. Patterns of transition also explain the level of corruption, and some of the 
problems related to media independence (concerning the privatization process, but it doesn’t 
seem to be highly problematic – political interference, rather than ownership seems to be a 
bigger problem), judicial framework (lack of necessary reforms, low salaries, and lack of 
efficiency, but they prove generally strong enough not to let politicians interfere in their work 
(– except for Hungary, and perhaps less in Slovakia), and even governance (here necessary 
reforms are also often lacking, for issues such as efficiency). The privatization process, lack 
of political will (also a legacy), and lack of implementation of reform, the results of the 
transition – with rise of disappointments and the consequences that may lead to , are also 
related to the transition. Strength of civil society I find to be a somewhat less useful 
explanation for any of the countries examined here. There is fact that the social commitment 
is very low, and weaker, compared to Western standards and culture; however, I find that civil 
society interacts more in society, and upon elections and demonstration’s when it’s “strictly 
necessary”, of which I have given examples, in order to get rid of for instance bad 
governance. NGOs have become stronger in all of these countries, and have the power to 
influence further. I find some evidence that civil society is somewhat stronger in the Czech 
Republic, compared to the three other countries though. People generally also feel more 
represented now than earlier, and this give a hope that civil society will grow even stronger in 
the future. However, some economic issues in NGOs have occurred, and some government 
leaders even refuse to work with them, and cooperate, which is rather worrying. Education I 
find to be a relevant indicator, explaining the strength of civil society, and how it can develop 
citizen education, which has often been lacking in these countries, is relevant. We can speak 
of a fascistic civil society, and citizenship education, together with the role of the educational 
system, which I would argue is important. This is also my suggestion for further research, 
since I have not fully prioritized education in my theory. Constitution and institutions I find 
somewhat less to be important as explanations in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia, 
even despite some weaknesses in their constitutions. However, for Hungary’s sake, the 
constitution has huge weaknesses where liberal democratic principles are concerned, and the 
new election law obviously benefits bigger parties – like the Fidesz-party.  
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I have also finally looked at the EU’s role in all of this, and it seems that its influence is 
rather limited after the accession process. After that, it is more up to the national leaders 
themselves to do the rest, which has resulted in a slowdown in reforms, and some would say 
that the EU could do much more, especially regarding the situation in Hungary. 
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Appendix 1 
How Nations in Transit measures their four variables: 
Judicial Framework and Independence: Highlights constitutional reform, human rights protections, criminal 
code reform, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, and guarantees of equality before the 
law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions. 
Corruption: Looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policymakers, laws on 
ﬁnancial disclosure and conﬂict of interest, and the eﬃciency of anticorruption initiatives. 
Independent Media: Addresses the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of 
journalists, and editorial independence; the emergence of a ﬁnancially viable private press; and internet access 
for private citizens. 
National Democratic Governance: Considers the democratic character and stability of the governmental 
system; the independence, eﬀectiveness, and accountability of legislative and executive branches; and the 
democratic oversight of military and security service (Freedom House 2011 3 “Methodology”). 
Appendix 2 Civil Society activity (ESS5 results) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Taken part in lawful demo last 12 
months (yes or no) Figure 1 Signed petition last 12 months (yes or 
no) 
Figure 3 Worked in another org. or association 
last 12 months (yes or no) 
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Appendix 3               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tables: Pre and post-economic crisis (Source: 
Transition Report 2010) 
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Appendix 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
World Bank Governance Indicators of each four countries 
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Appendix 5  
Economic development 1991-2010 in Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic (Source: World 
Bank GDP Growth (%) annual).  
Country 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Poland -7,02 2,51 3,74 5,29 6,95 6,24 7,09 4,98 4,52 4,26 
Slovak 
Republic 
-14,57 -6,72 -3,70 6,21 5,84 6,94 4,44 4,36 0,04 1,37 
Hungary -11,89 -3,06 -0,58 2,95 1,49 0,16 3,13 4,07 3,20 4,23 
Czech 
Republic 
-11,61 -0,52 0,06 2,22 5,95 4,03 -0,73 -0,76 1,34 3,65 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Poland 1,21 1,44 3,87 5,34 3,62 6,23 6,79 5,13 1,61 3,94 
Slovak 
Rep. 
3,48 4,58 4,78 5,06 6,66 8,35 10,49 5,89 -4,91 4,24 
Hungary 3,71 4,51 3,85 4,80 3,96 3,90 0,11 0,89 -6,80 1,26 
Czech 
Republic 
2,46 1,90 3,60 4,48 6,32 6,81 6,13 2,46 -4,15 2,35 
 
 
Appendix 6 Chi-Square tests 
Trust in country’s parliament 
 
Czech Republic and Slovakia  
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 100,329
a
 10 ,000 
Poland and Hungary 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 115,134
a
 10 ,000 
 
Trust in politicians 
Czech Republic and Slovakia  
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 115,404
a
 10 ,000 
 
 
 
 
113 
 
Poland and Hungary 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 50,768
a
 10 ,000 
 
Trust in legal system  
 
Czech Republic and Slovakia  
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 113,829
a
 10 ,000 
Poland and Hungary  
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 50,104
a
 10 ,000 
 
 
Contacted politician or gov. off. Last 12 months 
Czech Republic and Slovakia:  
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 19,855
a
 1 ,000 
Poland and Hungary 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 9,898
a
 1 ,002 
 
Worked in political party or action group last 12 months 
 
Czech Republic and Slovakia:  
 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square ,923
a
 1 ,337 
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Poland and Hungary 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square ,272
a
 1 ,602 
 
Worked in another org. or ass. last 12 months 
 
Czech Republic and Slovakia 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3,712
a
 1 ,054 
Poland and Hungary 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square ,279
a
 1 ,597 
 
Signed petition last 12 months 
 
Czech Republic and Slovakia  
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 15,287
a
 1 ,000 
Poland and Hungary  
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 84,913
a
 1 ,000 
 
Taken part of lawful demonstration last 12 months 
Czech Republic and Slovakia:  
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 22,979
a
 1 ,000 
Poland and Hungary 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1,473
a
 1 ,225 
 
 
 
